Structural Incompetence and SE Queensland's Water Crisis

Some issues raised in consultations by
Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport on
"Options for additional water supplies for south-east Queensland",
(Australia. Proof Committee Hansard)

Note: [number] refers to page numbers in .pdf draft

GYMPIE on 17/4/07

Landholders / Businesses affected by Traveston Dam Proposal

compensation for businesses (as compared with landowners) adversely affected by Traveston Dam proposal is of concern [8], as are social impacts on community [10];
farmers would not build a dam (as government is proposing to) in the middle of an alluvial flood plain [16];
state government claims about economic opportunities coming from dam are dubious [12];

Save the Mary River Group

low current flows in Mary river, and poor water quality, are concerns [18];
if those with currently inactive water allocations start trading on them, it will be impossible even before dam is built (according to government analyses) to meet environmental flow objectives for the Mary River. Dam would result in taking three times as much water from the river [18];.
the government relies on a preliminary GHD study as justification for the dam - yet the water yield and cost figures in that report bear no relationship to figures that have now been put forward for EPBC approval. With the new figures Traveston Dam is the most economically inappropriate of all available options [19];
there has been very poor public communication by Queensland Water Infrastructure PL [19]
dam proposals would involve taking 70 gigalitres at Stage 1, 110 GL at Stage 2, then 150 GL with Borumba Dam also. There would also be evaporation and seepage losses [20];
the dam's yield relies on taking the small flushing flows that come through every two years - and this will have an effect on the river downstream for 200 km to Great Sandy Strait. Environmental impact studies on this do not seem to be being done [21];
at Paradise Dam (under control of Queensland Water Infrastructure) there is concern about failures to meet imposed environmental standards [22];
early estimates put seepage losses from dam at 0.3m to 3.0 m. If evaporation losses are 1.4m and dam averages 5m depth, the dam would be vulnerable [23];
the cost of the dam (Stage 1) is estimated as $1.7bn plus $900m for piping and the cost of relocating (about) 30km of roads. This would provide storage yielding only 150,000 ML - which would not be considered viable anywhere else. Original estimates for water from Traveston were $3,500 / ML but this has now increased by a factor of 7 to $24,500 / ML [27];
government is using seepage estimates of 300 mm / year in yield estimates (the general figure used in SEQ) - though no work has been done to confirm this at this site on an alluvial flood plain. There are 26 m of alluvium under the dam [27];
those in the community investigating dam proposal have found it very hard to get technical information from government [29];
problems are perceived in the interdependence between the state government's Coordinator General's office and the dam proponents - which means that they are assessing their own project. Submissions were made about what needed to be considered in EIS, and there is no way to determine whether this will be done, because terms of reference for studies are not to be released [34];

Local MLA

there have been problems in poor consultation with community. For a long time there were announcements about a weir on the Mary River - then within a period of 7 days this was changed into a major dam [36];
many are concerned about low land valuations being used for compensation. People feel they are being bullied [37];

Community Organizations

there are high levels of social / individual stress in community associated with proposal for a dam whose viability is not certain [41];
the state government's treatment of affected community is bad either because it is incompetent or spiteful. What is being done is a crime [45];

Mary River Mayors

Traveston Dam is not designed to solve current drought problem - merely to deal with long-term supply-demand balance in SEQ - yet it has been included in emergency legislation on drought response. There is a large range of demand and supply measures in place in parallel to deal with drought. [51] The latter will meet supply requirements til 2030. Demand management options are the cheapest. Drought in Wivenhoe region is worst on record, which is not true elsewhere. In future major droughts don't need single water source, but rather measures that can be quickly rolled out. The impact of climate change is uncertain - and spending $2.5m on rain-fed dam is very risky option. Traveston Dam (because it required long distance water transport) involves significant greenhouse gas emissions. [52]
the process being used to investigate Traveston Dam lacks transparency to a much greater level than encountered elsewhere. Adequacy of supply depends on level of restrictions community will accept - a question they have never been asked. [53]
in 1994 Department of Water Resources investigated and rejected Traveston Dam (when yield estimate was 296,000 ML annually and cost was $125m - because of: location on alluvial flood plain; high capital cost; inundating prime agricultural land; and displacing population. [54]
DPI threatened penalty on local council because it erected <1m addition to weir on Mary River - on the grounds that this would interfere with lungfish and cod [54]
State government has criticised alternative water supply proposals on the basis of: ignoring population growth; requiring knife-edge future water security; and future desalination plant on Bribie Island - in response to which it was argued that alternatives were developed on the basis of government's own figures, and that various options were canvassed [56]. Those data were used, but questioned on the basis that they may over-estimate water requirements because of (a) urban consolidation and (b) improved efficiency in water using devices [57]. Per capita water use estimates for Brisbane are high compared with other cities - and will be reduced after current drought end because of practices adopted during drought - leaving water consumption at about Level 2 restriction level [58]. Queensland is already doing a lot in implementing water saving measures in new developments [59]
given true cost of Traveston water, options such as indirect recycling and desalination become more feasible [61]
it makes no more sense to get water for Brisbane from Clarence [61]
some improvement in situation would come from slowing population growth, but most demand comes from existing customers [62]
using rainwater tanks is more attractive if built into initial development, rather than if retro-fitted as this is very costly [63]
evaporation from storages in this area is usually assumed to equal annual rainfall. No one knows the extent of seepage losses. If the dam is 5m deep, 1m is lost through evaporation, another meter through seepage and another metre through siltation over time, eventually project would fail [63]
QWI quotes dam average depth as 16m - but it is only 8m based on dividing volume by area, and most of the time it would not be full - hence 5 m figure [64]
there is doubt about the ability of Mary River to absorb environmental impacts of a big Dam. Supply security for existing irrigators is uncertain. Cost of water to Brisbane would be high [64]

Engineers

it is most unusual to propose building dam on alluvial floodplain. Usually efforts are made to reduce evaporation / seepage. Proposed dam area is not pristine. It is subject to aquatic weed infestation. [68]
current SEQ water consumption is 400,000 ML / annum. Unconstrained this could rise to 950,000 ML by 2050. Traveston Stage 1 could meet less than 10% of that, and even Stage 2 is not much better. ALP blocked construction of Wolffdene, then bought land in 4 other catchments - none of which have had dams built. GHD report on which Traveston proposal is based shows water cost as $4,600 per ML, while current figure is $22,700. Yield estimates for dam use rainfall from 1893 to 1997 - but there is no data for 2000-2007 during severe drought. Though Deputy Premier claims that the dam, if built years ago, would now be full an analysis based on river flows suggests it would be near empty. [69] Situation in Brisbane River is very similar to Mary [70]
raising Borumba Dam has long been proposed [70];
when Wivenhoe Dam was built, 6.5 years of studies and consultations occurred before land was resumed. Traveston has been done the other way around. [70];
Wivenhoe Dam stored 3m ML on 32,000 hectares. Monduran Dam (like Traveston) holds 585,000 ML but covers only 5,000 hectares as compared with over 30,000 ha for Traveston. The latter is too shallow. Other dams have been built in big ravines which keep water cool, and reduce evaporation. A lot of silt comes down Mary River. An expert opinion was expressed some years ago that no dam could be designed on Traveston foundations - a situation that won't have changed much [70];
85% of the land for Wolffdene Dam has been resumed [71];
it would be at least 2014 before Traveston could supply water, and construction will demand resources that are already heavily in demand [71];
exploratory drilling resulted in something being released that killed cattle. There are a large number of arsenic cattle dips in the area [ 72];

Ecologists

there is concern about survival of lungfish if the dam proceeds [83];
there is also increased risk of aquatic weed infestations (which can harm the ecology) from construction of a dam [93];

Regional Environmental Groups

sodic, dispersive soils are common in Mary valley and pondage causes problems for downstream landholders while turbidity adversely affects downstream environment [96];
environmental impact studies of barrage on Mary River suggested that there should be no downstream environmental impact - but this was proved untrue [99];
several dams in Queensland have been badly affected by siltation - and no one knows about this for Mary River [101];
government is assuming that there is no downstream effect of dam because 85% of pre-dam flows would be maintained. But there is already little flow past barrage - and that which occurs is intermittent to suit requirements of irrigators - and this is not healthy for river [104];
proposals for raising the Mary River barrage were put forward by the state government some years ago - and it was found that the barrage is already at the hight that they proposed (ie it is higher than it is supposed to be) [108];
the state government is not worried about aquatic weeds in the river, because landholders are held to be responsible for removing them [108];

BRISBANE - 18 April 2007

Academic

dam site is not ideal. There is a need for an adequate catchment to fill it. In average year this would not occur. One year in 10 rain would be sufficient to fill and overflow. Dam-site should be in deep valley - but proposed site is in flat broad valley, so evaporation losses will be huge. Stage 1 average depth is 5m (and 8m in Stage 2). Wivenhoe has 11m - which is also not ideal. Dam site should be on stable rock and even latest site proposal is far from ideal. There should be low base permeability but site is in alluvial valley with alluvium over 30m deep in places [8]. Seepage losses could be 3.2m / annum - on top of 1.4m evaporation which will mean that most of storage is lost annually [9];
constructing small weirs on Brisbane river would make better use of rainfall in that catchment that now often goes out to sea [9];
seepage losses would fill aquifer - and it is unclear whether this water would then be available downstream [9];
resuming authority argues this site is third best available for evaporation [10] - and that it would be the third deepest dam in Queensland [11];
water hyacinth might take up 3m of water annually [12];
if potential losses are real, dam would be dry most of the time [12]
SEQ's population is projected to increase to 5m by 2050 (a factor of 2.5 increase) so need for other primary water sources appears certain - though others suggest that this is not so [14]
no one can say where seepage water from Mary river would end up - perhaps it could move into other catchments [15]
seepage studies for Wivenhoe Dam took 6.5 years [15]

Landowners Affected by Wyaralong Dam Proposal

information has not been made publicly available to justify proposed Wyaralong Dam [17] The proposal for it is based purely on belief it will have low political impact. No water has flowed down Teviot Brook - on which dam would be located- this year. The proposed yield would be 10,000 ML for $500m - though there are many other figures and would have even higher evaporation losses. There is a popular view that the yield could be 35,000ML and so provide a water supply quick-fix. However it would be 1.5 times more expensive water than from high-cost Traveston [18]';
better alternatives are available by (a) using some existing dams better (b) stormwater / rainwater capture and re-use in Beaudesert / Logan area (c) development of Glendower Dam which would have higher yield and lower cost [19];
Teviot Brook ran consistently in good rainfall periods (ie 1970s) but not currently [22];
there is a linkage between Wyaralong Dam and another on Logan River (at Cedar Grove), though state government stated that these were justified on a stand-alone basis. [24]
decisions are being made on the basis of GHD study though it was just a scoping study that was not suitable for this, and in fact itself indicated the need for significantly more work [25];
very little investigation was done before decisions were made [25]
there is a lack of official information about the yield expected to come from Wyaralong Dam - because it is regarded as part of a system - and a lack of information about how the decision favouring Wyaralong was made [28]

Academic

there is a problem with mega-projects worldwide - that financial costs are under-estimated, benefits are elevated and social / environmental costs are deflated. Governments have to do this to get projects through. Under-estimating social impacts is part of the problem [ 32];
there were poor decisions made well before the 1990s in developing real estate to bring a lot of people to SE Queensland [32];
there are deficiencies in the process the state government is using to cope with social impacts of Traveston [35];
all proposed economic benefits to region from Traveston Dam depend on other conditions being met [36];
many in the world are going to be water poor in future. Is the solution to pay full cost for it? But those who make money out of water supplies don't necessarily put this back into the utility - due to move away from service provision model [37];
decisions on location of both Traveston and Wyaralong Dams appeared to be influenced by the fact that they were in non-ALP-held electorates [37];
people are less willing to accept Dam decisions because they feel that they were largely determined by political considerations [38];
based on international practice for dealing with social / environmental / institutional / political costs of large dams 38 criteria were identified, on which state government passed on only 2 [39];
clear transparent and accountable processes have not been used in arriving at Traveston Dam proposal [41];
Queensland's lack of compliance with other national arrangements also needs to be considered [41];
environmental impacts of proposed Traveston Dam will be significant [42];
organisations making inputs in relation to environmental impacts lack the resources required to do so properly [49];
the Queensland Government often goes ahead with projects without undertaking an EIS [50];
increasing the height of other dams or buying everyone water tanks could be better options than Traveston [51]

Rural Organisations

there has not been an adequate cost/benefit analysis for Traveston Dam, or of water planning requirements for rural areas in SEQ [53];
there will be substantial adverse impacts on Gympie from dislocation of agriculture as a result of Traveston [69];
Water Commission recently completed a report into whole water grid - and this brought in Logan Valley and Mary Valley - which means that two large agricultural areas are now subservient to Brisbane's water needs. There is no evaluation of the impact of this - though it will significantly affect the risks of farming in those areas [71];
climate change has affected the already complicated business of hydrology - and GHD's history-based estimated of yields have been reduced in government's prudent yield estimates (though what this allows for is unclear) [72];
there should be a public testing of data used in making major decisions such as this [72];

State Opposition

the Opposition is concerned about the political process in reaching decision. Traveston was announced in April 2006 - and was a complete surprise because no one had heard of it or known it was being considered. Despite numerous studies of water supplies for SEQ - Traveston was only mentioned one with a one-line dismissal. [75] It was eventually revealed that decision resulted from desk-top study by GHD - which revealed many gaps in information about Traveston. The decision thus seems purely political - to be seen to be doing something in the face of water crisis. It was about building perceptions, not about supplying water [76];
the Opposition believes that diverse other water projects could be developed - that were already being planned [77];
a three-fold increase in water prices are likely in SEQ because projects that are being developed are being done in panic [78];
six months after decision was made it was obvious that there was no information about Traveston option - it had not been part of planning process [81];
there is a real prospect that Brisbane will run out of water [81];
if Traveston Dam will be able to provide water for Brisbane in 2014, there is every chance that other nearby catchments would also be full (ie Wivenhoe) [82];
the cost of Traveston (when road relocations etc) are taken into account will be closer to $3bn than $1.7bn), thus making water equivalent to the cost of desalinated water [82];
Traveston was included in emergency water regulations merely for political purposes - so that the Opposition would vote against those regulations [88];

State Public Servants

the state government has a diversity of plans in place to address water supply problems in SEQ, that result from a long drought and rapid population growth. Traveston Dam is only part of this. Site provides the largest yield and most secure potential supply in SEQ - because of its larger command of a relatively wet catchment. The site was selected through an appropriate process - and further studies have confirmed its appropriateness. A transparent EIS will be conducted [92];
a considerable amount of work has been done on what would be required to establish a water market in SEQ [95];
there has been a large volume of interchange of information with the community - via meetings, phone calls and supply of documents with community [96];
the government is not aware of areas where requests for information have not been met [98];
government disagrees with Professor White's view that demand management savings could be 330,000 ML rather than the 210,000 ML that the government assumes. An expert assessment of this is available. White believes that 300 litres / person / day is excessive use, but actually demand studies have been done. Also Water Commission, as independent statutory authority, should not take overaggressive approach to demand management [99];
government believes commercial-in-confidence provisions in purchase agreements are to give land-holders confidence that government will not disclose their deals to others [101];
Cedar grove Weir and Wyaralong Dam will yield 21,000 ML / annum when operated as a system [104];
government views Traveston Stage 1, Borumba and Traveston Stage 2 as a system that should not be seen as separate components. Comparing this with Glendower, Amamomoor, Cambroon and Borumba in terms of cumulative inflows reveals Traveston to be a standout in its performance as a dam [106];
pan evaporation for Traveston is 1.4 m, but net evaporation (which also takes account of rainfall and seepage) would be 520 mm / year. This is comparable with other structures [107];
the 70,000 ML yield estimate takes account of this, as well as stream inflows [108];
documents community was concerned about obtaining were officially requested by the committee [109];
current techniques you determining yields involve 'level of service' (as compared with traditional historical no-value yield approach) and this takes account of climate variability [110];
government has done many things to minimize social impacts [112] ;
community is unhappy with the effect that this has had on them [112]
where cows died after drilling, tests were done only on whether soil brought up was poisonous - not on what killed the cows [114];
government will soon make terms of reference for EIS available [115];
water supply options for Mary River had been considered for a long time. SE Queensland Regional Plan forced a focus on how to meet the needs of 1m extra people. Traveston site had long been recognised, but it now became necessary to consider integrated urban supply question. Traveston is largest site left in SEQ - and government decided to take a closer look. GHD report identified Traveston as No 1 in terms of yield and No 4 in terms of cost. In 1970s Gympie Council had done work on flood mitigation options on Mary. GHD study - which looked at 80 possible sites - and Traveston was no 1 in terms of yield - 2.5 times greater than the next best. At the same time the regions other storages were also being de-rated. In 2004 it was believed that available storages would yield 630, 000 ML / annum but this is now down at 450,000 ML. Thus bringing Traveston forward became important. [ 116];
traditionally water yield was calculated on the basis of historic no-failure yield basis. Now use same data with a stochastic analysis. Now however there is a need to move away from historical data and look towards the future - and beyond that to make allowance for climate change [117];
estimated cost for Dam Stage 1 is $1.7bn and includes relocation of associated infrastructure [117] which should yield 70,000 ML [119]
estimates for Borumba are $250m, and for Traveston 1 and 2 a total of $2-2.5bn. [119];
EIS will only consider Stage 1 - though what would happen in Stage 2 would also be relevant [120];
the GHD report had discussed a Traveston Dam that was considerably larger than the one that it is now proposed to build [122];
studies on losses through seepage have been done - and will be available as part of EIS - but is not available now for other engineers to check [123];
geological reports on the area are available - despite others' views that they were not [124]
Traveston was announced as preferred site (based on yields) subject to further investigation - and those investigations were not conducted on other sites [130];
how could anyone know the yield before investigations were done - because this depends on evaporation / seepage [130];
government took decision, and asked if project was capable of going forward to construction [131];
project was just plucked from the air - and tested. It was not actually compared against anything [131];
the determination was based on yield - no other option can provide what Traveston can [134];
other dams could be built yielding 119 ML - which is more than stage 1 for Traveston - but some of them are higher up in the catchment and would make it impossible to get expected yield from Traveston Stage 2 [136]
12 folders of documents were submitted from government to committee - which the latter have not had time to read [140]

TOWARDS A PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE FOR QUEENSLAND (2007+)
CPDS Home Contact	Professionalism: Chronological Summary Traveston Dam: The Weirdness Continues The Choice is not just between Flood Levees and Flood Levies Saving 'Brand Labor' from Traveston Dam? What about Saving 'Brand Queensland' and 'Brand Australia'? 2011 Flood Much about the flood is still to be uncovered