About 'Grand Conspiracy' Theories: Geopolitical Gossip

• Some Theories
• Real Problems
• Distorted perceptions
• "Grand" conspiracies
• Idealism
• Alternatives
• A: Articles

Geopolitical gossip about 'grand conspiracies' by US and other elites have been pervasive in relation to the September 11 attack in America, and subsequent attempts to eliminate the threat of terrorism (See also Competing Civilizations and Attack Implications).  The Asian financial crisis also generated a fair amount of geopolitical gossip.

Some examples of 'grand conspiracy' theories are identified below - and various articles related to such theories are outlined in an attachment to this document. Examples of conspiratorial materials are categorized separately.

This document will suggest that systemic problems in the current global order provide a partial foundation for perceiving conspiracies, and that there are innumerable other ways that such perceptions can be created in the minds of observers from real and imaginary causes. A very high standard needs to be set in testing evidence of alleged conspiracies.

However geopolitical gossip tends not to gain credibility because: such standards do not seem to be met in assessing what is seen as evidence; collusion amongst diverse groups is presumed without clearly justifying motivations for doing so; and theories tend only to blame scapegoats and show little understanding of how the real world works.  Because of the latter characteristic, conspiracy theories can perhaps be likened to primitive man's invention of 'evil spirits' to explain adverse events in the (then) incomprehensible natural world.

Various current 'grand' conspiracy theories seem to have limited credibility. 

The way some philosophical 'idealists' view the world (ie those who see all efforts to understand as subjective and ideas as 'chips' for playing political games, rather than as a way to understand the requirements for success in practical affairs) could be considered as a factor in geopolitical gossip.  Because conspiracy theorists tends to merely blame scapegoats and provide no practical suggestions about alternative options, they have limited prospects of ever actually changing anything.

The 'idealist' (postmodern / relativist) view has apparently become dominant in Western humanities faculties. This is positively dangerous in an integrating world because it contributes to ignorance of the practical (eg economic) implications of different cultural traditions - and this prevents those who suffer relative disadvantages from improving their position and encourages a belief that their problems must be due to 'oppression'. These factors seem significant in generating terrorist reactions.

How: Ignorance seems to be a major factor in such situations. For example a community may be marginalized and disadvantaged because it lacks access to understanding of the modern world. Then well-intentioned outsiders (who are ignorant of established ways) may attempt to help by introducing 'modern' ways. This leads to resistance by some who feel they are being subject to imperialism. This resistance is over-ridden because it is so clearly based on ignorance. Conflict emerges, and at no stage is it then possible to have effective communication about the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative ways.

Given the damage that undisciplined conspiracy theories can do and the presumed existence of cases of real wrong-doing that are swamped by a tidal wave of 'gossip', more effective ways of responding to this phenomenon seem to be needed.

Conspiracy theories can reflect real problems

Undoubtedly there are genuinely under-handed actions by powerful factions at times.

For example:

• Blinded by the Right: The Conscience of an ex-Conservative by David Brock confesses to elaborate deception in the production in 1992 of The Real Anita Hill which demolished the character of a person who had accused a prominent conservative politician of harassment - a step that was described as a major turning point in US politics (Mayer J., 'I once was blind', FR, 8/11/02) [Comment: confessing to an elaborate deception creates a credibility problem. Who can ever be sure that the confession is also not just a deception?]
• the AWU faction of the Queensland ALP appeared to routinely practice electoral rorting in order to secure important political positions (see Note 22)

However 'dirty tricks' such as the above examples (which can be equated with common criminality) tend to have localized impacts and to involve quite narrow groups of people.

Of more significance is that systemic defects in the way the world currently operates can give rise to problems that can be perceived to be due to 'conspiracies'.

Economic 'systems': There appears to scope for international business practices and economic theory to be significantly improved. For example widely accepted economic models can have adverse effects (eg foreign investment can reinforce regimes that provide poor economic leadership in resource rich regions; financial markets may lead to instability; and liberal market policies may create a pressure to 'compete' but not the systemic capabilities needed to be successfully 'competitive').

Also all prudent organizations and states now develop strategies for coping with (and constructively influencing) their environment (see Strategy Development in Business and Government). Almost every conceivable action will have been addressed by contingency planning - so indicators that current events are the results of 'plans' will exist even though there may be countless 'plans' that were never put into effect. Moreover, as the goal of any strategy is typically to gain a competitive advantage, there is almost always going to be a hidden agenda which the organization hopes that its competitors do not see. The difference between competitive strategy and 'conspiracies' is that the formed involves legal and moral goals and methods, while the latter does not.

However it is unnecessary to see the result of business actions as capitalist 'conspiracies', or a community's failure to progress as due to 'oppression'.

In particular foreign firms may be able to do little but reinforce the position of repressive regimes given:

• the impossibility of external leadership of constructive change in sovereign states - especially as such change may have complex cultural implications (see Competing Civilizations); and
• the sheer difficulties of achieving anything in societies that lack effective political and economic machinery.

Moreover quite different types of regimes are reinforced if they are available, and the problem may largely have domestic causes (eg in Muslim countries a need to link authority and religion can be expected to lead to authoritarianism).

US power: Legitimate criticism can be leveled at the way US power has sometimes been used (eg see Resentments are partly justified which refers to the side-effects of Cold-War 'covert' operations). And in the Cold War context some mutually supportive relationships were maintained with fairly ruthless regimes (Soeharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, Hussein in Iraq in the 1980s).

However the source of these problems is complex, including:

• a global context that lacks effective order and has often been hostile, noting

• UN and global economic machinery does not work effectively eg
  • debates can be political rather than practical producing ineffectual compromises such as the Kyoto protocol;
  • despotic regimes can be voted into influential positions;
  • global economic institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) tend to be biased to economic models preferred by US interests;
• the impact of the Cold War until the late 1980s, and that in this 'war'  both sides undertook covert operations in many 'neutral' regions and supported unsatisfactory (eg authoritarian / corrupt) allies over overt enemies;
• the large numbers of (sometimes failed) states that have been emerging that are badly / despotically governed and economically underdeveloped - and whose leaders blame others for their plight (a view that is likely to be more wrong than right - see Competing Civilizations);

• characteristics of US administrative and political machinery identified by Ellsberg that (at least in the past) supplied distorted information to national political leaders and provided few realistic checks on political judgments about security issues [1] - for which no simple solutions are obvious;
• the US's tendency to political isolationism and introspection as well as its aversion to 18th and 19th century style colonialism seem to have led to a less subtle approach than the successful colonial powers used in leading international affairs [1].

Israel: the establishment of Israel in the Middle East has disrupted the region.

However this was the result of attempts to right historical wrongs against Jewish peoples. It has resulted in a cycle of mutual injustices in the Middle East that now appears resolvable only by mutual forgiveness or mutual disaster. 

People with Jewish backgrounds and an interest in Israel's welfare have influential roles in Western (and especially US) society, and undoubtedly seek to use that influence to advantage. However there are many competing influences and, in a complex environment it is unrealistic to ascribe a superhuman and infallible influence to any particular faction.

Conspiracy theories can also reflect distorted perceptions

Conspiracies can can also be created in the minds of observers by various real and imaginary problems.

For example, this might include:

Side-effects of strategy

• strategic miscalculations can provide fertile soil in which to grow 'grand' conspiracies - especially if those responsible conceal or rationalize their actions;
• decisions may have to be made on the basis of incomplete information / analysis - which cannot readily be varied without weakening one's position by vacillation;
• deception of others can be a central element of some strategies - especially of the 'Art of War'  strategies widely studied in East Asia;
• covert operations continue to be undertaken to achieve geo-political objectives (eg in persuading the Northern Alliance to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan - Eccleston R. 'How greenbacks helped Bushwack the Taliban',  Australian,  20/11/02). When such methods are used, it is very difficult for outsiders to tell that this may be neither the major way in which societies operate nor the actual source of their strength, and to distinguish between fact and grand fictions about such activities (eg consider allegations of US involvement in a conspiracy to remove a democratically elected government [1]);

Complex or changed circumstances

• the implications of changes may not be considered or understood, eg in the 1970s the US might have valued control of an oil rich Middle Eastern state (like Iraq) for energy security, while quite different considerations may dominate now (see below);
• problems may arise from domestic conditions (eg the lack of an effective system of political economy, unbalanced education [1, 2]) - rather than from external actions;
• thousands of factors can be involved in particular situations - and the presence of a particular factor in many harmful events can be assumed to be the 'cause', though other unknown factors may actually have had the determining influence;
• human brains may not be 'wired' to enable them to effectively assess very complex situations [1]

Fabrication

• in times of conflict opposing interests may engage in 'propaganda wars' by putting a damaging 'spin' on known facts, or fabricating suggestive 'facts'. For example, the interpretation which extreme Leftists place on Western societies has been suggested as the basis on which they are understood by Islamist extremists [1];
• persons with ethnic, religious or political prejudices may demonize those they hate - and put a negative interpretation on their actions and fail to consider anything but the most 'demonic' explanations;
• false allegations about one's own involvement in affairs of state may be made out of a sense of bravado, to generate a sense of importance, or to gain attention in an otherwise dull life;
• malicious or deranged persons may simply make up stories;

Misunderstanding

• provincial communities may simply lack understanding of the global issues that elites need to deal with - and see evil as the motives for their actions. The US's famous isolationism, and the consequent ignorance of its community about what is happening elsewhere, probably explains why conspiracy theories have been so prevalent there;
• the facts about what has actually happened can become distorted - and speculative theories or creative fiction can acquire the status of proven facts;
• harm may be done inadvertently due to ignorance;
• it may be impossible to publicly reveal key facts, without upsetting the sensitivities of other parties in international negotiations;
• given a determination to find evidence of wrong-doing, it is possible with sincerity to interpret others' actions as part of the theory (ie to see and hear what one wants to hear) whereas those actions may have entirely different significance. The distortion of information flows to the US administration in the 1960s by administrations' expectations that Ellsberg recorded [1], illustrates the problem;

Conflicting interests

• national strategies developed with even noble motives can be interpreted as 'conspiracies' by those who see themselves to be adversely affected;

Organizational failure

• organizations / states may fail to communicate adequately. For example, Australia the effectiveness of public administration has been breaking down through the adoption of centralized / politicized / idealized corporate strategic planning (see The Decay of Australian Public Administration). And government, surrounded by cronies and 'yes men', seems to have been unable to recognize the need for more effective two-way communication with the the broader community;

Naive presentation of theories

• the media may refuse to report on conspiracy theories (believing that they lack credibility) and this in itself can be seen as further evidence of conspiracy.

Security

• it may be impossible for governments to reveal intelligence that they are relying on because doing so could endanger sources which have taken years to establish

The complexity of the real and imaginary factors that can give rise to perceptions of 'conspiracy' suggest that others should require a very high standard of evidence - not mere allegations - before accepting accounts of 'conspiracies'.

Examples:

• Fahrenheit 911
• God on our Side
• Adventure Capitalism
• Crime of the Century
• Loose Change

'Grand Conspiracy' Theories Lack Credibility

'Grand Conspiracy' theories tend not to gain mainstream credibility, perhaps because of:

• the sheer number and diversity of (often conflicting) opinions that are in circulation;
• a lack of critical evaluation of points of 'evidence' where such points are seen as closing the argument, rather than as the starting point for analysis [1]
• the unqualified inclusion of claims about some particular aspect that another observer knows to be false - perhaps because of limitations in a theorists' real-world knowledge - devalues everything that they say;
• a lack of positive proposals about how prevailing problems might be overcome, and an obsession on blaming scapegoats (which seems to be a distinctive characteristic of such theories). The massive efforts given to criticizing others' motives, and little to evaluating their methods, is why it is often realistic to view such theories as mere gossip. As suggested below this may be amplified by a tendency to philosophical 'idealism' and a lack of 'realism'. In particular this is revealed in:
• a tendency to adopt an unsophisticated (ie thuggish) view of power which demonstrates a clear lack of familiarity with the delicacy and (at-least-superficially) moral motives needed to sustain real-world top-level political and economic influence (eg involving legal process, networking, investment, information flows, people management).    The conspiracy theories may well tell more about the theorists' psychology, limited knowledge and poor prospects of ever gaining real influence than about what is actually happening - as the methods supposedly being used by conspirators would be quite ineffective. This is reminiscent of the most obvious defect in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (a late 19th century 'plan' for world domination that has been periodically cited ever since to rationalize anti-Semitism) that was presumably forged by (and thus reflected the methods for exerting power favoured by) the Czar's secret police.

Fahrenheit 9/11 seems a good illustration of these problems.

It has been variously argued that Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 (which gives a conspiratorial interpretation of the US administration's 'war against terror'):

• accurately revealed the greed, cynicism and ineptitude of the US government [1];
• was a conservative view which concealed the role which the US military plays in empire building by its emphasis on the Bush family businesses [1];
• effectively communicated to a wide audience some underlying truths about how the system works (links between business, the US government, and the war on Iraq) [1];
• concealed more than it revealed (eg it hid the drug and gas-for-China connections which are more significant than oil; it did not blame the White House for organizing the 9/11 attacks; and it ignored much evidence which had been sent to Moore [1, 2, 3]). It sought to provoke war with Saudi Arabia, and to get Kerry elected as US president [EMAIL];
• was incoherent, and also wrong about claimed facts [1];
• demonstrated that the American people had been lied to in relation to war with Iraq - but (a) it naively or lazily accepted the official version of 9/11 events (b) wrongly explored Saudi responsibility for those events, rather than Israel's and (c) failed to show the extent of bipartisan and media participation in the deception of the American people [1];
• presented nothing but lies and distortions. Its argument was that George W Bush (a) stole the presidential election, (b) invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to please Saudis who bribed him, the oil companies who hired him and the armament companies who squired him and (c) is fighting a war against the American people rather than against terror [1].

The point is that (irrespective of whether there is any truth involved) credibility suffers because:

• there is no agreement amongst theorists. Even the above commentaries on Fahrenheit 9/11 are mutually contradictory. For example, The Bush White House can not be both incompetent (in responding to the 9/11 attacks), and super-competent (in secretly organizing them);
• at least some errors can be demonstrated in what is presented as fact;
• the realities of the complex geopolitical situation which must influence any decisions by national leaders (eg see The Second Failure of Globalization?) are simply not mentioned - and it is assumed that personal considerations are virtually all that are relevant to decisions;
• there is only a search for scapegoats, rather than solutions, for global problems.

The overall effect is (as with the 'junk science' in The Day after Tomorrow) to confuse public understanding of important questions.

Another problem that 'grand conspiracies' face is that an implausibly high level of social cohesion would be required amongst insiders (as some 'grand conspiracies' imply complicity by people in many different organizations and levels of society).

While such cohesion might be possible in some circumstances:

• to motivate support by people from diverse walks of life a 'grand conspiracy' would need to be founded on an ideology or some other characteristic - and no one has suggested what this might be in relation to Western societies. Religion has not provided a unifying ideology (see below). And a desire to gain power would be insufficient on its own because, under democratic-capitalism, power constantly shifts to others noting both the electoral process and:
  • the 40-50% per decade turnover that occurs in the ranks of the world's largest corporations;
  • the so-called 'Brudenbooks syndrome' which is widely seen as a real reflection of the problem of maintaining family / national wealth (Haigh G 'Fatal delay', Bulletin,  17/12/02-14/3/03). This suggests that the first generation seeks to make money, the second consolidates and the third spends - as the motivation and will-power needed to continue taking difficult entrepreneurial initiatives is lost;
  • similar arguments that all companies eventually fail - because incompetents take over [1]; and
  • the changing character of capitalism - especially the shift towards business ownership by mutual funds which means that 'capitalists' who might attend a meeting as a person to conspire against someone have ever less significance and outcomes are increasingly due to 'capitalism' (an amorphous concept) .
• the most probable unifying ideology to motivate widespread cooperation will involve public policies. Because they are not hidden these cannot be seen as conspiracies - though because of the complexity of the issues involved the implications of those policies may only be understood by those who have devoted a lot of effort to study of the 'big picture' (which conspiracy theorists tend not to do);
• any 'grand conspiracy' would be likely to be soon fully exposed by whistle-blowers (not just rumoured) in peacetime societies that promote individualism, commercial competition, a free press and political pluralism [eg 1] - though one credible analysis suggested that this was not the case in the US in the 1960s [1];
• diversity of opinion, rather than unified cohesion, is currently quite apparent at the highest levels of US administration [1]

Andrew Denton's movie, With God on our Side, implied that unity of action in a US-led war against Islamism might be motivated by evangelical Christians, and presented a 'conspiracy theory' about this in a novel way - ie by encouraging the suspects to speak for themselves. None-the-less there seem to be serious defects in the movie's basic premise.

Geopolitical gossip may arise (and fail to gain credibility) because 'grand conspiracy' theorists do not attempt to (or cannot) realistically understand the complexity of the 'big picture' that powerful individuals face, and concentrate on scapegoating them instead.

An example, The Second Failure of Globalization?, outlines a likely context to events related to the war against 'terrorists with WMD' and related issues.  This suggests that the 'hidden' agenda of the US administration that has attracted endless speculation could be 'hidden' in plain view in its stated policies ie using its power to promote a democratic capitalist system of political economy (which is no different to its agenda over the past half century).

The real problem is that the methods being used probably won't work - yet virtually all criticism focuses on the people involved, and their 'dubious' motives.

Another example: 'Adventure Capitalism: The Hidden 2001 Plan to carve Up Iraq' points out the obvious fact that in planning regime change the US administration established working groups to try to figure out how Iraq's economy could to be made to work - and they (a) based the resulting Economic Plan on the free market theories - involving low taxes / deregulation / privatization - that they believed in and (b) involved their best available experts in devising those plans. It also argues that the resulting Plan was purely oriented to suit the interests of corporate lobbyists.

The problem with such a conspiracy theory is that it does not consider any of the practical / technical challenges involved in creating real-world economic solutions in Iraq - but rather seeks to explain outcomes entirely in terms of the greedy motivations of those who participated in the process. For example:

• there are good reasons why the way in which Iraq's oil resources are controlled (which 'Adventure capitalism' sees as being 'ripped off' by corporate interests) would be a focus of any well-intentioned effort to create a viable economy in Iraq. Natural resource wealth is a major impediment to the creation of the attitudes and institutions required in a productive economy [1]. However 'Adventure Capitalism' does not comment on, or even show any sign of knowing about, such issues;
• there are complex technical reasons to doubt that the Economic Plan to create a 'free market' economy could be successful (see Fatal Flaws).

This approach is naive because it (a) requires assuming the existence of all-knowing all-powerful elites who only need to be replaced for everything to come right and (b) fails completely to deal with the real practical problems that need to be solved.

Participants motivations are part of the equation (naturally) but, because of the involvement of professionals in the process also, in a pluralistic society personal profits can seldom impose policy 'solutions' which are obviously technically inappropriate.

Moreover while the democratic process in the US is run-down (eg involves excessive influence by corporate lobbyists) once again any serious analysis would concentrate on the systemic failures that allow this to happen. Trying to deal with such problems by a focus on the actions of individuals who exploit such systemic failures (as conspiracy theorists do) is naive because it can not lead to a solution to the problem either.

Similarly 'The Crime of the Century' pointed in 2005 to evidence that the US administration had decided on invasion of Iraq much earlier than publicly announced, and also argued that:

• evidence related to WMD was manipulated as part of a marketing campaign for war;
• the war was not legal, nor was it morally justified as Saddam was not really a threat;
• the war has had adverse consequences (eg alienating others and creating active enemies; high human and material costs);
• invasion of Iraq was was simply based on the preferences of the Bush administration;
• there was very little consideration of the aftermath of invasion; and
• the mainstream US media is complicit in covering-up this situation - and this threatens the viability of democracy in the US.

This view clearly made valid points about (say): the suspect legality of invading Iraq; the failure to seriously consider the aftermath of invasion; that everything has not gone well; and that there is a need to reinvigorate US democracy.

However the 'Crime of the Century' claim was misleading because:

• it suggested that claims about WMD were 'lies' even though no one publicly expressed the view that perhaps Iraq did not have these, and WMD were used in 'marketing' the invasion precisely because they were the one matter about everyone agreed;
• it implied that invasion of Iraq was based on a political whim and gave no consideration to how that decision will have emerged from the situation the US administration confronted.
  • One possible view of the 'big picture' situation was presented in The Second Failure of Globalization?  which suggested that the US administration probably concluded that a democratic revolution in the Middle East (for which the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime made it the prime candidate) was the best available option for defusing the threat posed by Islamist extremists, whose rationale for attacks against the West was the support the West was seen to provide for authoritarian government in the region [Note: it is the present author's view that that conclusion was based on sub-standard assessments of what could be achieved, and there were far better alternatives];
• no alternative was suggested for dealing with that situation which might over the past few years, or in future, have been better than the path chosen by the US administration; and
• it ignored the reality that in time of war, governments do not telegraph their intentions to their to their opponents (which means that the public also can not be fully informed). 

Because they are based on blaming someone rather than trying to understand what is going on, 'grand conspiracy' theories can perhaps be likened to primitive man's invention of 'evil spirits' to explain adverse events in the (then) incomprehensible natural world.

Even though there are real problems in the current international order, it seem to the author that there is a general lack of credibility in many of the 'grand conspiracy' theories that have circulated on the Internet since September 2001.

For example:

• attempting to 'destroy Islam in order to control the world' makes no sense, and no popular commitment to any such political agenda exists. In particular:
  • A Pakistani observer has suggested that this view simply reflects an over-estimation of Islam's importance in relation to much bigger questions about the future world order [1] - see also The Second Failure of Globalization?
  • From a Western viewpoint, Islam involves a belief in submission to God and that this requires strict adherence to a particular set of religious practices. Most would pity (rather than fear) countries in which Islam is dominant because it frequently seems to be associated with strict (sometimes repressive) social rules, political authoritarianism and poorly developed marginalized economies; and be mystified about why those practices seem to prevent its adherents participating in other societies;
  • Few would even be aware that some might see economic globalization as a threat to the existence of their view of Islamic cultures (and thus to the power of some elites);
  • Western societies have not generally seen themselves as being attacked when Islamist extremists direct violence [1] against non-conformists in non-Western countries (eg  around 250,000 Christians in such countries are reportedly killed  each year because of their religion). Furthermore even in the 19th century it was suggested that religion was no longer a significant factor in public policy or a basis for military fervour in Western societies (see Draper's History of the Conflict between Religion and Science - 1873) and in the 20th century the centre of gravity of Christianity shifted from Western societies to developing countries [1, 2]. In any event Christianity's founder encouraged his followers to respond to those who hate them with love;
  • While violent anti-Western intentions of Islamist extremists now cause Islam to be linked with threats (rather than being seen as a credible religious alternative), this is mainly because the difference between Islamism as a political theory and the religion of Islam is not recognized. However few would believe claims by Islamist extremists that they are true representatives of Islam [a perception that could easily be further reinforced if more traditional Muslims were vocal in disputing the extremists' claims];
  • the US's proposal to enforce (UN) weapons sanctions against Iraq involves a state whose government is secular rather than Islamic - and many Christian groups (and some prominent Western nations) have opposed such a move;
• it seems most unlikely that a rational US administration would propose invasion of Iraq with 'selfish imperialist' motivations because:
  • despite the concerns about security of access to energy resources that arose in the oil crises [1] and instability in Saudi Arabia [1] (which has often been the oil-supplier of last resort), control of Iraq's oil reserves (while one factor in the equation [1, 2]) seems implausible as the major basis for promoting conflict with Iraq - because:
    • access to those resources might have been gained more cheaply and easily by removing trade sanctions on Iraq [1, 2]
    • the value Iraq's oil (for which one estimate the author saw was $US16bn per year) is minute by comparison with the cost (presumably at least $US150bn) of the war and reconstruction process. Furthermore most of that revenue is pre-committed; 
    • oil resources can only be of very short term advantage given: the expected peaking of global oil production in the next few years [1], a fact which has clearly been widely recognized in official circles in US [1]; the oil price escalation that will follow; and the rapid transition this will ensure to non-oil fuel sources (initially natural gas which is more widely available) as soon a prices reach a level justifying general conversion. Many major energy companies appear to have accepted such a transition - and this issue is even being subjected to serious feasibility studies by government in Australia [1]. The Middle East's oil resource may have been a 'stupendous source of strategic power' in 1945 [1] but this seems likely to become much less important over the next few years. Many of those with central roles in the US administration have worked in the oil industry, and would thus be more aware than the public of the implications of these trends;
  • because of the potential effect of a terrorist attack, the US must have a legitimate fear about even slight possibilities that WMD could be made available to Islamist extremists [1, 2] and its administration could have reached the conclusion that a process of changes within 'rogue' states that have such weapons might be unavoidable to control this risk. [Note: Such a conclusion might be invalid because (a) the case of North Korea shows that nuclear armed states can not be attacked [1] (b) the potential for WMD resides in the heads of scientists and technicians rather than in arsenals and (c) there appear to be serious strategic difficulties associated with any attack on Iraq [1]];
  • a plausible case can be made that political and economic reform in the Middle East (though difficult [1]) could dramatically improve people's lives, reduce the tensions that give rise to terrorism and reverse the adverse perceptions of the US in the region. Moreover this option would be far cheaper than a 'selfish imperialism' option, which the US lacks the resources to sustain [Note: the real risk could be that such an idealistic plan contains unrecognised flaws - see the Second Failure of Globalization?);
  • US military forces from top to bottom are clearly convinced that their mission in Iraq involved liberation - because otherwise they would not have behaved as they did. Moreover give that view they would become unreliable and ineffective if at any stage command messages were inconsistent with this view;
  • a UN mandate was sought for the conflict, and such mandate would have ensured UN control of the establishment of any post-conflict Iraqi regime;
  • the US's traditional aspirations and the real limits on its power suggest that 'unilateralism' could well be an exercise in 'gamesmanship' strategically intended to create a situation in which all nations accept the need for the UN to become a serious mechanism to resolve global security problems (and thus allow the US to get on with business without facing high security costs).
• claims of a neo-con master-plan to 'rule the world' [1] make no sense as:
  • the military / security methods being used by the US in war against terror are fabulously expensive, generate resistance and a far less effective in boosting global US influence than much cheaper civil initiatives to develop an effective multilateral global order consistent with US preferences;
  • a group whose power depends on winning periodic democratic elections are on anything but a secure institutional base for 'taking over the world'
• the view that the Asian financial crisis was engineered to discredit Asian economic models is implausible. Though that crisis was a complex event, any 'plot' to create a crisis to damage south or east Asian societies required appreciating that they would be vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of capital. This potential vulnerability appears to arise from the preference for coordinating economic transactions through social relationships rather than through financial outcomes, which makes it almost impossible to achieve economic success when measured in financial terms - see Understanding the Cultural Revolution. In spite of systematically reviewing debate about this issue, the author has yet to see evidence that influential Western financial institutions / analysts really understand the Asian economic models, and without such understanding meaningful conspiracy was impossible.

Another type of problem can be illustrated by the movie Loose Change, a conspiracy theory suggesting that the official account of 9/11 events is flawed, and those events were orchestrated by factions within the US administration.

While such claims are contested on technical grounds, an even more fundamental problem relates to motivation - as, while there are various factions that might have had a motive to orchestrate the 9/11 events, those who developed the US administration's response seem most implausible culprits.

Why: While allegations are made about diverse aspects of the 9/11 events, the only suggestion that seems more substantial than a typical UFO sighting is that the collapse of WTC buildings was assisted by planted explosives (ie because Building 7, which was not hit by an aeroplane, collapsed).

If this theory about controlled demolition has validity, there are a LOT of potential culprits eg

• al Qaida who wanted to ensure that its aerial spectacular produced serious damage;
• East Asian factions (arguably the 'other side' in Western societies' only significant 'clash of civilizations') who wanted to divert US attention from their economic and political challenge, and ensure that its administration was dominated by those with inappropriate (ie military) skills;
• the Mossad who wanted stronger US support for Israel's situation in the Middle East;
• factions with military / industrial connections who hoped to profit from conflict.

However the US administration, and the neo Con factions who advised its response to 9/11 events, would be most implausible culprits, because there was no obvious link between the 9/11 attack by a presumably
stateless terror group and the US's response.

If  administration insiders had wanted to stage a false-flag attack to justify intervention in the Middle East (broader than Afghanistan), they would presumably have done something which directly justified the
plan they wanted to carry out. The Neo-con plan (ie seeking political and economic advancement in the Middle East generally through military intervention) could not be easily and directly justified by the 9/11 attacks, and seemed to be adopted mainly because no one else had suggestions about what to do.

Geopolitical  gossip and philosophical 'idealism'

As implied above, 'grand conspiracy' theories (whose authors are not limited to radical Islamists) seem to reflect a lack of access to real-world information and / or understanding about how mainstream economic and political affairs are handled in practice.

There seems to be some merit in the view that conspiracy theories emerge mostly in disenfranchised cultures - ie that where people lack ability to witness chaotic workings of machinery of power they can easily believe that political affairs can be driven by sinister, implacable forces. [1]

Conspiracy theorists also seem to adopt the (Marxian?) view that economic success must be the result of exploiting others and to be intent on finding someone to blame for problems, rather than seeking practical alternative policies and programs.

An example:

"We who investigate and articulate the causes and sources of the world's problems (in the manner exemplified by ....) ALREADY KNOW what the positive solutions and alternatives to those causes and sources are; but we also know that we cannot do ANYTHING to eliminate those causes and sources!

We are not so naive as to think that the mere articulation and discussion of alternatives is sufficient to achieve those alternatives.

We ALREADY KNOW how simple the solutions and alternatives are, .... We already know that there is NOTHING more simple than brotherly love, brotherly comradery, brotherly compassion, brotherly unity, brotherly equality of access to the goodnesses of earthly existence, and brotherly interest in the equal dispensation of justice, resources, and rights".

[Source: email response to suggestions about the need to discuss positive policy options rather than develop conspiracy theories]

Unfortunately such idealism is not realistic. Since the earliest emergence of complex human cultures (say) 40-60,000 years ago most of humanity has not simply lived on the natural fruits of the earth. The writer of Genesis stated a long time ago that humanity has had to work ever since rebelling against God by 'eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil'.  Moreover:

• there are ways that are working that are better, and others that are worse;
• the human population is now around 6bn, yet it may reasonably be estimated that the earth would only sustain (say) 50m working as hunter-gathers and (say) 500-1000m in agrarian economies. Survival by the majority (ie urban populations) and the living standards of all now depend on humanity's ability to creatively and sustainably process large quantities of material and energy.

So now it is really not sufficient to say that all that is needed is 'brotherly equality of access to the goodnesses of earthly existence'. And there are policy options (eg related to improving economic leadership capabilities and institutions) that could promote real equality  (see above).

Another example: Saddam Hussein reportedly reads extensively and has broad interests - with particular emphasis on Arab and military history. He also watches TV - and enjoys movies featuring intrigue. He has not traveled widely and relies on such sources for his knowledge of the world. Movies feed his inclination to believe broad conspiracy theories (Bowden M., 'Tales of the tyrant', Bulletin,  4/2/03)

The latter example suggests that one factor in geopolitical gossip may be the impact of the over-simplification of reality that is unavoidable in the mass media (and the need for drama in entertainment) on those without practical experience of how the world works .

However philosophical 'idealism' (ie the concept that knowledge is mainly assessed against individual or cultural preferences and has political implications) may be an even more significant factor in the origin of 'grand' conspiracy theories.

'Idealism' is the philosophical opposite of 'realism' (ie that knowledge is primarily assessed against empirical tests). The latter view was arguably a key cultural factor in the strength that Western societies acquired (eg as the foundation of science). However in recent decades there has been significant change in emphasis by students of the humanities. This has been described as 'post-modernism' [1], or post-structuralism or relativism and seems partly justified by (but also a massive over-reaction to) some limitations in philosophical 'realism'. 

Where opinions are given equal weight with empirical evidence (and practical considerations are neglected), unwarranted conspiracy theories are easy to generate - by building ever more elaborate speculations on a foundation of untested guesses.  Moreover those who expect ideas to originate in politically-motivated attempts to manipulate others, may ascribe their own motivations to everyone, including those seeking (imperfect) empirical knowledge.

The author understands that both philosophical idealism (in the sense that abstract ideas are not seen to adequately represent reality) and conspiracy theories are more prevalent in East Asian than they are in Western societies.   'Paranoia' may also be more justified in that region due to the indirect means for causing change that emerge from those same epistemologies.

Philosophical idealism also appears to have become the foundation for important schools of Middle Eastern studies under the influence of Edward Said's suggestion [1] that Orientalism (a term he coined to describe earlier Western studies of the Middle East) was purely a means of justifying Western control. Said has been seen to have created the intellectual basis of 'Muslim rage' [1] - on a basis which took no account of the practical impact of cultural assumptions on the ability of a society to be materially successful (see Competing Civilizations). His analysis appeared be based on a study of documents, and limited by the lack of cross-disciplinary support in assessing what in those documents was empirically valid.

Furthermore for centuries the world of Islam seems to have turned its back on empirical (scientific) knowledge - because it raised theological difficulties.

Taking an 'idealist' view can lead to a political interpretation of 'facts' and knowledge (ie that they reflects the arbitrary claims of elite groups to rationalize their dominance over others, rather than a genuine attempt to say what happened or understand cause-effect relationships). Moreover, complex situations can be oversimplified and not realistically understood. For example:

• it may be concluded (without consideration of how political and economic machinery works in practice) that material prosperity is simply dispensed by political power. Though if this were so, then market-oriented initiatives would be pointless, while in practice the economy of any nation that acted on this assumption would be weak.
• 'grand conspiracy' theorists appear to:
  • dismiss (rather than seek ways to improve) all proffered 'public' arguments while relying on 'private truths' (ie suspected 'facts' that only they acknowledge) - and thus never gain 'public' feedback about their claims;
  • have a biased approach to evidence. The author has observed that conspiracy theories tend to ignore the possibility that any evidence they rely on might have been manufactured for propaganda purposes (or be the result of mistakes), while asserting that ALL contrary evidence was manufactured. At least one case can be identified where a distressed observer misinterpreted what was happening, and their allegations were then cited as 'evidence' [1].
  • prefer blaming scapegoats to suggesting how to improve the economic and political order; and thus focus on identifying any possible self-interested motives. However, even if they do identify dubious motives, they thus:
  • lack the 'big-picture' view and the understanding needed to suggest practical reforms (ie they may be unable to see the forest because of all the trees). For example, it is impossible to understand the behaviour of powerful individuals by study of those individuals. Rather it is necessary to study the policy issues that they are concerned with and motivated by - such as the future global order (eg see The Second Failure of Globalization?);
• 'conspiracies' can be perceived where problems arise from unintended consequences, or problems resulting from the normal behaviour of economic, political or administrative organizations, or from incompetence in those organizations (ie from the effects of 'Murphy's Law') or from a large number of other sources;
• even though all prudent organizations and states develop strategies (and some do develop immoral / hidden conspiracies) this does not mean that their efforts are successful in the face of competing influences and a complex environment;
• complexity and rapid changes in the real world (a) make it impossible for any elite to understand causes and effects well enough to form an effective 'grand' plot and (b) ensure that unintended consequences are a constant feature of any initiatives. These factors tend to prevent 'plots' by Western elites [who would try to base 'plots' on understanding] having pervasive long term influence.

For all of these reasons 'grand conspiracy' theorists generally seem to have little to contribute.

However a most dangerous consequence of philosophical idealism (ie the 'relativist' view that knowledge is mainly assessed against individual or cultural preferences and has political implications) has been a general lack of analysis or discussion of the practical (eg economic) consequences of different cultural assumptions and institutions which:

• makes it almost impossible for disadvantaged communities to improve their position;
• encourages some in those communities to see 'grand conspiracies' or to blame 'oppressors' for their problems (see Cultural Ignorance as a Source of Conflict, and [1]). This can make the situation worse by (a) providing a kind of 'moral' basis for ethnic prejudice (b) encouraging attacks against 'oppressors' who are not actually the main source of their problems which lead to reprisals;
• increases the risk that outsiders might inadvertently damage such communities (eg as appeared to be the case with the Asian financial crisis - and with the IMF's role in Indonesia in particular).

The prevalence of 'grand conspiracy' theories appears to be only one of many practical problems and dangers associated with the post-modern confusion about the 'realism' of knowledge.

Alternatives

The fact that conspiracy theories (a) are often (though not always) imaginary (b) tend to encounter official brush-offs because of the way they are presented and (c) are none-the-less influential in breeding more theories and political extremism, suggests that more constructive ways of responding to the phenomenon are needed.

It is in the interests of the community (and those who encounter evidence of real official mis-deeds) than the 'noise' represented by torrents of geopolitical gossip be reduced. It is the 'noise' which makes it harder to identify real criminal misdeeds when they occur.

Useful steps that those who circulate conspiracy theories could take to build credibility might involve:

• setting very high standards in critically assessing 'evidence', and doing so in an organized way; and
• seeking practical options for future political and economic arrangements that would inhibit mis-behaviour - as creating an effective political and economic regime is much more likely to be effective than speculative gossip (or terrorism).

Practical alternatives to blaming scapegoats might be available through:

• proposing practical reform to prevailing systems of democratic capitalism so as to create an environment in which all might reasonably hope to succeed (see Defusing a Clash  in Competing Civilizations for preliminary speculations); and
• Discouraging Pointless Extremism by exposing the fact that the 'spiritual leaders' of those who advocate terrorism (who it seems tend to be influenced by conspiracy theorists) have no practical alternatives to propose;

From November 2002