- Strategic Assessment -

Three years after the invasion of Iraq, the country is a nightmare of daily bombings and shootings. Once a secular state, Iraq's constitution now recognizes Islam as the source of its laws. A corrupt dictatorship has been replaced by a corrupt government with close ties to Iran's Islamic revolutionary government. Policymaking weakness in the decision to commit are clear: willingness to act without normal professional advice; a casual disregard of prohibitions on invasions; confused and changing rationale for using force; cherry-picking intelligence for political purposes; and the lack of skeptical media. Advice was not given to ministers on the strategic pros and cons, but merely what to do if told to go (Toohey B 'How shock and awe turned to fear and loathing', FR, 18-19/3/06).

Intended defection of firsts secretary of Chinese embassy could be most important. China is known to abuse it diplomatic posts in other countries to harass those who oppose Communist regime in China. ASIO entirely abandoned its counter espionage activities after 911 - and this now provides an opportunity to fill the gaps (Toohey B 'Chen: the mst important since Petrov', FR, 7/6/05).

Australia needs sophisticated approach to foreign, security and trade policy based on continuous review, careful intelligence, sensitive diplomacy and a willingness to change course. There is a need to influence US policies (pre-emption rather than consultation) which have been badly received in Australia's region; manage relations with China; reinvigorate Japan relationship; boost relations with India. There is also a need for achievable reform of UN. The war on terror is a simplistic slogan for more complex issues. Asia is only a western label for a complex region. Cooperation against terrorism has improved Australia's relationships in its region, but it is seen as less independent of US. There must be leadership against racism and religious intolerance related to Islam. Australia needs to be seen as less assertive / intrusive in its region. The ANZUS treaty needs to be updated. More interest needs to be shown in the multilateral system (Woolcott R 'Australia needs better foreign policy strategy', FR, 4-5/6/05).

A report into Australia's intelligence agencies has showed that the numbers of staff on international postings and the quantity of information they are able to provide has fallen significantly. This results in large gaps in Australia's ability to cope with an increasingly complex international environment (Sheridan G 'Shrinking diplomacy', A, 14/5/05).

Group of 43 who signed letter monstoring the federal government include: persons who have a history of similar attacks; conspiracy theorists; those who believe UN is effective despite tyrant regimes; some who believe democracy is unrealistic for Iraq. Statement alleged that war in Iraq was based on false assumptions and deception - but no one knew whether assumptions were false, and a parliamentary inquiry found no evidence of deception. Statement is similar to whole deceptions and cynicism that has characterized opposition to war against Islamic terrorism (Bolt A., 'A diatribe of lies and deceit', SM, 15/8/04)

Statement by group of 43 exposed strategic and cultural gulf inside national security insiders. That group reflects an establishment whose intellectual ascendancy was eclipsed by 911. Australia's participation for first time in unprovoked military aggression was criticized. Three assumptions have been made: should not seek to seize territory or control populations; use of force must be legitimized by UN; and should not deploy forces to achieve unattainable ends. Group of 43 objects to radicalism of Bush doctrine of pre-emption. They argue Australia is not safer because of Iraq. ALP is now party of foreign policy orthodoxy (Kelly P 'The group of 43 is right', A, 11/8/04)

Group of 43 statement (while preceded by similar criticism of Iraq policy in US and UK) is without precedent in Australia. But statement does not go to heart of matter when it calls for truth in government. This suggests that main problem was distorting facts - whereas government used best information available. The real issue is wisdom of going to war - as sometimes deception of community can be good leadership. The group of 43 actually are chastising government on basis of wisdom gained over long period in making Australia's defence and foreign policy (Meaney Neville 'Objectors get it only half right' A, 10/8/04)

COMMENT: Beyond the 'Group of 43' ?

The above comment on the debate about Iraq and truth in government seems very reasonable. It certainly seems likely to be far more constructive to consider the strategic issues involved in Iraq (and whether a good judgment was made) rather than whether the intelligence was right and correctly used. Another credible author seemed to have reached a similar conclusion - in a different way [1].

However what is remarkable, and of real concern, is that with all of time that has passed and with growing recognition of the need to undertake the strategic analysis rather than fret about whether facts were distorted, there seems to be no evidence that anyone has actually done the analysis in a way which has even been as sophisticated as the present author's amateurish speculations. The latter are outlined in The Second Failure of Globalization? (March 2003) and were based on prior research into the relationship between cultural traditions and economic prosperity, whose implications are outlined in Competing Civilizations). The 'flavour' of this can be illustrated by a brief account of what it might imply about the arguments of the Group of 43.

Illustrating the Implications

The Group of 43 reflects the fundamental values and aspirations of the 'Anglosphere'. Unfortunately it seems that they are a long way below the crest of a steep learning curve which will lead to recognition that their fundamental values (though highly virtuous and functional) are not universally shared and are in fact key sources of international friction.

They are coming at the question of what to do about the events of 911 from the same perspective as Tony Blair originally had - ie lets talk this through and find a way to construct a world which eliminates the breeding grounds of terrorism. Blair spent many many months in 2002 traveling to talk to world leaders on behalf of the original US-led Coalition against Terror, seeking consensus - and came up empty handed as far as anyone can tell. The Second Failure of Globalization? suggests probable reasons for a failure to get agreement about how to get a solution (ie profound cultural differences in the nature of what would be acceptable as a world order).

The current world order (based on various multilateral institutions originally set up on the basis of Anglo-sphere assumptions) is fraying at the edges. Those multilateral institutions don't work properly. Failed states have been emerging; many have not succeeded economically; and frustration and political repression have led to terrorism - which is simply unacceptable if this could involve the use of WMD.

The difficulty is best illustrated by considering the Muslim world - where the core problem in effective modernization appears to be the authoritarianism which has been central to Arabic culture and influenced the character of Islam. It was presumably the lens through which the revelation Muhammad's had of something very like the Judeo-Christian message was viewed (ie God wants you to be good - but it is wrong to assume, as in the Judeo-Christian tradition, that you should have a free choice about this - goodness should be enforced). This authoritarianism guarantees that the ability to change which is critical to economic success is not present. However Islam assumes that Allah is all powerful and just, so Islamists argue that the reason that economic success has not been achieved is a lack of strict enforcement of Islamic law. This view is a kind of 'cargo cult' - as doing what they want would actually make their situation worse.

Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East who are keen to modernize have repressed the 'cargo cultists' - but an Islamist revolution has been brewing which is seen (apparently under the leadership of Osama bin Laden) to require an attack against the US as the external power which supports the local authoritarians. This is portrayed as a 'Holy war' because it would establish Islamist regimes and also because it is 'desirable' to destroy anyone who supports the liberal moral values which lead to the 'degeneracy' they perceive in Western societies.

After 911, and the failure of Blair's shuttle diplomacy, the arguments of the 'idealist' US neo-cons prevailed. Their view is based on the 'blowback' concept which emerged about 20-30 years ago in the CIA - ie that US support for authoritarian regimes (based on the 'realist' view that nothing better could be achieved) leads to more costs than benefits. The neo-cons concluded from this that the US should use its power to set up better regimes - and Iraq was the obvious test case. However one can not achieve what they were trying to do through military force, but only by changing people's values and beliefs. Now Iraq has been established as the place where the Islamist revolution and the democratic-capitalist counter-revolution are concentrated. It may well be that various Middle Eastern regimes will offer support to the US / UN sponsored Iraqi regime in order to repress the Islamist revolution which would threaten them. However there are many very dangerous alternative outcomes.

Anglosphere fundamentalists (such as the Group of 43) are focused on criticizing their current national leaders for failing to solve a problem. However they have got some nasty shocks awaiting them as they idealistically go beyond that to confront the problem itself.

Group of 43 former diplomats and service chiefs who demanded honesty in government was criticized by government as old and out of date - a view they disputed (Kerin J 'Daiquiri set spikes Howard attack', A, 10/8/04)

Future Government must give priority to truth in government - as Australia's involvement in Iraq was based on false assumptions and public deception. Saddam's dictatorship has ended - but this was not the reason given for war. Action to combat terrorism after 911 (widely supported) was diverted to unpopular action in Iraq. This was destructive for Iraq, placed international system under stress. The prestige of US and presidency has collapsed - and Australia has been adversely affected because of unquestioning support. Terrorist activity has not been contained - but has increased. Australia has not become safer, but is a higher profile terrorist target. Australia's alliance with US should be a genuine partnership, not a rubber stamp. Australian politicians must produce more balanced policies and present these in more sophisticated ways - in relation to US alliance, engagement with Asia and Pacific and multilateral diplomacy ('Challenging the PM', statement by former service chiefs, public servants and diplomats, A, 9/8/04)

After Pearl Harbour attack there were many inquiries into why it had not been expected, and also conspiracy theories. The same is happening with 911. Those who opposed war in Iraq have argued that they were right all along - because inquiries have concluded there was no sound basis for believing in WMD holdings. But there were many independent analysts who believed that it was right to overthrow Hussein - because of uncertainties involved. (Monk P 'Blame game obscures proper debate on Iraq', FR, 17-18/7/04).

Fundamental structural problems plague Australia's intelligence community. Debate about this has been obscured by irrelevant consideration of whether federal government politicised intelligence reporting. The real problem is that intelligence assessment is too often bureaucratized and subjective. This results from too many senior staff coming from policy backgrounds, rather than from intelligence career professionals. These outsiders (especially diplomats) slant reports towards desired policy outcomes - rather than being objective. Most people can become intelligence analysts - but making estimates on this basis requires much more knowledge and experience. Amateurs brought in to management positions can not undertake this more demanding activity. Such people can refuse to believe intelligence analysis which contradicts their own beliefs and prejudices. The clash between Lance Collins (an experienced analyst) and senior DIO managers (who come from administrative backgrounds) illustrates this. DIO has long been criticized for its focus on satisfying high level policy makers, and its inability to support the ADF. This results from bureaucratic mess that is Australia's higher defense management overall. These differences in experience bases, professional perspectives and institutional culture underlie failure by many to even understand the seriousness of Collins claims. The problem is not politicisation in a party-political sense but subjectivity by bureaucratic policy-makers. (James N., 'I spy a bureaucratic amateur', CM, 21/4/04)

Concerns that politics or a Jakarta lobby dictate intelligence assessments do not refect real understanding of top level policy making (Behm A 'No politics in intelligence', A, 15/4/04)

A senior officer claims that DIO suffers from military intelligence failures. He claims that DIO assessments have been influenced by government policy as much as by professional judgments. (Walters P etal 'Officer damns spy failures', A, 14/4/04)

Howard government has averted any serious inquiry into decision to wage war in Iraq - and settled for private assessment of performance of intelligence agencies. It applied no pressure to intelligence agencies to 'sex up' their assessments. But the decision to support US in Iraq was based on bigger questions than those addressed by intelligence (by bodies such as DIO and ONA). The real question concerns strategic and policy advice about Iraq from PM&C, DFAT and Defence (Kelly P. 'Caught by the facts, but PM wins the politics', A, 3/3/04)

Intelligence is often false. In Cold War era it was recognized that intelligence was game of smoke an mirrors. Saddam Hussein did have WMD program - but intelligence could not identify its capability. However acting on uncertain intelligence, coalition enforced an otherwise unenforceable UN resolution. In uncertain world of rogue states, global interconnections, ruthless crime and terror groups intelligence is always about trying to find out what you do not know. Thus intelligence is always uncertain - and thus subject to political manipulation. Intelligence agencies can not be like objective think-tanks concerned with unvarnished truth. Intelligence will always be government by political imperatives however denied (Jones David M and Smith M 'How spying puts us into a spin', FR, 2/3/04).

Howard Government exaggerated threat posed by Iraq's WMD in lead up to war. according to parliamentary inquiry into Australia's handling of pre-war intelligence. Reliance was placed on flawed US and British intelligence instead of more cautious, yet still overstated, analysis by Australian agencies. PM accepted most of report and indicated that inquiry into intelligence agencies would proceed. PM said that government made political judgment about the threat in deciding to participate in Coalition of the Willing. Committee member (Beazley) said that sense of immediate threat was largely the work of politicians. Intelligence agencies reports were partly response to political pressure. Government had suggested that Iraq had large new WMD programs - which was based on US sources derived from untested Iraqi defectors. Committee accepts that ONA and DIO were not subject to political pressure (Walters P and Kerin J 'PM's spin sexed-up Iraq threat', A, 2/3/04)

ONA should not be given more staff, but closed down so as to start again (Toohey B. 'ONA goes overboard again', FR, 2/3/04).

Government claimed that parliamentary report in intelligence about Iraq's WMD showed that it did not 'sex up' the intelligence - but passages in report suggests that it did. Proposed inquiry into intelligence is formula for white-wash. There needs to be a public inquiry into performance by intelligence agencies - and into how government used that intelligence (Barker G. 'Howard fails intelligence test', FR, 2/3/04).

Howard Government's public presentation of threat posed by Hussein's WMD did not match the more cautious assessments provided by key intelligence agencies. There was conflict between the assessments of ONA and DIO. ONA's analytical capability was limited. (Walters P. 'Findings expose conflict on WMD', A, 2/3/04)

Parliament has been given three complex messages about Iraq. The war was not driven by intelligence. It involved a serious intelligence failure. Government's judgments on Iraq were not shared by intelligence agencies. There is a serious problem in security / political decision making process. There is no suggestion that government 'sexed up' the intelligence.  Lessons are (a) intelligence agencies know war was not based on their intelligence - and that US was committed to action against Iraq independent of WMD. (b) Howard government's case based on WMD was more moderate than in UK / US and (c) government's case for war that Iraq's WMD were grave threat was not supported by intelligence. Government's views were based on UK / US material. (e) Australian intelligence agencies rely on others for 97% of their information (Kelly P., 'Double failure over case for war', A, 2/3/04)

Australia's agencies were more moderate in assessing intelligence of Iraq's WMD than those in US. But they none-the-less overstated the issues - according to Jull report. Public confidence in value of intelligence is at stake.  (Walters P. 'Skeptical approach proved more accurate', A, 2/3/04)

Joint parliamentary committee report on intelligence and Iraq rightly pointed the finger at intelligence agencies (especially ONA). But they were not always wrong. From 1998-2002 they argued that Iraq's WMD ambitions were disjointed and contained. US Secretary of State said this in February 2001. But by 2002 the climate had changed. Partial intelligence was relied upon to build a case. PM has selectively used intelligence quotes previously - in children-overboard case. But the government's failure to acknowledge the many instances where intelligence advice was qualified that is most worrying. A royal commission is required to resolve this (Ungerer Carl, 'Iraq intelligence driven by politics', A, 2/3/04)

The WMD report could be interpreted in many ways. PM noted that Australia's assessment was more moderate than in UK / US. But (despite his claims) it did show that his rhetoric had not been matched by intelligence. Beazley pointed out that politicians (not intelligence agencies) made the decision to go to war. PM still has no doubt about justification of war - despite changes in the reasons. And Labor foreign affairs spokesman often said that there was no doubt about Iraq's WMD - based on intelligence. Labor's Robert Ray was right to point out that too often political leaders simplify. (Price M 'All sides take succor from blots of war', A, 2/3/04)

Intelligence analysts are subject not only to political pressures but to even more subtle pressure of knowing others' expectations (Daly P. 'The first casualty', Bulletin. 24/2/04)

UN intelligence about Iraq's WMD situation was better than any others (Zakaria F 'We had good intel - The UN's', Bulletin, 10/2/04)