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 Beyond Populist Rhetoric (email sent 27/3/11) 
Michael McKenna, 
The Australian 
Re: 
Campbell Newman has Queensland’s public sector in his sights, The 
Australian, 26-27/3/11 
Your article referred to proposals by Campbell Newman for 
resolving Queensland’s economic and governmental woes. I should like to suggest 
for your consideration that (so far) his solutions seem unconvincing. Attention 
most needs to be given to raising the quality of the economy (as reflected in 
its productivity, and thus the strength of the tax base) and of policy advice 
(from both the community and the public service). Campbell Newman’s proposals 
(if they are as your article suggested) would not boost the knowledge, skills 
and experience that underpin either Queensland’s economy or public policy any 
more than others’ efforts have done.   
My interpretation of your article: 
Campbell Newman would cut Queensland’s public service, outsource management of 
government assets and hand more power to councils – in an effort to boost 
infrastructure spending and revive the state economy. His focus would be on the 
economy.  The
ALP (under Bligh and Beattie) is seen to have allowed the bureaucracy to get 
out of control. Newman sees Queensland’s economy as foundering and in desperate 
need of infrastructure spending to entice investment (eg dams to support 
agriculture). ALP will object that it is already struggling to fund services. 
But Newman envisages balancing increased spending with public service savings – 
arguing that Brisbane City Council numbers had been slashed by attrition not 
sackings. Efficiency dividends would be forced on departments. The bureaucracy 
is seen to be huge and out of control – so the head count needs to be 
controlled. More spending is needed on infrastructure, with less on services. 
Former LNP leader was seen to have ignored business calls for more 
infrastructure spending, and failed to set out a detailed economic vision. 
Despite past LNP criticism of Ms Bligh’s privatisation program, Mr Newman saw 
room for more. Private firms could maintain government-owned power grids. 
Government authorities don’t need to own coal terminals. 
 
In relation to the specific proposals that your article 
ascribed to Campbell Newman it is noted that:  
  - Infrastructure is only one component in a developed economy, and 
is usually not, by itself, the key to stimulating growth. A better alternative 
would be to empower strategic leadership in market oriented learning within 
potential industrial clusters. This should help strengthen government’s tax base 
and revenues; 
 
  - Infrastructure spending has already been escalated enormously in 
Queensland. However much investment has been badly 
  directed or even wasted, mainly because  poorly 
advised changes to government machinery rendered the latter largely ineffectual;
  
 
  - To overcome such problems, there is a need to re-consider (for 
example): the nature and functions of government; the effect of centralised 
efforts to decide / control everything; and the contribution of public service 
knowledge and experience to effective government;
 
  - Undertaking some government functions through the private sector 
can provide some, but unfortunately limited, benefits;
 
  - Problems in government have been obvious for years, and will be 
hard to fix. These have not arisen simply because the public service is ‘out of 
control’ and too numerous. Efficiency dividends or counting heads will achieve 
little (and could be counter-productive). Improving the quality of government 
decisions (with the support of a better informed community and a professional 
public service) is the best route to achieving more effective government and 
cost savings. 
 
 
These suggestions 
about the need for more than populist rhetoric are developed in more detail 
below. 
John Craig 
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      Details | 
      
 Details 
Getting Serious about Economic Development 
  - Infrastructure spending is necessary to complement the growth of 
productive economic activities, but it will not necessarily stimulate those 
activities – as can be
illustrated by Queensland’s past emphasis on publicly-funded industrial 
estates (which in some ways were the equivalent of the ‘Cargo Cults’ practised in New Guinea);  
  
 
  - Queensland’s infrastructure backlogs have been largely the result 
of: (a) rapid population growth (especially in SE Queensland) due to high rates 
of migration; and (b) problems in government machinery that had been exacerbated 
in the 1980s and 1990s (see below). Rapid migration was probably started by 
eliminating death duties in the 1970s, and then became a self-sustaining 
‘sun-state’ phenomenon (see
SEQ 2001 suffered from naval gazing, 1994). While rapid population growth 
(and eventually massive infrastructure investment) has sustained high rates of 
economic growth, it has not contributed much to economic development 
(ie to creating an economy that is well-positioned strategically, or highly 
productive). Queensland’s gross state product grew faster than the national 
average for some years, but in per capital terms (a measure of productivity) the 
state’s GSP has remained below the national average. Now one major driver of 
past growth (ie interstate migration) seems to be disappearing – and thus 
creating negative feedback effects on job prospects (see
Speculations about Queensland's Economic Predicament, 2010). This arguably 
reflects: (a) the shock of the global financial crisis; (b) the fact that 
housing is no longer much cheaper than in southern cities; and (c) increasing 
congestion and household costs partly due to poor infrastructure efforts;
 
  - Strategies put in place by governments since the 1980s to try to 
raise the quality / productivity of the state’s economy have not been effective 
– because they have been politically, rather than market, oriented (eg see
Queensland's Economic Strategy, 2002 and 
Commentary on 'Smart State', 2003). As noted in the former, government 
programs to ‘assist’ individual enterprises, while they may be politically 
appealing and lead to short-term activity, are actually obstacles to developing 
the economy (ie to increasing complementary firms’ ability to provide effective 
and sustainable assistance to one another); 
 
  - Better methods are outlined in
A Case for Innovative Economic Leadership (2009). The latter suggested 
democratically empowering new methods for market-oriented economic leadership to 
accelerate the emergence of economy or region wide systems that individuals / 
enterprises require for success in high value-added activities. Economic 
opportunities that might be given particular attention could include: 
agribusiness; functions linked to mineral and energy resources; 
globally-oriented small and medium enterprises; existing embryonic industry 
clusters in various regions; and functions linked to solving social and 
environmental challenges. While the need for dams (for example) to support 
agriculture might be an outcome of such a process, it should not be seen (in the 
absence of all complementary functions) to be the sufficient precondition for 
the emergence of a productive industry;
 
  - Effective economic development methods should boost economic 
productivity (and the tax base), and thereby reduce government financial 
constraints
 
 
Infrastructure Problems: Partly A Self Inflicted Wound 
  - Queensland’s infrastructure spending has already increased 
dramatically – from about $3bn pa in the mid-1990s to about $18bn pa. Many 
problems have arisen as a result (eg as noted in
'Neglect catches up with Beattie' - 'Sunshine dims as borrowing goes up', 
2007). The latter, in commenting on the jump from $10bn pa spending to $14bn pa, 
noted: (a) the dubious capital accounting that had apparently been the basis of 
funding some spending; (b) the cost blow outs that had resulted from 
simultaneous infrastructure and resource investment booms; and (c) the dubious 
nature of some water infrastructure investments;
 
  - Poorly considered infrastructure investments have also been 
apparent in electricity (see
Failure in Queensland's Electricity Distribution Network, 2004) and 
transport (see
Brisbane's Transportation Monster, 2008). Causes of ineffectual and wasteful 
infrastructure development arguably include: complexities and buck-passing due 
to extreme federal financial imbalances; and political advisers’ naivety about 
the nature and functions of government. Machinery of government was crippled by 
politicisation, loss of essential knowledge and experience and attempts to apply 
business-like methods to non-business-like functions (eg see
Defects in Infrastructure Planning and Delivery in Queensland, 2002).
 
 
Some Overlooked Requirements for Effective Government 
  - The core function of government is ‘governing’ (ie creating a 
framework in which others can do things, eg via a system of law). Limits on the 
ability of central decision makers to acquire the dispersed and often-tacit 
knowledge needed to decide everything is the basis of economists’ case for a 
market economy. The same constraint also applies within complex organisations 
such as governments. Thus government leaders who don’t recognise that they can’t 
know and decide everything can cause serious problems (see
The Secret of Failure: Claim Wisdom without Practical Realism). Political 
leaders can usefully state the community’s aspirations to provide a coherent 
sense of direction for decentralised efforts. This can be part of the core task 
of government (and its leaders in particular) of creating frameworks in which 
others (both externally and internally) can decide and take the initiatives 
needed to achieve practical outcomes. 
 
  - Unfortunately machinery of government intended to facilitate 
highly centralised strategic control of outcomes was put in place in Queensland 
by the inexperienced Goss administration – and, though partly reformed later, 
this has done a great deal of damage by: (a) initially purging the knowledge and 
skills required to do anything other than carry forward that government’s 
electoral policies; and (b) subsequently suppressing the knowledge, experience, 
initiative and commitment of those not at the centre. Highly centralised 
machinery of government seemed to be the major factor in the inadequate skills 
and bullying culture exhibited in agencies such as Queensland Health – and the 
medical failures that resulted at Bundaberg Hospital (eg see
Intended Submission to Health System Royal Commission, 2005); 
 
  - There has been no serious consideration of the importance to 
effective government of the public service’s knowledge and skill base (eg see
Competence is more useful to good government than compliance and
Misunderstanding the Public Service’s Contribution). For Australia’s system 
of government to work, the public service needs to complement political 
understanding of the popularity of policies with knowledge of practical 
requirements, and of the hundreds of other considerations that arise from past 
policy decisions (or the emerging environment) that are not in the present 
government’s agenda. Eliminating the knowledge and skills required to do this in 
a search for unquestioning compliance has led governments to now often pursue 
populist (ie trendy-sounding but ineffectual) policies, in the way that they 
could not have done previously (see
On Populism, 2007).
 
 
Public-Private Interface 
  - While the possibility of transferring government functions to the 
private sector should always be kept in mind, it is not a panacea for problems 
in government, and can create new sets of problems;
 
  - Governments traditionally take responsibility for providing some 
goods and services because market failures exist and imply that problems will 
arise if they are undertaken by the private sector (see
Governing is not Just Running a Large Business). Providing goods and 
services in a political environment can generate inefficiencies. However private 
sector involvement, hopefully to promote operational efficiencies, may be of 
limited benefit, because market failures remain and have to be dealt with in 
other ways that offset operational cost savings (see 
Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure, revised 2002);
 
  - Privatisation (ie transferring ownership to the private sector) 
can generate problems for functions that are subject to serious market failures 
(as illustrated by problems with the
Dalrymple Bay Coal Loader). Privatisation options should be considered in 
terms of whether or not market failures exist that require public ownership, 
rather than in terms of (say) the effect on government balance sheets;
 
  - Outsourcing the performance of some government functions can be of 
great value (eg via contracting). However, in doing so, there is a critical need 
to ensure that the knowledge and skills in the public service related to those 
functions remains in advance (and independent) of contractors. A risk otherwise 
emerges of private contractors gaining the ability to politically manipulate 
public programs in their own interests (as appears to be a major problem for the 
US administration – noting controversies about its military-industrial complex). 
Embryonic versions of such problems seem to be emerging in Queensland (eg see
Conflict of Interest in Brisbane's Transportation Monster).  
 
 
Fixing Queensland’s Government 
  - There is nothing new about problems arising in Queensland’s public 
service (eg see
The Growing Case for a Professional Public Service, from 2001, and
The Decay of Australian Public Administration, 2002);
 
  - It is unwise to blame the Government’s financial constraints on 
the public service, or suggest that all that is needed is to bring the public 
service under control. As suggested in
Why does Queensland have a financial problem? (2009), the ratio of public 
servants to Queensland’s rapidly rising population seems to have been roughly 
constant [1]. Moreover Queensland’s government for years has been characterised by 
crises (eg in child protection, electricity distribution, hospitals, water 
supply) and the ‘solution’ was usually to throw large amounts of money at the 
problem to make it go away, rather than address the machinery of government 
deficiencies that had given rise to the crises. Thus it can reasonably be argued 
that it is rapid increases in public spending that have led to increasing 
numbers of public servants (rather than the other way around). Billions of 
dollars have also been thrown at sometimes-poorly-considered infrastructure or 
at poorly-considered political agendas (eg consider 
Queensland's Biotechnology Bubble, 2002); 
 
  - The head count in public agencies may well need to be cut – 
hopefully by attrition, rather than by sackings. But this won’t be achieved 
without disrupting services just by imposing ‘efficiency dividends’, or counting 
heads. Pressure to boost public service efficiency, eg by requiring efficiency 
dividends, is not new (see
Improving Public Sector Performance in Queensland, 2005). The latter was 
primarily a comment on a proposal for a Service Delivery and Performance 
Commission. It argued that: (a) such efforts are a most inefficient way of 
boosting efficiency; and (b) better outcomes would result from restoring a 
professional basis for public service, and improving community understanding 
  of 
what governing is about. Government can be small and effective – providing its 
top level focus is on ‘governing’ (ie creating a framework for others to do 
things, both internally and externally). However when the top level focus is on 
government’s secondary role of delivery of services (including infrastructure), 
options that might result in smaller government spending will not tend to be 
considered. Central agencies will be busy trying to micro-manage outcomes, and 
line-agencies will be stripped of the skills and motivations to envisage 
alternatives. Infrastructure involves capital expenditure as part of public 
functions that have much broader implications (eg managing water resources 
involves environmental, land use, legal and other considerations – as well as 
perhaps building dams). Managing infrastructure projects should be a 
middle-management function. When infrastructure shifts to become the 
top-management focus, then top-management capacity to deal with the broader 
responsibilities of government gets marginalised or squeezed out (see
Middle Management from the Top, 2005); 
 
  - Some suggestions about fixing government in Queensland are 
included in
Response to an Open Note to Campbell Newman (2011). Key suggestions 
include: (a) seeking much higher quality advice to Queensland’s political 
process both externally (eg through more realistic and up-to-date understanding 
of policy issues by community leaders generally) and internally (eg through 
restoration of professional independence in public services); and (b) seeking 
institutional reform, not as a precondition for ‘doing things’, but rather as a 
recognised goal which is part of the process of achieving practical outcomes;
 
  - Making government effective will not be a simple challenge, noting 
the complexities involved that are suggested in 
Australia's Governance Crisis and the Need for Nation Building. However 
this has to be done because the continuance of populist ‘quick fixes’ (such as 
scapegoating public servants or transferring parts of extremely complex 
functions to the private sector) are likely to continue to make the situation 
worse. 
 
 
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