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Solving SE Queensland's Transport Planning Woes: Detailed Argument
Auditor
General's Concerns
South-East
Queensland transport planning in disarray (23/6/09) drew attention to the Auditor General's criticism of, and suggestion
about, transport planning in the region. In particular
it was reported
that he had:
-
expressed
concern about:
-
a lack of
state level coordination;
-
systemic
weakness in planning across operators;
-
the use of
out-of-date key transport documents and plans, and inconsistencies in data
collection and reporting;
-
a massive
increase in spending since 2004 on the basis of immature plans; and
-
a one
dimensional approach to public transport.
- previously expressed similar concerns about poor planning
in health (noting Gray S.,
Qld's health service in need of treatment,
9/6/09); and
- suggested that the merger of the Transport
Department and Main Roads into a single department offered opportunities to
enhance integration, embed genuine collaboration and achieve synergies.
Another source suggested that the Auditor General has criticised: a lack of
coordinated leadership in transport planning; the lack of certainty that solutions
developed were complementary; uncertain data; outdated strategies as the basis
for planning; lapsing of Transport Department's coordination plan in 2004;
and reliance on a 1997 Integrated Regional Transport Plan despite changes in the
region over the past decade [1]
Government Reaction
The State Government did not seem genuine in 'welcoming' the Auditor General's
report - as the report implied that, because of organisational weaknesses, public money
may be being wasted on poorly considered infrastructure.
For example, a later
article by Tony Moore (Cash
splash no match for brain power: why money alone can't fix our roads,
24/6/09) noted that the responsible ministers had responded to the Auditor
General's report by merely repeating a list of upcoming projects - which some
informed observers had reservations about. Furthermore it was reported (Odgers
R., 'Premier refuses gridlock apology', Courier Mail, 25/6/09) that:
- the Premier
had responded by merely noting that "rapid population growth in the southeast
was driving congestion", so "the government was building roads, bridges and
tunnels and improving public transport in a bid to ease traffic gridlock";
though
- the Auditor
General had warned that that "there was no guarantee the situation would
improve despite billions of dollars being spent on infrastructure".
Spending Based on Inadequate Plans: A Real Problem
There is no doubt
that there are deficiencies in transport planning for SE Queensland (see
Brisbane's Transportation Monster).
The latter included reference to an outline of widely expressed public concerns about
this issue over many years. There is also good reason to doubt the wisdom of
some prevailing ideas about transport solutions.
For example:
- there has
been an assumption (noting the Premier's comment reported above) that gaps in
Brisbane's freeway network can be filled by developing tunnels. Yet tunnel
options (which are many times more expensive than surface roads where rights
of way are available) seem financially suspect. Charging affordable tolls apparently depends on complex financial
engineering (eg to defer repayments of debts for decades by ongoing
borrowing in the hope that long term traffic growth allows them to be repaid
eventually). This is unlikely to be viable in the post-GFC environment and in
the face of an expected global peak oil event which seems likely to disrupt
the presumed un-ending growth in traffic volumes (see
Airport Link: An Example of the Monster?)'. It may well be that major
tunnel options in future should be focussed on mass transit applications;
- some $17m was
reportedly committed to undertake a
Western Brisbane Transport Network Investigation (WBTNI)
- an initiative that seemed highly desirable in the face of existing transport
problems in the region that is the focus for future urban growth under the SE
Queensland Regional Plan. But it produced no obvious outcome - and advice was
received about a joint
Transport and Main Road investigation (the 'Connecting SEQ 2031' project)
apparently intended to take a broader view of similar questions (see
Integrated Regional Transport Plan for SE Queensland: A Case
for Increased Public and Business Awareness and Participation);
- one of the
main issues the WBTNI was expected to address was a Brisbane west bypass (ie a
route similar to the Gateway Motorway to Brisbane's east). However this option
was
ruled out politically
apparently on the basis that it was outside the
urban 'footprint' set by the SEQ regional plan. It seemed to be assumed that the
north-south traffic demand to Brisbane's west could be served by the
Western Freeway together with a new tunnel freeway north from Toowong
roundabout. However, if as is likely the tunnel freeway option proves prohibitively
costly, the only option could be the development of the so-called Route 20
which failed in the face of local objections many years ago. It may well be
that: the adoption of an urban 'footprint' makes the development of a freeway
based transport system impossible - as it limits access to the green-field
rights-of-way that such a systems traditionally exploit and contribute to
urban sprawl in doing so;
-
three freeway tunnels
have been suggested for connection to the Western
Freeway at Toowong (two by Brisbane's Lord Mayor's TransApex proposals, and one
through WBTNI), yet it seemed that investigations of one of these options (the
Northern Link) was being undertaken without considering the other two;
- the
'Connecting SEQ 2031' project was said to being taking account of diverse challenges including oil
supply / price constraints. This seems desirable because there have been
indications (in Brisbane as elsewhere) that escalating oil prices reduce total motor
vehicle usage and increase public transport demand. However the 'Connecting
SEQ 2031' project is to take the regional plan as given - despite the
possibility that the global peak oil event will increase fuel costs enormously
(eg 3-8 times), make driving much less affordable and thus encourage a shift
in urban form (eg discourage suburban-style development - see
comments on
'Time to Reassess Land Use'). Thus trying to plan transport systems separately
from urban planning and from analysis of likely future fuel costs was likely to be
unreliable.
There are moreover grounds for concern about the
regional / infrastructure plans
for SE Queensland that have been developed over the years in the hope that they
would provide a realistic framework for detailed transport planning (eg see
Growth Management in
SE Queensland and
SE Queensland
Regional Plan and Infrastructure Plan).
The latter suggested in relation to the regional plan that:
- problems in managing land use and infrastructure in SE Queensland can not
be separated from a general lack of top management competencies in Queensland,
and severe dysfunctions that have now developed in state public
administration;
- a solution is available in the medium term - but some envisaged
'solutions' would not work;
- overcoming the funding constraints to eliminate infrastructure backlogs
will not be easy.
In relation to infrastructure plans, it suggested that the plan was a modest
and internally coherent proposal that drew attention to many important issues.
However it contained fatal defects because:
- its was a central 'strategic plan' which was necessarily remote from those
with the detailed information needed to ensure that the plan makes sense, and
the operational responsibility to give it practical effect;
- given serious defects in Queensland's infrastructure machinery,
committing substantial funding for infrastructure was a formula for 'white
elephants';
- the expectation that a committee could coordinate such a plan was
unrealistic;
- there seemed to be practical defects in the plan itself;
- the limitations of what can be achieved through public-private
partnerships were not resolved.
Super-departments: A Non-Solution?
Unfortunately
the fragmentation and unreliability of transport planning is unlikely to be
fixed by a super-department (a move that the Auditor General reportedly endorsed).
In the first place, for reasons suggested above, no 'super-department' can ever be big
enough to internalize everything that needs to be planned simultaneously.
Managing
relationships between complex issues (eg through creating a legal
framework for social / economic transactions within the community, or
arranging services that can't be coordinated through market mechanisms) is in some ways the very
essence of what 'governing' involves (see
Governing is not just running a large business). Fairly effective machinery has traditionally been
established to facilitate coordination through Cabinet, the budget process,
senior ministers and central agencies. However the informal communication
amongst networked and motivated public service staff is likely to be equally
significant.
The present
writer recalls concluding years ago that:
"Unless the internal organisation structure of [super departments] is good,
all that is done is to introduce another echelon which hides the lack of
coordination which it is meant to cure. In such a situation disaggregation of
the [super department] and their coordination through the Chief Executive
could be just as effective" (Craig J., 'Coordination as an aspect of
Government Planning and Administration', Master's thesis, University of
Queensland, 1978). It seems that 'super-departments' are still widely
regarded as unsuccessful by serious students of public administration
(see observations below).
This concern about the effectiveness of super-departments applies generally to the across the board
restructuring of Queensland's public sector (ie the creation of 13
super-departments under six super-ministries [1])
that was announced in March 2009, though it had not been mentioned before the
then-recent election [1].
A Realistic Solution?
Queensland faces real problems in meeting
demands for services (eg transport and health). This partly reflects the
accumulation of backlogs due to rapid post-1980 population growth to which
there was no systematic response in the 1980s and only an ineffectual
response in the 1990s.
It also partly reflects poorly-informed political influence over investment
decisions.
This is illustrated by lobbying for projects which
may appear to have local benefits without concern for their regional
impacts. Consider for example:
- a mayor's explanation about the
'obvious' importance of an extension to the Centenary Highway in
anticipation of future urban growth [1].
The problem is that that extension implies adding further traffic to the Centenary Highway /
Western Freeway which (as noted below) may be hard to handle;
- political lobbying by a local MLA for evaluation of a 'Kenmore Bypass' based on
purely local considerations, though it would have regional traffic
implications - including diverting Moggill Road traffic (and ultimately
perhaps also north-and-east-bound Warrego Highway traffic) onto the Centenary
Highway / Western Freeway (see
Selling a 'Lemon': the
Kenmore Bypass)
In other parts of the world political 'pork barrelling' to gain local
projects at public expense has led to notorious 'roads to nowhere'.
The above examples are different. They involve roads that would feed into
probably-irresolvable congestion on the Western Freeway. Even if the
latter was substantial upgraded, the regional system might not be workable because
of the uncertain feasibility of freeway connections at Toowong. It is noted that in the 1930s the Office of Coordinator General was
created in Queensland because of concerns that political influence was
being brought to bear to secure public spending on wasteful projects.
However the biggest source of current problems
lies in the unthinking creation of ineffectual machinery of government -
perhaps primarily as
a result of:
- the financial imbalances that have emerged
in Australia's federal system of government - which, especially since the
1970s, have rendered states virtually incapable of taking real
responsibility, or being held democratically accountable, for their nominal
functions (eg see
Federal-State Fiscal Imbalances). The latter referred to the effect of
those financial imbalances on shifting power within state agencies from
those with the knowledge and skill to 'do things' to those in central
agencies concerned with lobbying for funds (an effect very much like the
effect of tariff protection on manufacturers);
- the politicisation, de-skilling,
pseudo-commercialization and unworkably-centralised decision-making that was
inflicted by the Goss Government in the early 1990s on the basis of inexperienced
reformer's theories (eg see
The Growing Case for a Professional Public
Service and
Decay of Australian Public Administration). Similarly destructive
'reforms' had led to immediate crises for Victoria's
unfortunate Cain
Government in the 1980s, as it made the mistake of tasking its newly-unworkable
machinery to achieve ambitious goals;
- the amateurish regional planning and infrastructure management
arrangements mentioned above, that have created an
insecure context within which operational planning for transport
infrastructure has been expected to be undertaken.
The specific organisational defects that the
Auditor General's 2009 report identified probably reflect the lack of an
effective professional working environment for the Public Service.
Similar factors
were previously noted in relation to the crises that emerged in Queensland's hospital
system (see
Intended Submission to Health System
Royal Commission) and SE Queensland's water supplies (see
Structural Incompetence and SE
Queensland's Water Crisis).
Given an
environment favouring professionalism and collaboration (ie where public
servants were allowed and motivated to deal with real problems rather than
merely mechanically following orders that reflect the intrinsically-limited information available
to elected officials), many defects would probably have been identified and resolved
internally long ago.
Thus one way to start overcoming defects in planning and delivery of state
services is a process (perhaps
similar to that used
in the 1970s) that seeks to develop a sense of cohesive purpose (eg
focused on infrastructure delivery) within a
professional and politically-independent public sector - with structural
changes as a consequence rather than the driver of improved organisational
effectiveness. Such a process would allow all current requirements (not simply those that
occur to external critics) to be taken into account in developing new
arrangements.
However it needs to be clearly recognised that there would now be many other
requirements to create an effective system of government in Queensland.
Aspects of this challenge include:
- the emergence of a community sense of responsibility and commitment, rather than
dependency and a 'lucky-country' apathy, followed by;
- the creation of a much stronger set of external institutions able to provide
informed inputs to the democratic political process - partly to enable Parliament to
become a relevant constraint on the abuses of Executive power that arise from
cronyism within 'Queensland Inc';
- reform of federal-financial arrangements to enable and force states to
take responsibility for their functions;
- a more transparent state budget process;
- career structures that protects public servants against political 'bullying', and a framework for professional evaluation of public service
appointments;
- procedural liberalization and decentralization within government administration;
- reducing the expectation of what can be achieved through
'regional' planning / coordination - that does not
directly engage the operational planning activities of responsible agencies;
- emphasis on strategic
'management' (to stimulate organisational learning) rather than
centralized strategic
'planning';
- reviewing the expectation that
business-like methods are suitable for
governing - and particularly reviewing arrangements following from National
Competition Policy as the latter has arguably impeded governments in
managing infrastructure development;
- rethinking where public private partnerships are relevant
- eg in terms of the need to manage infrastructure systems as well as
implementing individual projects;
- emphasis on increasing economic productivity through
development of the
market economy, rather than distorting effective government by assuming
that 'business-like'
methods must be the best way to promote efficiency;
- dealing with 'modern' challenges to the effectiveness of democratic
government (ie growing complexity and globalization).
Documents are available that
refer in more detail to some aspects of this challenge. See also speculations
about the requirements to be
Queensland's Next Successful Premier .
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