Introduction (The
Need to do More than
Prepare for the Last Great Battle of WWII +
Later indicators of
security challenges in Asia) +
Addenda:
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Introduction The purpose of this document is to provide preliminary comments and
suggestions in relation to a Kokoda Foundation publication by Professor Ross
Babbage (Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030 (February 2011) which is referred to here as
'the report').
An outline of the executive summary of that report (and of other issues
raised) is presented below, together with
comments by other observers.
Overview: In brief the report suggested that China's growing
military capabilities pose potential future threats to Australia's security
that required fundamental (and costly) changes to Australia's defence
planning. Several observers endorsed the importance of considering that issue,
though there was both support for and opposition to the conclusions Professor Babbage
drew.
The email to Professor Babbage reproduced below,
is an overview of the comments in this document.
The Need to do More than Prepare for the Last Great Battle
of WWII (email sent 16/2/11)
Professor Ross Babbage,
Kokoda Foundation
I should like to make some preliminary suggestions
following your recent report on responding to potentially-major security threats
to Australia posed by China’s rising military capacities. Those suggestions are
outlined on my web-site in
Comments on Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030.
As I have no expertise in defence planning, my comments are
based primarily on attempts to understand the intellectual basis of the
‘economic miracles’ achieved in recent decades by East Asian societies with an
ancient Chinese cultural heritage. Moreover they are limited to trying to
illustrate the breadth of issues that need to be considered in seeking a
strategic edge in ‘Asia’. In that context possibilities (in relation to both the
nature of the strategic challenge and appropriate remedies) emerge that are
quite different to the ‘hard power’ options normally considered by defence
planners. None-the-less considering those possibilities could be a useful
exercise – because (even if the particular possibilities suggested don’t stand
up to close scrutiny) they illustrate the types of possibilities that need to be
considered.
In brief my preliminary suggestions are that:
- Your report’s conclusion about the need for a whole-of-nation
approach to security is sound. Thus the focus of most your report on traditional
‘national security’ capabilities is too narrow. Economic, social, governance and
intellectual (ie ‘soft power’) capabilities are arguably even more important in
gaining a strategic edge. Analysis of ‘hard power’ options should be used
initially to show others what might be needed if ‘soft power’
options fail;
- The PLA’s build-up described in your report suggests that China
expects to be either: (a) attacked by the US; or (b) at risk of being blockaded
to deny access to resources. China may fear aggressive reactions to: (a)
disruption of the established democratic-capitalist basis of the international
order by an emerging neo-Confucian order; and / or (b) belated recognition of
how the US’s economy has been ‘attacked’ (and perhaps even how the US may have
been deceived);
- The most effective way to counter the threats posed by the
build-up of PLA capabilities is probably to eliminate the motives behind that
build-up. This might be achieved by (for example): promoting China’s people’s
understanding of their options; increasing ‘Asia literacy’ in the West; and
depriving unbalanced / mercantilist systems of socio-political-economy of the
current account surpluses that they need for stability;
- Very large defence cost savings could be achieved in the
medium-long term by broadening the concept of ‘national security capabilities’.
Most of what is required to ensure a ‘strategic edge’ might be more
appropriately described as ‘nation building’ (eg eliminating domestic weaknesses
associated with ignorance and ineffectual governance).
I would be interested in your reaction to my speculations.
John Craig
That email also noted; (a) the present writer's lack of defence planning expertise; and (b) that these comments are based on efforts to
understand the intellectual foundations of 'economic miracles' in recent decades
in societies with an ancient Chinese cultural
heritage, and are limited to trying to illustrate what needs to be different in
dealing with national security issues in 'Asia' (see also Qualification below).
Later indicators of
security challenges in Asia:
Japan
There have long been indications of nationalistic fervour
in Japan (see
Reverting to the Soul of a Samurai?).
The latter includes reference to:
China In March 2012 it was reported
that the person who is expected to be China's president next year (Xi Jinping):
(a) rejected US president Obama's proposal for a serious dialogue between US and
China's armed forces; (b) is seen to tougher, more nationalistic and closer to
the military than his predecessor (Hu Jintao); and (c) won't resist those who
press for China to be tougher as the US is seen to be heading for inexorable
decline [1]
In August 2012 a long term resident in China
suggested that since its inception China's Communist Party had
sought support from China's people on the basis of a vengeful nationalism.
In November 2012 it was
suggested
that China's new Politburo was dominated by conservative hardliners, rather than
those who might have followed through on the political and economic reforms
advocated by China's retiring president (Hu Jintao) .
In January 2013 attention was drawn to ASIO's concern that
Australia could be the target of cyber espionage attacks that were believed to
originate primarily with the Chinese Government (Joye C.,
'ASIO espionage warning', Financial Review,
2-4/1/13)
In March 2013 China's ambassador to Australia
outlined China's aspirations for peaceful development
in an article that was superficially attractive but also replete with
uncertainties because of the cultural issues that are addressed below.
In April 2013 it was suggested that though China's new
president has promoted military cooperation with many countries, China's
strategic ambitions and poor transparency have not changed. In the 1990s Beijing
offered assurances of seeking a peaceful rise, and then from 2010 undermined
their own rhetoric with escalating diplomatic incidents. This caused all
countries in the region to seek closer security ties with the US and each other.
China's defence budgets have increased faster than its GDP for 15 years, and its
submarine program indicates that it is not merely interested in promoting
regional security. The regional stampede to balance China has caused a
'diplomatic reset' by China's leaders - but its fundamental (expansionist?)
objectives have not altered. [1]
In April 2013 attention was also
drawn to the nationalistic aspirations expressed by the General Secretary of
China's Communist Party - involving a dream of the resurgence of the 'Chinese
Race'
After being appointed as party secretary Xi Jinping led
Politburo Standing Committee on a tour of the The Road to Rejuvenation
exhibition at National Museum in Beijing - and there promised to pursue the
'China dream' (ie the great revival of the Chinese race). The exhibition tells
the epic tale of China's decline and dismemberment at the hands of foreign
forces and the struggle of the Communist-led people to reclaim their national
pride, dignity and power. China is seen to finally be in control of its own
destiny after 170 years of struggle (from opium Wars). Modern Chinese leaders
have tried to define their leadership through such slogans as the China dream -
though achieving the 'Chinese races great rejuvenation' is now seen to be
closer. The 'China dream' was originally the title of a book by Liu Mingfu (a
PLA colonel) which addressed overcoming American hegemony and assuming global
supremacy. It was initially banned, but then republished after Xi's museum
visit. Its call for a revival of Spartan, martial spirit echoes the new
leaderships crackdown on corruption and lavish living. The military (and its
'princeling generals') are key supporters / advisers of Xi, and China's more
assertive foreign policy reflects the moralistic nationalism at the core of his
statist vision. The Party's austerity program (outlined in Politburo's 'eight
point regulation' aims to improve work styles and resembles the Maoist 'mass
line'. In contrast to US approach this argues that China dream is a collective
enterprise (ie the China dream asserts that if it is good for the country, its
good for the nation and everyone benefits. This continues the cultural tradition
of Eastern collectivism which holds that a big / powerful country safeguards the
happiness of the people and allows everyone to share in benefits of state
development. Individual dreams and state dreams are seen to be mutually related.
This raises questions about whose dream matters most - the Party's or the
peoples. On the Internet some Chinese dispute the 'China dream'. But others
(soldiers and nationalists) embrace the dream. The China dream is a powerful
method for grassroots mobilization - but the Party may not have the legitimacy /
capacity to control the future. Xi's predecessor had a vision of 'China's
peaceful rise'. Xi's 'China dream' may define the next decade or fizzle out. Xi
is a relaxed / confident patriot who views his princeling status as mandate to
rule. He is clearly different to his predecessor Hu - though both were risk
averse - preserving the Communist Party's wealth and power above any other
priority [1]
Anti-Western Communist Party documents show that Xi
Jinping's presidency is set on a hard line against foreign influences. Officials
are required to understand the harm of Western viewpoints, and emphasis the need
for China to stand up to the West in becoming rich and strong. Battlefield
tactics are expected to be used to defeat liberals and dissidents. China's
universities have banned discussion of seven evil subjects: universal values;
Western ideas of the freedom of the press; civil society; civic rights;
historical mistakes of the Communist Party; crony networks; and judicial
independence. China's journalists are not allowed to cite foreign sources in
reports. While Xi and others have talked about bold economic reforms, it is
clear that political change is not on the agenda [1]
In June 2014 it was plausibly argued that Xi Jinping's
reforms had nothing to do with the economic and political liberalization that
Western observers had anticipated but rather involved the re-establishment of
something like China's ancient Confucian system of governance by bureaucratic
elites (see
The Resurgence of Ancient Authoritarianism in China)
North Korea
In April 2013 North Korea threatened to attack both South
Korea and the US (An
Art of War Perspective on North Korea's
Threats).
In late 2014 it was suggested that 'pax
Americana' (the post WWII international order featuring free markets, liberal
democracy and a rule of law that had been sustained by US power) was likely to
be severely challenged by the combined effect of: China's rise; Russian
militarism; and Middle Eastern instabilities with an associated global extremist
fundamentalism. Thus Australia would need to develop an overarching national
security strategy which examined defense issues in a much broader context.
2014 may be the start of a shift to a
more turbulent world no longer dominated by US values and power. Such
shifts occur periodically and are often accompanied by war /
revolution (eg 1918, 1945, 1989. Pax Americana arose from end of WWII
when US and its allies established global institutions / norms that
favoured the free market, liberal democracies and the rule of law.
This was based on US's unrivaled military capacity and its global
alliances. The US-led international order was not always peaceful - eg
consider Cold War conflicts. However pax Americana is now being
challenged by: China's rise, military assertiveness by Russia;
disintegration of regional order in Middle East; and spread of
virulent anti-Western fundamentalism. China has the strategic clout to
pose challenges of a complexity and magnitude not previously
experienced by US-led international order. Its population and economy
dwarfs fascist Germany and imperial Japan - and 20 years of double
digit defense spending have created a strong military capacity.
China's recent behaviour suggests an unwillingness to conform to
international norms. It has challenged the international order in Asia
(especially at sea). China makes clear that it wants to use its power
to change the rules of the game - and replace US as pre-eminent state
in Asia. Whether it will have similar global ambitions depends on how
successful it is in Asia. Examples of initiatives include: proposed
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, FTA with Australia, gas accord
with Russia and limited rapprochement with Japan. Regional development
and economic integration are intended to reduce US economic influence
in Asia. A second challenge had come from Russia's annexation of
Crimea. Europe's leaders had wrongly believed that predatory
nationalism and military aggression had been eliminated from that
continent. Russia does not share Europe's aversion to the use of
military force. Russia sees problems with international order that
does not recognize it as a resurgent great power. Russia is flexing
military muscle and rebuilding alliances worldwide. It has also had a
pivot to Asia - developing relationships with China. Russia has also
impeded efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iraq
and Syria (two heartland states in the Middle East) are destabilized
by conflicts. Egypt confronts its own internal potential
instabilities. Arab-Palestinian relationships have deteriorated
rapidly. Islamic state is a transnational movement with the trappings
of statehood which makes it resistance to conventional deterrence abd
counter-strategies. It is now in alliance with Al Qa'ida and other
extremist groups with a goal of defeating pax Americana and all it
represents. Given three major challenges and the West in relative
decline, pax Americana cannot endure. The US can't provide the global
leadership and authority that it used to. The geopolitical tensions
and volatility of 2014 are likely to be the new normal until the
transition to a new stable order is complete. This process could be
even more difficult if accompanied by systemic (financial, economic,
environmental) shocks. Australia's commitment to the US alliance
system has allowed it to benefit from pax Americana - and it has much
to lose if the old order shifts to a new order that is less liberal.
Australia needs to be pro-active in shaping the new order. The US
alliance has been beneficial - but it is no longer sufficient.
Australia needs to re-examine its foreign policy, trade and defense
policies and articulate a more overarching national strategy. As well
as a Defense White Paper the government needs a major update of the
2013 National Security Strategy [1]
It was also argued that Australia did not have a fully-developed policy
in relation to China.
China's president's visit in November 2014 raised questions about Australia's
and NZ's relationship with the country that has become their largest trading
partner. Many in the worold want China to take on a more active role (on Western
terms), it is ironic that China's leader made that point in Australia. Australia
has no strong vision of its relationship with China. Some don't want a strategy
about this - and many just want to stick with the US no matter what. Xi
posed the question about whether this is sustainable. Australia has long
outsourced deeper strategic thinking to the US, and then just gone along. Both
the US and Australia welcome a strong, peaceful, cooperative China- and want
China to have a similar political image. Trouble arise in dealing with values
and rights. Australia sounds like it has a policy (see Asia in the Asian
Century white paper) but this has disappeared. This doesn't mean that
Australia doesn't want a policy - but that it is leaving the heavy lifting of
integrating China into the global system to the US. China is not
predictable enough for this to be viable. China's growth is recognised to be
vulnerable. It's unity is not secure. Its political moderl is being changed -
though not towards what Western observers would like. Its environmental problems
are massive. China could easily suffer a killer blow, which then would 'kill'
Australia. Australia needs to look at China's internal problems as see how they
might be reduced. It also needs a strategy if China collapses. There is a need
to think of China's rise in terms of what sort of China might exist in 10 years.
China's president talked about Australia's role in an an increasingly
China-influenced world. [1]
And in 2015 there was tension between the
economic advantages that Australia sought, and the strategic risks it
faced, in developing relationships in Asia
Australia's treasurer is in Beijing for discussions related to
AIIB, while the world is being told that China intends to be a
rule maker in the global system. There is deepening economic
engagement - while strategic analysts believe a tougher line is
needed. In 2005 World Bank president called for China to become
influential stakeholder in the international system. But now China
indicates that it will make its own rules. US primacy in Asia has
eroded. After the Asian Financial Crisis Japan tried to get
support for an Asian monetary fund - but failed. China is now
being more successful. China is doing better because it is
thinking bigger - with a strategic vision for the region, creating
the AIIB and seeking to internationalize its currency. US
opposition to AIIB has been labeled a strategic mistake.
Australia's PM (who is strongly pro-US) has lamented lack of US
support for AIIB. However China has failed to reassure the region
on strategic front - and mistrust is growing - and countries are
strengthening security ties with US. US must get the balance
between engaging with and hedging China right . There needs to be
a rules / law-based approach to resolving territorial disputes.
However China will have its own view of the rules and the system [1].
CPDS Comment: This reflects a fundamental
ignorance about the nature of the international order that China
is seeking to create (and which Japan had sought using military
tactics in the 1930s). Under the system favoured by Asian
authoritarians, they would rule. There would be no law / rules to
which they would be subjected - see
Creating a New
International 'Confucian' / Bureaucratic Financial and Political
Order?
This conflict between economic and strategic considerations
parallels the challenge that Australia faced in relation to
Japan's simultaneous militaristic expansion and demand for
Australian iron ore in the 1930s.
Australia's prime minister has launched a new era of relations with Singapore
that includes increased intelligence exchanges, hosting Singaporean
military in Australia and enhancing trade and investment links. It
is hoped that Australia's relationship with Singapore will become
as easy as that with New Zealand [1]
CPDS Comment: This proposed arrangement
reflects some naivety. Singapore is closer
to being a dictatorship than it is to being a liberal democracy.
This is apparent to businesses
that have dealings in Singapore. But how this can be so
requires understanding the nature of power under East Asian
traditions (ie being associated with high status within an
ethnic hierarchy rather than in the ways power is exerted
through liberal Western institutions - see
Asian
Authoritarians Can't be Contained without Understanding How
They Exert Power).
Singapore, three quarters of whose population is ethnic
Chinese, is a product of history. It is governed on the basis
of a combination of Chinese and British practices.
There is a large Chinese Diaspora across SE Asia as the
result of Civil Wars over the past 1000 years that drove the
merchant class out of China in successive waves. And that
Diaspora are the focus of a lot of resentment by other ethnic
groups in SE Asia because of both their
economic power and their behind the scenes distortion of local
political systems. Various observers have argued (see
Civil Wars)
that:
- the Diaspora remain part of greater China and continue
to focus on political and economic maneuvering within that
framework;
- the Diaspora financed China's transformation into a
major economic power [This suggestion needs to be
considered in the context of: (a) Mao's efforts, through
the Cultural Revolution, to eliminate Confucian traditions
from China on the grounds that the social hierarchy this
involves had oppressed Chinese people; (b) the restoration
of a form of Confucianism as the basis of China's post-Mao
economic development; and (c) the resentment this
generates in China by those who favour social equality -
see Confucianism versus
Communism: The Continuing Contest in China];
- Chinese Triads (ie organized crime) are associated
with the Diaspora business groups and used as a form of
private army. Triads, it may be noted, were also used by
the Chinese Government in suppressing student dissent
against China's authoritarianism in Hong Kong in 2015;
- the Diaspora earn significant income from drugs
and prostitution;
- the Diaspora's involvement in corruption is common.
Singapore was
established
as a British trading center in the early 19th century and
became part of Malaysia in 1963 - before being expelled in
1965. Singapore's economic rise depended significantly
on providing a relatively reliable institutional framework is
a region of instability - though it was not entirely devoid of
dubious practices, such as facilitating tax evasion and
providing a haven for the proceeds of organized crime and
corruption (see
Singapore: The Rise and Rise of Asia'a Switzerland).
However, as is usual under the
neo-Confucian
methods that were developed by Japan as the basis for
economic 'miracles' in Asia, Singapore's economic
dealings tend to have strong political / power-seeking dimensions
(ie there is no separation between geo-political /
ethnic-nationalistic considerations and business dealings ie
no significant enterprise that is genuinely 'private').
This point was explored in relation to the implications of a
proposed Singaporean takeover of the Australian Stock Exchange (see Proposed ASX
Takeover: Lifting the Level of Debate, 2010). It needs to be
considered in relation to the view that close ties can easily
be established between Australia and Singapore in all areas.
In late 2015 concerns were expressed about the sale of
Darwin Harbour to a Chinese company. This has become part of strategic
rivalry between the US, China and Japan. No one in Canberra seems to
have considered these implications as the Trade Minister and Minister for
Northern Development viewed the issue only in economic terms. Peter
Jennings (ASPI) pointed out that NT Government had crafted the deal as a
99 year lease to avoid having to get FIRB approval. Defense Department
privately communicated their concerns about the deal. Darwin in key to US
/ Australian military cooperation. Naval cooperation will have special
emphasis on Darwin. A federal cabinet defence and security committee needs
to review such decisions. Concerns about strategic issues fail to
highlight the economic importance that Darwin now has - and will have in
future (Darwin's history in terms of economic and military relationships
with Asia were outlined) [1]
A need was seen for Australia to develop a new security plan based on closer
relationships with the US and efforts to boost Australia's 'intelligence'
capabilities.
Maritime incidents highlight the stress on
regional security resulting from China's territorial claims and great power
ambitions. Such incidents need to be viewed in context of review of Australia's
strategy. Game Plan: The Case for a New Australian Grand Strategy (Ross
Babbage) attempt to outline such a strategy. It urges closer US links - in
contrast to others' suggestions. Australia's geography has always made defence a
difficult task - and Australia is now moving to centre-stage in grand-power
rivalry. Avoiding conflict is the best possible outcome. Keating, Fraser and
White have argued that Australia should jettison US alliance and strike out
alone. Babbage urges becoming the US's indispensible ally. Both US and China see
Australia as having greater strategic importance than previously. US seeks
support as China threatens long-established US bases in East Asia and Western
Pacific. Advocates of abandoning US alliance fear being dragged into US efforts
to block China's rise and its 'legitimate' great power ambitions. Australia is
torn between trade with China and strategic relationship (and cultural affinity)
with US. However that trade with China developed under liberal international
order that US has built / protected since 1945 - and which is now under
challenge mainly from China. US seems weary of maintaining the
international system - as the UK was before WWI. It does not seek war with China
- but will need allies and defensive depth to maintain the liberal international
order. Australia is crucial to US if it gives ground to China in Asia. Babbage
urges thinking this through. Around 2000 Paul Braken (Yale) foresaw much of what
has happened - while many analysts lost sight of strategic realities due to 911
and hope that China might become more liberal and tractable. The latter must end
because of China's spiralling military spending and territorial claims that
alarm its neighbours. Babbage recommends that Australia become 'the centre of
intelligence excellence' for neighbour and allies as well as US's closest
confident and best informed nation around SE Asian theatre. This would require a
much more serious approach to collection / analysis / use of intelligence as
well as counter-intelligence and counter-espionage. This requires a willingness
to critically examine strategic policy assumptions (eg about China, US alliance,
risks of military conflict, and international liberal order that has prevailed
for the last 70 years) [1]
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CPDS Comments
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CPDS COMMENTS
Broadening the Scope of National Security
The report nominates the rise of China (and the role of the PLA) as the reason for a new approach
to ensuring Australia's national security, and is primarily concerned with how
the PLAs' military capabilities might be countered. However the nature of
security capabilities and their missions that are addressed in the report are
too narrow.
Outline. The report suggests (p iii) that national security
capabilities would be those concerned with: "assisting recovery from civil
disasters, helping to resuscitate fragile countries and regions, contributing to
border security, undertaking counterinsurgency campaigns in distant theatres,
launching counter-terrorist operations and preparing to fight in the direct
defence of Australia".
China's rising influence raises many questions for Australia (see
China as the Future of the World
- in relation to a 2003 presentation to Australia's federal Parliament by
China's President Hu). For example, China seems currently to be characterised
by:
- a rejection of such Western characteristics as universal values, social
equality and
concern for the welfare and capabilities of individuals;
- rule, not by law, but rather by the so-called 'Communist' Party (using a
variation of the
traditional methods of Confucian bureaucratic elites);
- an economy that is orchestrated through neo-Confucian relationships
amongst and with those elites (which has created what is effectively a
whole-of-society bureaucracy) - rather than by decentralised profit-oriented decisions within
enterprises; and
- seeking influence elsewhere by creating behind-the-scenes relationships
which lock benefited individuals / organisations into subordinate positions in
that social hierarchy.
These features became far more obvious as a result of changes put into place
by president Xi Jinping in 2013 (see
The Resurgence of Ancient
Authoritarianism in China).
A broader concept of 'national security capabilities' in particular is thus needed
for reasons outlined. These include: the radically
different and unfamiliar way in which 'Asia' works; the way strategy is
conducted in 'Asia'; the relationship between defence and economic
considerations; the need for an 'Asia-literate'
assessment to realistically assess China's
options and motives; and the existence of other challenges that may require more than a
business-as-usual strategic response.
Firstly Understanding is Difficult. A broad approach is needed because even understanding how the
dominant societies in East Asia (who have an ancient Chinese cultural heritage) work is challenging. Without such understanding
it is impossible to:
- understand why there has been cultural resistance to Western-style (eg
liberal democratic capitalistic) institutions; and
- plan a meaningful response - because one can not know even what
to respond to.
Such
understanding seems to be possible if the challenge is looked at from a
particular perspective. Moreover doing so provides useful insights into the
strengths, weaknesses and potential actions of such societies, which otherwise seem
inscrutable (eg see
Reading China's Mind?). And, as a primary component in
traditional East Asian 'Art of
War' strategies involves deception and hopefully preventing others from
understanding how an ethnic community actually operates, understanding is, in itself, likely to
inhibit deception and thus confer a significant strategic edge.
Brief explanation: Understanding
East Asian societies that lack the West's
Judeo-Christian and classical Greek heritage, is not straight forward.
Moreover a fair level of 'Asia literacy' is needed before it is even
possible to understand why this is so.
Understanding East Asia requires understanding traditions:
- that hold that
there is little point in 'understanding' (see
Epistemology: The
Core Issue in Competing Civilizations and
Competing Thought Cultures) - and where
the traditional
purpose of 'education' was to inculcate behaviours rather than
enable students to 'understand';
- where political power is traditionally wielded through controlling
access to information (see China's Bigger
Secret). In 2013 it was
claimed, for example, that the political department of China's PLA
conducts systematic programs to influence / deceive foreign leaders;
- where the purpose of providing information is not to enable
recipients to 'understand' but rather to: (a) avoid direct
confrontation; and (b) induce recipients to do things that
are expected to be beneficial to the provider's family / ethnic community. Thus
verbal or written information provided
by insiders is not reliable as a basis for Western-style
understanding (but rather has the character of polite conversation / 'politically-correct' propaganda). And where information provided is not 'true' this does not mean that
it has to be viewed as a 'lie' - as others are expected to know that
information will be polite / 'politically correct' rather than necessarily
factual. Understanding requires looking at what is being done rather
than at what is being said or at the 'face' that has been put on.
Western observers were arguably unwise in not looking beyond the
liberal democratic 'face' that Japan put
on after WWII;
- whose willingness to tell what Western observers would perceive as
the 'truth' is also limited by a desire to: 'preserve face'; and work
around problems, rather than confront them directly;
- where insiders (unless Westernised) perceive themselves primarily
as part / agents of an hierarchical family / ethnic network rather
than as individuals, and give priority to the interests of those
networks over their individual interests or the interests of outsiders
with whom they may have social or business relationships;
- whose
traditional 'Art of War' tactics
for dealing with powerful outsiders feature deception (ie seeking to mislead them,
perhaps as suggested below).
and
- in which it is likely to be hard to tell: (a) who has the real power
(where this depends on connections and access to, and ability to use,
information); and thus (b) who can thus reliably say what is being
done. For example, 'the oyabun (boss / leader) does not dance
on stage' (ie is not obvious) is a traditional Japanese saying. And
behind the Emperor (a role that
apparently brought more privileges than direct influence), China's Confucian bureaucracy traditionally
wielded the real (knowledge-and-connection-based) power. And the
inability now of China's leaders to move beyond whatever internal
consensus exists (eg in international negotiations) has been
noted. Watching what
is being done, is likely to be more reliable than listening to what is
said by nominal leaders.
- whose
traditional approach to education involves conditioning people to
behave in a particular way, rather than to understand. Encouraging
Australians to 'do it' without thinking deeply seems to be reflected
in:
The assumption that there is little point in seeking abstract
'understanding' has some validity in societies that
have not developed the simplified social spaces that make rationality
(ie the manipulation of abstract concepts as models of reality) a
reasonably effective method for decision making by individuals in
Western societies (given features of the latter societies such as individual liberty, a rule of
law, capitalism and democracy that make Western societies into the
'realm of the rational / responsible individual' - see
Cultural Foundations of Western Strengths).
Rather than seeking 'understanding', information is traditionally
used indirectly to alter individual's behaviour and whole social / economic systems, and
power is not associated with making decisions but with the ability to
access and use information to constructively affect the thinking and
actions of subordinates within an hierarchical social network, and disruptively
affect the thinking and actions of outsiders / enemies. The result
is that things tend to be done in practice before 'ideas' are expressed
about what this means (which is the reverse of the Western practice).
Thus when something is announced, it will be found that whatever is
required to make it work is already (more or less) in place.
In an economic context this approach to using information enables 'economic miracles' through
stimulating simultaneous and complementary changes in all parts of an
economic system (eg under the 'vision development and administrative
guidance' that was method originally used by Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry to accelerate economic development in
the decades following WWII, and similar methods that seem likely to have
been used by local officials in China more recently). It does not suffer the limits to central economic
planning that apply in Western societies where: (a) the process is
distorted by interest group politics; and (b) 'planners' try to make
decisions on the basis of their own (overly-simplified) understanding
without access to the dispersed information held within the economy
itself (see
Industry Policy).
A more detailed attempt to provide a basis for understanding the
intellectual foundations of societies with an ancient Chinese cultural
heritage is in East Asia
in Competing Civilizations. The latter includes an outline of the
background to the suggestions outlined here, and suggests amongst other
things that such societies can be likened to whole-of-society
bureaucracies, where the methods that can allow Western bureaucracies to
be effective in managing very complex issues (ie consensus and collegiality) are the basis of the whole
society, not simply those components subject to serious market failures.
The need to be aware of different ways of thinking and doing things
is suggested in Look at the Forest, not Just at the
Trees.
The fundamental source of centuries of resistance to Western influence (which
is only comprehensible from an understanding of how East Asian societies
traditionally operated) has revolved around the West's primary emphasis on
individuals and universal values rather than on ethnic communities / tribes (eg see
Cultural Foundations of Western
Strengths and compare this with the character of societies that operate on
the basis of quite different intellectual traditions - see
Epistemology: The
Core Issue).
Secondly a broad approach is vital also because there is traditionally no separation in
(East) 'Asia' between military / security activities and everything else (eg economic
strategy, social relationships and even the activities of organized crime).
Elaboration: In 'Asia' it
has been said, ‘everything is the same’ – military, business, social and even
criminal linkages are all part of the same strategic process; orchestrated by
the same people to have complementary and mutually reinforcing goals (ie traditionally, under Confucianism,
the process is orchestrated by bureaucratic elites who are
selected on the basis of their excellence in managing information, and thus
their ability to influence others’ thinking and actions. In Japan a
neo-Confucian bureaucracy (presumably operating under imperial mandate)
seems to have been the foundation of post-WWII economic 'miracles' (see
A New
Japan?). And in China since the late
1970s it seems that the so-called 'Communist' Party has taken on this role -
a fact that was made much more obvious in 2014 - see
The
Resurgence of Ancient Authoritarianism in China).
A likely rationale for a Confucian system was presented by Henry Liu in
The Abduction of
Modernity (2003). Order within the society as a whole (built on the
order that exists with families / communities) is seen to be of primary
importance. Western societies are seen to be 'barbarians' because weapons
were invented and used which enabled common folk to challenge those they
should have acknowledged as their aristocratic superiors - a view which was
a bit simplistic for reasons suggested in
Cultural Foundations of Western
Strength: The Realm of the Rational Responsible Individual.
As noted below, the primary goal of
'commercial' success in East Asia appears to involve boosting national power - in a
manner like that of the
mercantilist strategies that prevailed in Europe in the 18th centuries.
Those outsiders engage with in business dealings (or as employers, employees
or friends) may
be discretely playing a 'Game
of Thrones' rather than simply engaged in profit-seeking commerce.
There is also a need to recognise that:
- Because of the precedence given to the strength of ethnic
communities over the welfare of individuals, outsiders developing
relationships in the region need to consider 'what' (rather than 'who')
they are developing a relationship with. The 'what' may be good or bad,
but its unlikely to be possible to determine which it is simply from
interactions with the 'who';
- organized crime (eg Triads and Yakuza) appears to act as
the private armies of ruling elites in enforcing domestic discipline (one
claim the present writer recalls reading was that Japan's Yakuza played a
role in resolving disputes like that of lawyers in Western societies) and in undertaking
clandestine nationalistic operations (see Seagrave S.,
'Lords of the Rim'
which pointed to Triads' support for China's Diaspora in seeking to exert political and
economic influence across SE Asia as an extension of 'China', and
The Dark Side). A cultural
perspective on this emerged from assertions in October 2013 that the owner
of a Chinese company was respected by subordinates as a 'war lord' because
of his success in business, politics and the underworld [1].
The allegation that China's regime called upon triad gangs to oppose
pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2014 may also be noted [1]. It is
arguably not sufficient merely to collect intelligence about East Asian
organized
crime groups in relation to their criminal activities.
- the strategic process might involve providing benefits to
individuals and organisations within Australia who are in a position to
influence: (a) their networks; or (b) public opinion (eg see
illustration).
Moreover the essence of traditional
'Art of War' strategy is deception
and undermining the capabilities of outsiders,
as well as 'winning beforehand' (ie implementing a goal in the real world before it
is announced - and hopefully before enemies even suspect it). And in pursuing a goal, one could start by doing
something completely unrelated to that goal (so that those looking for
problems in that area will see nothing). Consider the Japanese game of Go – in
which attacks occur randomly on a large board, and one secures a position by
building two interlinked ‘circles’, and then uses this base to move on. Also
strategy plays out over VERY long time scales – decades or even centuries –
so that others forget about the context in which current events need to be
viewed. Extremely long-term strategies might be organised by, for
example, recruiting young people to pursue the goals of their elders. In Japan it is understood that the 'Tale of the 47 Ronin'
is the most popular folk story. It concerns masterless samurai who pretended
dissolute living for decades in order to gain a chance to avenge themselves
on the enemy who killed their master.
The goal of 'Art of War' strategies can be likened to confronting enemies
with a situation a bit like that of a spacecraft crossing the 'event
horizon' of a large black hole. Initially those in the spacecraft experience
nothing different - though the reality is they have passed under the
influence of gravitational field so intense that nothing can escape - and by
the time they realize that there is a problem it is too hard for anyone to
do anything about it.
This is not the way things work
in Western societies, but highlights the need for security considerations to
cover a broad range of issues (as the report seems to conclude).
In particular there is a need to closely observe what is actually being
done, and not be misled into believing that what is said realistically
describes what is happening.
Also 'Asia's' traditional (Art of War) approach to strategy primarily involves 'soft power' techniques
(ie 'to win without fighting is best' - perhaps by encouraging enemies to become
dissolute or make mistakes) and these can't be satisfactorily
countered solely or even primarily by 'hard power' (ie military capacity). Those
'Art of War' traditions also emphasise 'winning beforehand' (as well as
other tactics that need to be
seriously considered).
Under East Asian traditions power in exerted not by the Western method of
making decisions on the basis of rational understanding, but rather by highly educated
(bureaucratic) elites' access to the information that networks of
themselves-powerful subordinates use as the
basis of making decisions that are then enforced by state power (see comment
on power and China's Bigger Secret). It was
suggested in late 2013 that China was extending such methods into the
international arena.
Chinese government is working to ensure a positive image - allegedly partly by
using methods of control it has traditionally used at home in other countries.
This reflects a multi-layered system for censoring unwanted news and stifling
opposing viewpoints. Suggested methods include: direct action (obstructing news
gathering / preventing publication and punishing disobedient media); providing
carrots / sticks to encourage self-censorship; indirect pressure through
satellite firms and foreign governments; and cyber-attacks not directly
traceable to China. China Central TV (founded in 1958 mainly for propaganda) has
expanded internationally. [ 1]
In 2014 it seemed that those methods were being used to
create a new China-centred international order
- ie via the BRICS.
Thirdly a broader approach is needed because
there is a parallel economic contest between 'Asia' (notably Japan initially and
now also China) and the West
(especially the US) which: (a) has features that are poorly understood because
of the general lack of strategic Asia-literacy amongst economists,
defence planners and others who have
struggled to understand what has been going on in terms of often-inapplicable Western
concepts such as a rule-of-law, democracy and capitalism; (b) involve
non-capitalistic 'commercial' goals that are oriented more to boosting national
power, rather than to benefiting citizens (eg as investors / consumers); and (c) clearly impacts on the resources that can be available
for military assets - and is thus ultimately likely to be the key strategic
consideration.
Elaboration: The system's of socio-political-economy that have emerged
across
East Asia (and ultimately in China) are variations on the methods that were the basis of Japan's pre-1990s
'economic miracles' (see
Understanding East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Soci-political-economy). Those systems have advantages in accelerating economic change through
leadership by social elites in economic 'learning'.
However they are
macroeconomically-unbalanced in that
they require a domestic demand-deficit (which some have labelled a 'savings
glut') because national savings are devoted (on the basis of consensus by
social elites and their subordinates) to investments aimed at boosting market
share / cash flow (rather than seeking profitability for independent enterprises - which
is the capitalistic alternative). Under the prevailing Western-style
'capitalistic' / profit focused international order those
systems have been vulnerable to financial crises (as shown by the Asian
financial crisis of 1997) and their stability has depended on the willingness and ability of
trading partners (especially the US) to: provide excess demand; tolerate large current account
deficits; and continue increasing debt levels indefinitely. These arrangements arguably
constitute a novel form of protectionism that is not recognised due to the
inability of Western analysts to conceive of the communal discipline that is
needed to allow this to emerge (see Resist
Protectionism: A Call that is Decades Too Late); and were a significant factor in the GFC (see
Impacting the Global Economy).
Those systems of socio-political-economy are not necessarily
'economically aggressive' (ie intended primarily to weaken others' strategic
positions). In one respect they may have been the best economic options
available because of cultural constraints (eg see
Understanding the Cultural
Revolution). Moreover trading partners have a choice as to what effect
those methods have. Those methods result in a domestic demand-deficit in
'Asia' and others (eg US) only got into a position of ever increasing debt
by being willing to use their domestic economic demand to sustain global
growth despite demand-deficits elsewhere.
However when those systems of socio-political-economy are simply not
understood, others make themselves vulnerable (see Babes
in the Asian Woods).
Moreover there are indications that those methods
may have been intentionally 'economically aggressive' - and that the
country that the West perceives as the 'good cop' in East Asia (Japan) may have played a much longer and
ultimately more significant clandestine role on the basis of traditional
'Art of War' tactics than
China, the country now often perceived
as the 'bad cop' (see
Coalitions of Interest below)
The most significant of these
indications is that Japan adopted a democratic capitalist 'face' after WWII when its
political and economic reality was quite different - and
the 'dark side' of
Japan apparently continued to exert powerful behind-the-scenes influences.
Japan's governing Liberal
Democratic Party in the post-WWII era was neither liberal, nor 'democratic' in a Western sense.
Autocratic power in government resided with the bureaucracy (a Confucian
tradition) and the LDP comprised representatives of virtually all
influential groups so that consultations were held within the Party,
resulting in consensus, rather
than through debate in the public domain (a practice which in 2011 appears to be being
considered in China as the means to give effect to top-level proposals to
allow 'democracy'). Assembling 'all' political factions into a single party
would perhaps have been arranged behind the scenes by facilitators (the
so-called 'kuromaku') that Emperor Hirohito (as the symbol of the state and
the unity of Japanese people) permitted to act on his behalf in organising
post-WWII Japan. The
contention that the role of Japan's emperor after WWII was purely
'ceremonial' like modern Western royalty does not reflect any understanding
of the way Japanese society worked - because decisions had to emerge within
an hierarchical framework where the 'head' facilitated the process without
actually doing anything themselves or making the ultimate decisions. The
outcome would however have had to be one of which the Emperor approved.
Japan's post-WWII economic model has been
suggested (by a close
observer) to have originated with the Japanese military in Manchuria in the
1930s (a contention which the present writer has no basis for assessing).
The multi-$bn 'slush fund' for Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(whose role was to orchestrate accelerated economic learning through an
apolitical strategic management process - ' vision development and
administrative guidance', in fact traditional Confucian methods) was
held by Ryochi Sasakawa: (a) a suspected Class A
War criminal in 1945; (b) a notorious ultranationalist with strong influence
over Japan's Yakuza gangs; and a vocal admirer of Admiral Yamomoto. Yamomoto had
not only led Japan's raid against Pearl Harbour and and push south in Asia
towards Australia, but also apparently argued that Japan could not win a 'war' against
the US. In this regard, consider:
In Outliers Malcolm Gladwell suggested that planes crash
after a
common sequence of minor issues (eg slightly bad weather, a touch behind
schedule, a tired pilot) but that the primary cause is the breakdown in
communication amongst the flight crew. Moreover a high Power Distance Index (PDI)
compounds this failure to communicate. 'Power distance is concerned with
attitudes with hierarchy, specifically how much a particular culture values
and respects authority.' Between 1988 and 1998, Gladwell noted, Korea Air
had a crash rate seventeen times higher than a comparable airline such as US
carrier United Airlines. Cockpit crew were too polite to question the
authority figure directly when they noticed something wrong. When they tried
to express a level of dissent, they did it cloaked in polite language. The
'black box' recording of a Korean Air crash in Guam demonstrated how
politeness can be deadly. A subordinate to the captain hints there is a
problem. The pilot hints back he is on top of it. The subordinate hints a
little stronger that perhaps the problem might command more of the captain's
attention. The captain misses the hint again and hints back he has it all
under control. Eventually the subordinate got to the point - and tried to
save the plane, but it hit a mountain before his action mattered. The US is
not a classless society, but no cultural respect for authority rules
American behaviour. This rebelliousness turns out to be an asset. The cause
of most airline crashes is not mechanical but cultural (ie an inability to get
the message through when things are going wrong),
- There is a radical difference between the Western approach to 'war'
(which Japan had apparently adopted in seeking to expand its influence prior to 1945) and
traditional
East Asian 'Art of War' tactics - which involve an emphasis on deception
and on 'soft power' / non-military
tactics in order to (hopefully) 'win beforehand'.
A Japanese-led contest for control of the global financial system has
now apparently been underway for decades though it has been invisible to
Asia-illiterate Western observers, though it has possibly had spin-offs that
have had significant effects on the world's political and economic history
(eg see An
Unrecognised Clash of Financial Systems and
Focusing on Japan and the GFC).
Furthermore Japan would have
to have realised that its financial systems were incompatible with internationally accepted
financial / economic arrangements (and required trading partners to
continually incur increasing debts) well before 1990, and yet said very little.
Reference to Japan as a non-capitalist market economy (by Eisuke Sakikabara,
Japan's 'Mr Yen') was as close as Japan went to alerting others (and he did
not explain the consequences any more than Western observers understood what
he was talking about). And Japan subsequently provided behind-the
scenes encouragement to the US Federal Reserve to ease monetary policy
excessively and dangerously (as evidenced by Alan Greenspan's frequent
reference to the need to ease policy to avoid the risk of deflation, a risk
that Japan faced but the US did not).
From the point of view of defence planning the economic
contest is critically important because: (a) the
US’s economic capacity to support its military capabilities (which are
overstretched) is likely to be severely constrained as a result of the ever
increasing debt levels that are needed to sustain growth in the face of
demand deficits elsewhere; and (b) the PLA’s build up (supported by China's
rapid growth) is being
effective in eroding US capacity to deploy forces in the region.
The fact that Japan has reportedly acquired a strategic position in the
production of many components that are vital for a modern economy (and that
the US's capacity to operate independently no longer exists) should also be
noted [1]
In fact the economic contest is arguably the most important strategic
consideration. It was, after all, the failure of the Soviet economic model
(rather than military defeat) that brought an end to the Cold War. And, as
suggested below, the nature of the economic contest
needs to be recognised in order to understand likely motives for the PLA
build-up.
The US Federal Reserve has apparently started trying to counteract
mercantilist economic strategies - through quantitative easing that is
likely to stimulate 'carry-trades' into emerging economies and thus boost
their asset values and demand levels - ie to 'do unto others as others have
long done to the US' (see Currency
War). While the US has also started talking about an unwillingness
to permanently be the 'consumer of last resort' (see
US Backing Away from Bretton Woods)
and the US president has called for new emphasis on innovation to strengthen
the US economy, this is unlikely to be sufficient unless measures to
accelerate system-wide economic learning (which are equivalent at
the level of industry clusters to innovation within enterprises) are put in
place that could work in a democratic environment (eg as suggested in an Australian context in
A Case for Innovative Economic Leadership). Those methods
potentially provide much stronger support to individuals and enterprises in
addressing new opportunities and
should
also provide scope for faster discovery of commercially relevant solutions to
social and environmental challenges.
Fourthly, the scenarios about China’s future that are outlined in the report (p9-10) are
inadequate
because they do not reflect an Asia-literate interpretation of options that are
available to China (concerning which
China's Development: Assessing the Implications attempts, undoubtedly inadequately, to paint a picture).
Not only are China's strengths not understood without an Asia-literate view
of strategy, but so also are weaknesses which might cause the wheels to fall off
China's economic or political wagons (eg see
Heading for a Crash?). There are many dimensions of potential weakness, of
which the most critical is dependence on the willingness and
ability of trading partners to sustain ongoing current account deficits (and
thus increasing debts). And, even if this could be overcome, a more fundamental
constraint involves the lack of feedback from consumers to producers which was the reason that 18th
century mercantilist economic models failed in the face of capitalistic
alternatives which did benefit from that feedback (see
Balancing Supply and Demand).
Fifthly, discerning China’s motives in developing the PLA’s
capabilities requires attempting to understand what is going on from an 'Asian'
point of view. The build up described in the report suggests that China expects
that over the next decade it will either be: (a) attacked directly by the US
using state of art weapons (or perhaps nuclear weapons); or (b) at risk of
losing access to natural resources (as Japan was in the 1930s), so that there is
a need to launch expeditionary forces to ensure access to key resources. Under
the latter scenario Australia would clearly be a key target, as it was in WWII.
More particularly, there is a need to consider why China might expect to be
either attacked or blockaded. Possible motives that can't be discerned from a
conventional viewpoint are that a violent reaction (especially from the US) may
be feared to:
- the growing visibility and influence of a new neo-Confucian
international order which can be expected to disrupt the global order based
on Western-style democratic capitalist principles that the US has
underpinned since WWII. This could be an updated version of Japan’s ‘Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere’ perhaps organised in something like the way China
maintained an international order prior to the expansion of Western
influence (see Creating a new
Confucian Economic World?)
- belated understanding of the unbalanced mercantilist systems of
socio-political-economy by which the US's economic strength has been
challenged (and perhaps even discovery that the US has been deceived by
Japan - an ally who might have played a double game as suggested below).
Finally it is noted that the PLA's rising power is not the only
significant factor that is likely to disrupt 'more of the same' security
strategies. Though the present writer has not studied the way they have been
taken into account in prior work, it is noted that a 'business as usual' approach
could be disrupted by:
In anticipating what the world / region will be like in 2030 (or 2040), it is
not sufficient to simply project current trends as the report tended to do.
The report concludes
that there is a need for: ‘mastery
of strategy at the highest strategic level’; 'a culture of whole-of-nation
national security’; and ‘fostering exceptional military and civilian leadership’
(pp x-xi).
However in suggesting this the report seems to be limiting its proposals to traditional 'national security' functions
(eg diplomacy, military capabilities). However what is arguably needed is for
those involved in traditional 'national security' functions to help others with knowledge and skills
relevant to social, economic, governance and educational functions to realize
that: (a) what they are doing has national security implications; and (b) if
they are not successful than major national security threats will emerge,
requiring costly and complex 'hard power' responses.
A case for a broader concept of 'national security capabilities' can also
be made in relation to the threats posed by Islamist extremists - where national
security could probably be promoted more quickly, effectively and cheaply by discrediting
the ideologies of the spiritual leaders of those who advocate terrorism (see
Discouraging Pointless Extremism).
This mainly requires initiative in the academy, rather than on the battlefield.
More generally a case can be made that much of the potential for conflict in the
world arises as a result of failure to seriously consider the consequences of differences in
cultural assumptions (see Competing
Civilizations). The greatest potential to boost Australia national
security probably lies in motivating university humanities and social science faculties to pursue
such issues.
Coalitions of Interests?
To state the obvious, the
PLA’s increasing military capacity is primarily a consequence of China’s
economic growth. Large sums are made available by China’s government
to the PLA, and the report suggests that these are being spent in ways that would
constrain
US military activities in the Western Pacific.
There
is in fact a sense in which China's goals in developing it’s economy seem to be:
firstly to finance the PLA's modernisation and expansion; secondly to boost the
position of those with linkages to the so-called 'Communist Party'; and only lastly to
improve the welfare of China's people. It can be noted that the PLA's resources
are increasing either a bit, or a lot, faster than China's GDP (depending on
which data are relied upon), and (prior to China's 2011 goals of shifting to a
consumer driven economy) the share of GDP flowing to households remained
quite low (except for those with 'Communist Party' connections some of whom have
become extremely wealthy).
It can also be noted that, while this is a matter beyond the present writer's
knowledge, a pro-China western resident has
suggested that since its
inception the Chinese Communist Party has encouraged China's people to
feel aggrieved about what has been done to them and presents itself to, and
seeks support from, them as the instrument of vengeance.
Moreover, while the present writer has little knowledge of China's political
factions, it seems that China’s economic development was
likely to have been led by traditionally ‘commercially-oriented’ groups with strong southern China (and
offshore Chinese) links. Those groups were arguably the most suppressed under Mao.
After his death they perhaps entered into a 'deal' with the PLA (who were
presumably the stabilizing influence in the post-Mao era).
The bargain may have been that the commercially oriented groups would be allowed to
control the 'Communist Party' (and thus China's Government) in order to
implement a modified version of the model of socio-political-economy that Japan
had pioneered, providing this produced the resources needed for a military
build-up which the PLA had desperately wanted to fight the Cold War when China
was in the grip of Mao's version of Communism.
The report suggested (p30) that the PLA is showing thinking similar to the
Japanese Imperial Army in preparation for Pearl Harbour. This may be no
coincidence, because there is a plausible basis for suspecting (though no
certainty) that China may have entered into a coalition arrangement with Japan
in the 1970s on the basis of their shared interests (ie China's efforts to find
an alternative to democratic capitalism through Communism, and Japan's efforts
to create a Neo-Confucian order which apparently offered a path to economic
prosperity without democratic capitalism). If so, then the PLA may now in effect be
‘Japan’s army’, and the potential conflict with the US and its allies that could
emerge might well be viewed as ‘the last great battle of WWII’.
Broader
Resistance to Western Influence?: The PLA is probably not
Australia's only Asian security challenge.
Because of some ongoing not-necessarily-obvious developments, it would be wise
to consider what has been happening in China (especially what has happened since the late 1970s) in the context of a much earlier resistance to
Western influence over recent centuries that has been led by Japan (ie by Japan's ultranationalists and
bureaucratic elite, who at least until the 1980s, remained very influential
perhaps because they operated in key respects under an imperial mandate like that under which East Asia had been
administered by Confucian bureaucratic elites for centuries prior to Western expansion).
It can be noted that in 1989 anthropologists suggested
that Japan had maintained its traditional culture
and ways of doing things virtually unchanged despite being exposed to
western influences:
"Japan has adjusted so well to Western influence that it has beaten others
at their own game. Despite its initial mistake of emulating the colonial
powers, Japan changed and adapted rapidly. However Japan remains the same on
the inside as it has been for thousands of years. It is run according to a
jealously-guarded set of concepts that Japan defends from any contamination.
More than any other Pacific people, Japanese have retained their original
culture and distinctive way of doing things. Many people and cultural
influences came to Japan from China - though Japan's isolation allowed them
to take their own distinctive form" (Thorpe A., and Raymond R., 'Man on the
Rim', Angus and Robertson, 1989)
However the possibility that a truly 'new' Japan has been
created as a result of its disastrous economic experience since the early 1990s also
needs serious consideration.
Good Cop - Bad Cop?
Ross Babbage's
report focused on China, yet it is possible (though not certain) that Japan is also a major
(perhaps the major) player doing a ‘good cop’ routine, while China plays the ‘bad
cop’ (eg see Japan’s Predicament).
The latter focuses on post-1990 developments yet it is
essential (eg because of the
continued strong
ultranationalist rhetoric of Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe)
to consider the cultural and historical context.
Japan’s cultural traditions are: (a) derived from those of ancient
China, though different from China's; (b) incompatible with
‘liberal’ Western political and economic institutions - especially in
relation to financial systems; (c) very difficult to
understand from a Western viewpoint - because they
do not encourage understanding; and (d) necessary to understand to
perceive how political and economic power is exerted within
hierarchical ethnic social networks; and (e) little changed at least
until the 1990s from what they were centuries ago
despite adopting Western-style institutional forms.
Japan (like other nations in East Asia) has cultural traditions that are
radically incompatible with Western systems (and thus with the international
order Western nations established in recent centuries) in terms of the nature of
knowledge; power; governance; strategy; and economic methods / goals) - see
East Asia: The Realm of the Autocratic, Hierarchical
and Intuitive Ethnic Group? and
Background Note.
Those
differences are hard to understand (eg see Why
Understanding is Difficult) and have practical implications that
none-the-less need
to be understood to deal successfully / safely with East Asia (see
Babes in the Asian
Woods). Examples of apparent significant Western incomprehension are cited
in the latter while others are mentioned below.
Problem solving in Western societies
makes significant use of abstract concepts – and social, political and economic
institutions exist that allow abstract concepts (such as universal values,
truth, law, profitability) to be effective in problem solving because of
Western society's Judeo-Christian and classical Greek cultural heritage. Those
'liberal' institutions (which are based on the notion that people are
individuals rather than merely parts of a community / 'tribe') furthermore depend on the presumption that widespread
Christian adherence ensures that ethical behaviour is most appropriately
assured by individual consciences responsible to God - rather than
requiring family, communal or state supervision (see
Cultural Foundations of Western
Progress: The Realm of the Rational / Responsible Individual).
This is
anything but the case in societies with an ancient Chinese cultural heritage. Key issues
are the absence of any faith in, or reliance on, the use of abstract
concepts in East Asian thought and the presumption that compliance with
others' expectations (rather than independent decisions) is required for
ethically-satisfactory behaviour. Decisions are expected to be made in the
framework of hierarchical social networks. As a consequence such societies
traditionally lacked social,
political and economic institutions in which abstracts (eg individual
rationality or profitability) could be used reasonably reliably. Emphasis was rather placed
on consensus within an hierarchical ethnic community - with members of those
communities subject to community pressure to play their part in that consensus
without individually seeking to 'understand' it as a basis of independent
initiative. Also information was traditionally used primarily by a
society's elites as something like propaganda to influence the behaviour of
their associates, subordinates and enemies rather to boost others understanding.
This is also
the way information
is tradiitionally used in East Asian 'education'. Notions such as universal values,
equality under a
rule of law, profitability and concern for the welfare / capabilities of
individuals had no part in those traditions.
A significant difference between Japan and China lies in
the large number of potentially-competing social hierarchies
in China (which has been described as a 'tray of sand', while
Japan has been likened to a 'rock').
Japan was forced to open to Western influences by Commander
Perry from the United States in 1854. The ruling
Shoguns (hereditary military dictators) were displaced in favour of
renewed Imperial rule by Ronin (former Samurai) and Yakuza (ultranationalist
gangster) factions who were committed to making Japan a modern economic and
military power while maintaining Japan's traditional cultural order
and social hierarchies in the face of liberal Western influences.
Former Samurai played the most
significant role in the Meiji restoration. For example the Ronin, Sakamoto, organised an agreement about this amongst competing factions [1,
2]). And Japan's highly nationalistic organised crime gangs, the
Yakuza [1,
2,
3] whose predecessors had been samurai,
also supported imperial restoration (eg consider
Jirocho of Shimizu). For this the yakuza gained a respected social
role, ie as nationalistic gangsters who enforced social discipline amongst
Japan's people on behalf of the ruling regime. That role would be disrupted under the rule of
law that Western influences sought to promote - and this presumably explains
why Yakuza have played such a prominent role in organizing
Japan's political systems.
Japan then moved heaven and earth to resist Western expansion
(including ultimately playing a major role in WW2 as an ally of
Fascist Germany and Italy).
According to Wikipedia, fascist
movements shared certain common features, including the veneration
of the state, a devotion to a strong leader, and an emphasis on ultra-nationalism
and militarism.
Japan had sought Western recognition of its unique (‘superior’)
culture in the 1930s (without actually explaining what was involved –
a reluctance to enable others to understand that is traditional
feature of East Asian cultures). Western rejection of this request was
one of the factors that led to Japan’s militaristic attempt to create
a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in the 1930s and 1940s.
After earlier 'incidents' (eg in Manchuria) Japan's war started in
1937 with the
Second Sino-Japanese War which initially
presented as a 'holy war' to bring the world under Japan's control
- starting with China (which was perceived to have been Japan’s
ancient ‘big brother’ in the so-called 'Great Han Race' - see
Korea: Comparisons with Japan and China).
The dominant racial group in Japan is the
Yamato whose origins are
unclear - and presumably involved migrants from various parts of
Asia. However there is a view that they were mainly Han Chinese.
Whatever their racial origins, there is little doubt that Japan and
Korea (in particular) were heavily influenced by China (see
East Asian Cultural Sphere / Sinosphere
Western attempts to understand Japan’s aggression perceived it
to be about bringing ‘Asia’ under Japan’s control, without appreciating
the cultural issues (eg excluding Western cultural influences –
especially the notion of individualism and of individual freedom from conformity
to pressures within social networks) that were presumably significant factor from the viewpoint
of the ultranationalist militarists who controlled Japan under Emperor Hirohito
in that era.
The Greater East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere was imperial propaganda used in occupied Asian nations early in
the Showa era by Japan's government and military. It covered NE / SE
Asia and Oceania. It was stated in 1940 to be a bloc of Asia nations led
by Japan that would be free of Western powers. A secret document in 1943
dealt with global policy with the Yamato race as nucleus - and described
Japan's superior position in the Sphere. It stated Japanese superiority
and that the Sphere would be hierarchical - ie that Japan would
dominate. The scholar who first proposed the Sphere was opposed to
militarism. An earlier version had encompassed NE Asia only. The
original idea was to free Asia from colonial powers, but it soon was
recognised as a way to access resources as raw materials for war. Many
Japanese viewed the Sphere idealistically as a step towards peace.
However the Sphere is remembered mainly as a front for Japanese
aggression and for control of occupied territories by puppet
governments. Japanese economic planners also envisaged a 'yen bloc' to
break dependence on Stirling and $US zones. An attempt was made to
develop a linked set of economic and political relationships in the
areas Japan controlled. The concept of a unified Asia had first been
proposed by a Japanese general in 1936. With the start of WWII Japan
demanded that Western powers withdraw support from China under an 'Asia
for the Asians' slogan - to which Western power could not respond. Many
colonized nations in Asia initially responded favourably to Japan's
efforts. Japan's failure to win the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1941)
was blamed on Western support for China - though China received much
more support from Russia. Initial favourable responses to Japan's
occupation faded as new Asian imperialists were seen to be worse that
those from West. China and other Asian nations were seen to be too
weakened lacking in unity to be equal partners with Japan. It was
Japan's task to 'make men of them again' and liberate them from western
oppressors. From Japan's viewpoint accessing China's markets was a key
goal in initiating war with the allies. It was seen that the Sphere, if
created, would be synonymous with Japan's empire. A Greater East Asia
Conference was held (with discussions in English) in 1943 to illustrate
Japan's commitment to pan-Asianism. The Sphere collapsed with Japan's
surrender in 1945. Though Japan stimulated anti-westernism in parts of
Asia, the role of Japan's militarists was seen to be damaging - because
they saw everything from Japan's perspective. Everything had to be done
the Japanese way. Quite different outcomes might have emerged if Japan
had acted in accord with the rhetoric about the Sphere. Extensive
propaganda efforts had been organized around the region. The land that
Japan envisaged capturing extended well beyond Asia. Japan's WW2 goal
was not to capture all this at once, but the lay the foundation for
another war in 20 years. [1]
Japan’s initial post-WW2 economic and political regime was
established under the control of Allied Occupation Forces. It
nominally conformed with US expectations but in fact was anything but liberal and democratic –
a fact that Occupation Forces did not seem to understand because of a
lack of understanding of Japanese culture. That system: (a) involved a basis for economic
‘miracles’ through variations of traditional East Asian systems of
bureaucratic Confucian administration that one Japan-watcher suggested were
developed by the Japanese military in Manchuria in the 1930s; and (b)
were apparently put into place by ultranationalist factions that had
Emperor Hirohito’s support. This occurred despite the desire of US Occupation
Forces to eliminate Japan’s imperial system because of its association with
the ideological basis of Japan’s militarism in the 1930s and early 1940s.
When nations in East Asia opened to
and became successful
In the post WW2 era, Japan adopted methods for promoting
international trade that involved a variation of the Confucian
methods of bureaucratic governance on behalf of emperors by
which much of Asia had been governed prior to Western
expansion (see Understanding East Asia's
Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy). This included bureaucratic guidance
by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in accelerating market-oriented economic learning (a process that would
not work in a truly democratic / interest-group-focused environment - see
Economic Solutions
are Beyond Politics, 1996), supported by a bureaucratically controlled
banking system which provided funding to increase national economic strength
but little regard to profitability. These
methods have parallels with the way in which governments finance wars by
selling war bonds and leads to / requires the favourable international financial imbalances that contributed
to the GFC (see Impacting the Global
Economy). – this was based on a variation of the traditional methods
whereby those countries functioned in the centuries prior to
Western expansion . There was arguably no real alternative because of the lack of the cultural
preconditions that liberal Western-style economic and political institutions required (eg
for reasons
suggested in Understanding the
Cultural Revolution Needed to Adapt to Western Financial Systems, 1998).
Japan’s
post-war
economic miracles were achieve
through
For decades before China had any
significant role, Japan's economy had involved mercantilist distortion of its financial system
like that that emerged later in China as
the basis for friction with US related to trade and financial imbalances (eg see Mikuni's
Why Japan can't
deregulate its financial system, 2000). And, as seems normal in East
Asia, there was no such thing as a market that was free of a nationalistic
political agenda (see In East Asia Deals
Always Involve Politics). Mercantilist goals
In the post-WWII era, Japan was governed by a (so called) Liberal
Democratic Party. While this appealed to US sentiments, Japan’s government was
neither liberal nor democratic (see above). Behind a
democratic 'face' that allowed elected politicians many benefits, observers
generally acknowledge that from 1945 Japan was governed in relation to
financial and economic affairs by its bureaucracy. What they have not
generally recognized was that this would have required some
sort of
imperial mandate and reproduced arrangements similar to the traditional
process of government by elite bureaucrats on behalf of emperors by which East
Asia had been ruled prior to Western expansion. How this seems to have been achieved is outlined
(based on expert observers' accounts of what happened) in
Establishing
Japan's Post-WWII Political and Economic Systems. This was likely to have
created a real behind-the-scenes government dominated by many of the same
bureaucrats who had stimulated Japan’s militaristic expansion in the 1930s (see
why this was
likely).
Occupation forces eliminated Japan's more obvious militarists - without apparently
considering that they might be the product, rather than the source, of
influences
that were centred elsewhere (eg in the 'belly' of Japan whose consensual
conclusions traditionally give direction to bureaucratic elites and were
influenced by the ultranationalist Yakuza - who (as the accepted enforcers of
social discipline on behalf of the imperial system that had been restored at the
time of the Meiji restoration) had a great deal of influence at, and spoke
for, the grass-roots of Japanese
society). Japan's post-WWII arrangements can best be explained by assuming that
ultranationalist / Yakuza influences orchestrated a 'new' Meiji-like (but
behind-the-scenes) restoration of imperial authority (as they would presumably
have seen Japan's defeat in WWII as like the situation Japan faced after the
Shoguns had proven unable to resist Western influence).
There are hints that the system of socio-political economy that allowed
Japan's economic miracle was orchestrated behind the scenes by Japan's
ultranationalist factions. For example:
- Eammon Fingleton
suggested (on what evidentiary basis is unknown) that
Japan's post-war economic methods had been developed by Japan's military in
Manchuria in the 1930s. He also suggested that Japan encouraged the use of
those methods by various societies in East Asia with compatible cultures -
ultimately including China in the late 1970s; and
- funding for special projects by Japan's Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (which took the lead in stimulating accelerated economic
development) was apparently provided by Ryochi Sasakawa - reportedly a notorious:
ultranationalist / Yakuza boss; suspected war criminal who had worked with Yakuza
organizations building infrastructure in Manchuria in the 1930s to facilitate
Japan's invasion; outspoken admirer of Admiral Yamamoto (who had led Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour and military expansion into Asia); and
top-level post-WWII 'kuromaku' (ie facilitator of relationships amongst Japan's government, business and
ultranationalist faction) - a top-level fixer role which in Japan presumably
implied that he had gained a mandate from Emperor Hirohito (see
The Dark Side of Japan in Australia?
below).
It can be noted also that Admiral Yamamoto (who commanded Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour and
planned an invasion of Australia) reportedly believed that Japan could not win
a war against the West (in relation to which observations about the limitations that wide consultation imposes on field initiative may be noted);
Japan encouraged the adoption of the methods it had used to achieve
economic 'miracles' by other states in south and east Asia that had a
Confucian cultural influence. The Japan-watcher mentioned above has argued that Japan transmitted those methods to China in the
late 1970s - where they seemed subsequently to be implemented through
the so-called ‘Communist Party’, rather than through the bureaucracy as they
had been in Japan;
At least until the 1980s, there was: (a) a strong ultranationalist
influence in Japan (eg rhetoric about Japan’s cultural superiority was
reportedly a major feature of education in Japanese universities –
though never presented in English); (b) a desire to become economically No 1 on the
basis of that presumed cultural ‘superiority; and (c) extensive Western media commentary on the
tensions between Japan and Western societies – that was similar to those more
recently
associated with China.
Ultranationalist factions (with strong Yakuza links) who pursue themes of racial / cultural superiority continued to play, an influential role in Japan
while hidden in the shadows (see
The Dark Side of Japan).
The latter referred to:
- reports of ongoing insistence on Japan's uniqueness and superiority in
Japanese universities in the 1980s [an emphasis which the present writer has
never seen any reference to being eliminated];
- the reported popularity of the 'Tale of the 47 Ronin' - which concerns
masterless samurai who pretend dissolute living for decades to gain an
opportunity to kill their dead master's enemy;
- the lack of any sense of universal ethics - obligations exist only to
those to whom one has a relationship;
- the need to consider the nature of traditional East Asian
Art of War strategies (eg
their emphasis on deception; getting close to enemies (which discourages them from
looking at what is going on behind the scenes); holding up a 'mirror'
so that when others look they see a reflection of themselves);
- Japan's post-WWII mercantilist economy strategy (ie one concerned with
building national economic power, rather than creating opportunities for
citizens as as investors / consumers) - and the apparent involvement of
ultranationalist / Yakuza factions (presumably empowered by an Imperial mandate) in funding
special economic development projects for the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry and in coordinating government / business
relationships;
- the apparent expression of support for Japan's 1930's militarism and
ultranationalist agenda's at the top levels of Japanese government that has
continued to the present - combined with an executive reinterpretation in 2014
of Japan's war-renouncing constitution to reverse its intent;
An aside: if one goes to the Peace Memorial in
Hiroshima and looks at the translation of the reasons that it is believed that
the US chose to bomb Hiroshima, the preferred reason is that this was an
opportunity to experiment with the effect of nuclear weapons on a previously undamaged city
(ie the fact that Hiroshima was the HQ of the Japanese 5th Army which
had rampaged across Asia was apparently considered to be of secondary
importance). The memorial in Hiroshima may not be to Peace.
In the 1980s a notorious ultranationalist Yakuza boss with
high level Japanese government connections (Ryochi
Sasakawa) apparently encouraged development of infrastructure that would have
facilitated Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for a WW2 invasion of Australia (ie
airports at a series of resorts down the Queensland coast and the Darwin to
Alice Springs railway line) while also encouraging the development of what would
have been effectively an Australian-government-endorsed Japanese ‘colony’
inside the ‘Brisbane line’.
Sasakawa had: reportedly supported the
development by Yakuza gangs of infrastructure to facilitate Japan’s invasion
of Manchuria in the 1930s; been held as a suspected Class A War Criminal in 1945
– before being released; and then played a major behind-the-scene role (along
with two others) in organising Japan’s post-war political and economic systems
(which implied an imperial mandate). He was also a vocal admirer of Admiral
Yamamoto;
The incompatibility of Japan's methods for resource allocation
and Western profitability-focused methods led to: (a) a constant but unrecognised
Japan-led effort to gain control of the international
financial system; and (b) an obstacle to sustainable global
economic growth.
the incompatibility between the Western-style international financial
systems and the non-capitalistic financial system that had
been a component of Japan's economic 'miracle' in the decades after WWII led
to increasing tensions and problems in the global financial system from the
1970s (see
A Generally
Unrecognised Financial War?) - though the significance of these was not
understood because the
neo-Confucian foundations of Japan's system of socio-political-economy
were kept hidden. Ultimately however those incompatibilities became a serious
obstacle to global economic growth - because financial repression to protect the
suspect balance sheets of financial institutions under neo-Confucian systems
meant that global growth could only be sustained if their trading partners
were willing and able to tolerate large current account deficits and rapidly
rising public and private debts (see Structural
Incompatibility Puts Global Growth at Risk, 2003+);
The vigorous (virulent?) economic
competition between the US and Japan (who was clearly seeking to become No1
economically in the 1970s and 1980s, ended in the late 1980s when
Japan's distorted financial
system collapsed under the strain of trying to win economically.
A 'New' Japan?
A case was made in 2014 that Japan had fundamentally altered and embraced
a truly liberal democratic system of political economy.
The standing
ovation that Japan’s Prime Minister,
Shinzo Abe, gained from Australia’s parliament in 2014 will generate some
resentment in China. China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading
partner in 2007 – but Australia’s prime minister sees Japan and
Australia’s ‘best friend in Asia’. Japan will be Asia’s most advanced /
capable economy for decades – and is more important than China is in
supplying capital and exporting innovations. It has a larger middle class
and domestic consumption level. And Japan’s armed forces are still more
than a match for China’s. As China’s power grows, its regional impact will
depend on how it is governed. Japan’s political evolution and successful
rise since WWII will provide an example of why liberal democracy remains
the best option in Asia. Some see liberal democracy as a Western
construction unsuitable in Confucian societies. But robust democracies in
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan disprove this – in addition to democratic
yearnings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Neither Confucian values nor
‘Chinese-ness’ are incompatible with liberal-democratic political reform.
On the contrary Confucian societies – with their emphasis on social order,
filial loyalty, learning and hard work – that pursued democratic reforms
are the richest in Asia. In Japan a well-functioning multi-party system
took time to take hold. However Japanese government put liberal
institutions in place that have worked well. After WWII election laws were
relaxed to allow universal suffrage. Freedom of association and unions
were permitted. Peasants were given genuine land ownership. The dominance
and power of the pre-war Zaibatsus (industrial and financial conglomerates
linked with the imperial government – were wound back. A private sector
was allowed to thrive and drive economic activity and innovation. Powerful
economic classes independent of the government for opportunities and
successes emerged. These conditions allow liberal democracy to thrive – a
lesson for the Chinese Communist Party. In China the state has increased
while the private sector retreated from the mid 1990s. Prior to that
private initiative had driven economic growth in China. Sine mid-1990s SOE
have driven economic activity – which prevented the emergence of a
powerful economic / entrepreneurial class independent of government. SOE’s
role in China now exceeds that in Japan at any time. China’s problem is
that (except for oil-rich Middle Eastern states) the 30 countries that
went from middle-income to high income status have adopted the same
liberal economic and democratic political institutions. But China’s
political class knows that this would undermine authoritarian politics.
This affects future order in Asia – because the liberal order that
underpins Australia’s past, current and future prosperity demands that
private commercial and economic interest be separated from political,
strategic or regime interest. Great powers must forfeit their capacity to
engineer economic outcomes – and instead facilitate legitimate
competition. Submission to the rule of law is not natural for any
government – but is practised and entrenched in free markets overseen by
liberal democracies, accountable to the law and people – but much less so
in state-led economic and authoritarian systems. China argues that every
country should determine its own pace of economic and political reform.
However China is the authoritarian extreme in a region where every other
major country has become a liberal democracy. Australia’s decision to move
closer to Japan mirrors that in every maritime country in Asia. Australia
is moving with, rather than against the crowd. It is to be hoped that
Japan inspires the future blueprint for China. (Lee J. ‘Abbott
right to push for closer ties with Tokyo’, The Australian,
9/7/14)
While the emergence of a truly 'new' Japan would be a very
welcome development, there are some reasons for caution. These suggest the
need to look behind the increasingly liberal 'face' that Japan has presented
to the world to determine whether it reflects what is really happening.
- After its financial crisis in about 1990, Japan changed to become
the West’s best friend in Asia. However it is unclear how deep those changes
went;
- In confronting its financial crisis Japan did not significantly
change its financial system. Doing so would have disrupted the
presumably-imperially-mandated role that Japan’s bureaucracy had in
controlling both Japan’s financial system and major industries. Until very
recently, Japan’s financial practices seem to have corresponded to those
associated with a non-capitalist
corporate state – and the massive cultural changes needed to do anything else
don’t seem to have been made. When the Democratic Party of Japan displaced the
LDP (from 2009-2012), it reportedly found government difficult because of
behind-the-scenes activities that it was unable to influence politically;
- note why Japan Can't Deregulate
financial system (2000) and more recent evidence
- Osama bin Laden referred to the US nuclear attacks on Japan that
ended WW2 as one of the justifications for the 911 attacks in America. This is
an agenda of Japan’s ultranationalists. All of the other justifications that
bin Laden referred to involved issues of concern to groups with whom Al Qaida
would have been expected to be negotiating. There are parallels between the
ideology of Islamist extremists and Japan’s ultranationalists (eg both object
to the freedom from family / community / state supervision that individuals have
as a consequence of the West’s Christian heritage – and to the associated
liberal political and economic institutions). There are also significant
differences;
- Despite its disputes with China over the ownership of various
deserted islands (disputes that enable Japan and China to escalate development
of their military capacity), Japan and China have reportedly consulted behind
the scenes about how China might avoid a financial crisis like that in about
1990 which disrupted Japan’s economic ‘miracle’;
- Japan’s current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is notorious for
expression of ultranationalist rhetoric – including putting a ‘noble
cause’ interpretation on Japan’s militarism in the 1930s and 1940s and
praising Japan’s war criminals for sacrificing their souls to create Japan’s
future;
- Japan has developed a satellite system that provides much higher
resolution over Australia than previously available. This improves
meteorological assessments – while also potentially providing much clearer
information about any military facilities in Australia. This needs to be
considered in the context of: (a) perceptions that China’s military
development is like that in Japan prior to WW2; (b) China’s apparent attempt
to create an international order similar to Japan’s Greater East Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere – and parallel domestic attempts to purge China of
Western cultural influences; (c) China’s risk of a financial crisis that would
generate domestic political instability – and perhaps might be seen to require
external military action to promote national unity; (d) the lease of the Port of
Darwin to a Chinese company with state / PLA links – which would facilitate
the development of other transport related facilities from Darwin; (e) proposals
for presenting outback Australian road signs in Chinese; and (f) the ‘slicing
the onion’ tactics that are reportedly being used by both China and the US to
achieve (in incremental stages) strategic goals in Asia that would be rejected if
presented as a whole.
Reasons for caution include:
- the deception involved in Japan's post-WWII pretense of a liberal
democratic system (see above). Japan's
bureaucracy orchestrated market-oriented economic 'miracles' using a
variation of traditional Confucian methods of government. It could only
have done this under a mandate from Emperor Hirohito. Economic 'miracles'
can be achieved by what might be called 'strategic market management'
which involve stimulating market-oriented learning by whole economic
systems (eg by methods suggested in
Developing a Regional Industry Cluster). However this can not work
where the process is subject to democratic (ie interest group sensitive)
oversight. Accelerating market-oriented
economic change would have been impossible in Japan if the bureaucracy were
actually accountable to a democratic (and thus interest-group-focused)
government (see
Economic
Solutions Appear to be Beyond Politics). A notorious ultranationalist
/ war criminal allegedly facilitated behind-the-scenes relationships between Japan's
government, business and ultranationalist - while controlling a huge slush
fund from gambling on speed-boat racing for use on special economic
projects. Again this could only have been possible under a mandate from
Emperor Hirohito. There has been no subsequent transparency from Japan about that
likely deception. Moreover, while it has been
argued that the near-total
control of Japan's government that the bureaucracy had in the post-WWII
era was reduced as 'political' groups became more competent:
- it was also argued that the reforms that were undertaken in the
1990s reinforced the bureaucracies' dominance (especially in relation
to the role of the Ministry of Finance as a virtual political
institution in its own right) -
op cit;
- this might alternatively imply that some
'politicians' have to some extent taken the role that elite /
quasi-aristocratic bureaucrats had played in orchestrating
consensus-forming and action by hierarchical social networks that they
head. However the fact that the LDP lost political power in the early
1990s would make this less likely;
- the massive cultural obstacles to the genuine adoption of the sort of
liberal democratic arrangements that the above article
suggests have been put in place since 1990 (eg see
Understanding the Cultural
revolution Needed in East Asia to Adapt to Western Financial Systems,
1998 and Competing Civilizations,
2001). For example:
- a rule of law (along with other liberal Western-style
institutions) creates a framework within which responsible
individuals can make decisions on the basis of a rational understanding of
their environment without having to second-guess the reactions of the
powerful. Traditional Japanese culture distrusts 'understanding' (because
liberal social institutions in which rationality might work reliably have not been
created) and relies instead on consensus within an ethnic hierarchy.
- The
essence of Confucianism involves a rejection of the concept of
universally-applicable laws governing individual's behaviour. Confucian obligations
to others depend on who they are and how one is related to them;
- the difficulties that Western observers' have in gaining
'understanding in East Asia, eg because there is no reliance on
'understanding' and information is traditionally provided
not to enable others to 'understand but rather to influence others to do
things that are believed likely advantage the provider's ethnic community
(see Why Understanding is Difficult);
- the emphasis that traditional
Art of War tactics
place on deception and (for example) 'holding up a mirror' so that when others look at you
they see a reflection of themselves;
- Japan’s response in the 1990s to the financial crisis that emerged in about 1989.
Japan's financial system was not reformed. Doing so would have caused its
(presumably imperially-mandated?) bureaucratic
elites to lose their power to allocate national savings in what their business subordinates perceived
by consensus to be the national interest - and also perhaps cause Japan's
economy to collapse altogether. Rather Japan:
- indicated an intent to 'internationalize' - which could imply: (a)
changing Japan domestically to conform with dominant international practices;
or (b) seeking (behind the scenes) to create a world more compatible with
Japan's domestic practices; or (c) a bit of both;
- created massive amounts of credit at near zero interest and spent heavily
on infrastructure (including 'bridges to nowhere') and exported credit to the world through carry trades (because
Japan's distorted
financial system directed credit only to production and not to consumption
- thereby preventing the availability of cheap credit from increasing domestic demand). The
carry trades had the effect of
enabling Japan's export-led growth to continue to some extent by stimulating
asset bubbles and excess demand elsewhere - particularly in the US. This
process and the adoption across Asia of variations of the methods Japan had
used to achieve 'economic miracles' contributed (presumably inadvertently) to
the Asian financial
crisis of 1997 and ultimately to the
global financial crisis of 2008;
- became the US’s new best friend in Asia. ‘Getting close to ones enemies’
(which discourages them from looking closely at what is happening behind the
scenes)
is a classic Art of War strategy. In the 1980s analyses of the 'dark side' of
Japan were frequently published - but this virtually ceased in the 1990s; and
- encouraged the US Federal Reserve to adopt easy money policies. US Fed
chairman, Alan Greenspan, frequently argued the need to easy money policies to
overcome the 'risk of deflation' - which was a risk that Japan faced, but that
the US did not. The consequence for the US of adopting the role of 'consumer
of last resort' when trading partners adopted repressive financial systems (ie
directed credit into production but not into consumption so as to ensure
favourable international financial imbalances) was that the US
built up large debts and eventually created the asset bubbles that triggered
the global financial crisis (see Impacting the Global Economy). The US Federal Reserve eventually started
copying the process of creating huge quantities of credit and exporting it to
the world (perhaps 'to do unto others as others had been doing to the US'??) and
this further increased global reliance on demand stimulated by asset bubbles
(see Currency War);
- recent
indications that Japan's financial and business dealings remain
incompatible with a liberal market economy;
- Japan's renewed risk in 2014 of a financial crisis (similar
to that which China faces) because of the concealed
bad-debts of its non-capitalistic financial system and the heavy government
debts that have been needed to sustain growth over the past 2 decades (see
Japan's Predicament). This could
potentially create social and political instability like that that resulted
from the Great Depression, and motivated / permitted Japan's militarists to seize power
in the 1930s;
- the significant behind-the-scenes influence that Japan's
ultranationalists played in the post-WWII era (see
The Dark Side of
Japan); the lack of any obvious end to their role; and indications
that such factions may be increasingly powerful (see
Reverting to the Soul of a Samurai?). The former refers in
particular to Views
of the Role and Power of Japan's Yakuza while the latter refers in
particular to:
- the uncertainty about the position that Japan's prime minister (Shinzo
Abe) takes.
He is often seen to have
militaristic and ultranationalist leanings and has
been described as the most dangerous man in Asia because of
his ultranationalism. For example, Abe: presented Japan's
WWII actions in Asia as part of a 'great cause' (ie to liberate Asia from Western colonisation and imperialism); encouraged the production of
text books to present that view to Japanese youth; shouted 'banzai' ('Long
live the Emperor') at a
ceremony to mark the end of US occupation of Japan; upset neighbouring
states by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine which is seen as an ultra
nationalistic theme park); and praised Japan's WWII war criminals for
sacrificing their souls to create the foundations of Japan. Observers have different opinions (both of
which are possible) about whether
such actions are mainly to gain the support of nationalists in Japan or to
lead Japan again down the path of militarism and ultranationalism;
- several actions that would probably be contrary to Australia's
national interest that were taken by an
Australian Prime Minister (Tony Abbott) who had been
seen to have a close association with Japan's Prime Minister (Shinzo
Abe). The latter, as noted above, appeared to be
pursuing a fairly dubious agenda. That Australian prime minister's
probably-unsafe actions (which indicate the possibility
that some reflect malignant behind the scenes 'suggestions' to
Australia's political system rather than (or in addition to) ineptitude) included:
- the Abbott Government's emphasis on Japan as
'Australia's best friend in Asia';
- the Abbott Government's
proposal to source Australia's submarine fleet from Japan;
- the Abbott Government's
proposal to support Australia's participation in a China-led
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The AIIB needs to be
recognized as part of a China-led process to create a
new international order
that would: (a) virtually amount the the establishment of the 'Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere' that was Japan's goal through military tactics
in WWII; and (b) allow China's authoritarian ('bureaucratic
non-capitalist') government to intervene directly in major economic
activities
in other countries (see
Looking at the AIIB in Context
);
- Tony Abbott's proposal to 'shirt front' Russia's
president during the G20 meeting in Brisbane related to events in
the Ukraine [1]
- a proposal that did nothing to boost Australia's international
credibility and presumably alienated Russia's regime;
- the way in which Australia's political leaders sought to prevent
the executions of convicted drug smugglers in Indonesia. This was
reportedly
seen by Indonesia to be insulting and (together with
earlier allegations of clumsy diplomatic relationships) seemed
likely to unravel decades of efforts to build closer relationships
with Australia's most strategically-significant neighbour;
- Tony Abbott's
reference to Australian aborigines who live in remote locations
as making a 'lifestyle' choice' which has costs that government
can't afford to underwrite. While there is some validity in his
claim (see The Challenge of
Aboriginal Advancement), the insulting way this was expressed
was likely to alienate many aboriginal groups and perhaps render
some vulnerable to being radicalized - a possibility that needs to
be considered in the context of
Islamist Extremists are not Alone in Favouring
Pre-modern Social Systems;
- in late 2015 a very high resolution (Himawari-8) geo-stationary
satellite was positioned over Australia by the
Japanese Space Agency and the images it produced were made available to
the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, and thus improved the quality of
weather forecasting [1].
However it needs also to be recognized that, if the high resolution
images from that geo-stationary satellite were made available to a
potential future invading force, it would make a dramatic difference to
their awareness of Australia's defense arrangements.
In order to determine whether Japan's 'new' face
reflects the underlying reality it would be desirable to (say):
- consider what is known of the behind-the-scenes thinking of Japan's
emperor - as this, under Japan's imperial traditional, will
determine whose advice he will tend to listen to and whose activities he
will tend to 'smile upon' - and thus what those who subscribe to Japan's
imperial traditions will tend to act upon;
- identify the attitude of Japan's ultranationalists to the
divinity of their emperor. This had been the foundation of the
ideology of Fascist Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. And the unifying
authority of Japan's emperor had been the basis of creating
Japan's post-WW11 'liberal democratic' political and economic
institutions - that were dominated by an imperially-mandated
bureaucracy. Also major companies in Japan's pre-1990 'miracle
economy' were dominated by former senior bureaucrats who
'descended from heaven';
- examine the role of Japan's bureaucracies. To what extent are
they now genuinely
responsive to the people's elected representative? Or do they continue to govern Japan
in collaboration with ultranationalist factions operating under Imperial
mandate as appears to have been the case prior to the 1990s. Observers
have suggested that the LDP now seems increasingly dominated by
former senior bureaucrats;
- consider the content of material in Japan's universities by
translating text books - noting the
reported emphasis on racial and cultural uniqueness and superiority in the
1980s. The reported support by Japan's prime minister (Shinzo Abe) for a new school text book which puts
a 'noble cause' interpretation on Japan's militarism in the 1930s and
1940s needs consideration in that context;
- investigate whether undisclosed activities by such groups to achieve
ultra nationalistic aspirations (such as those speculated below in
Other Possibilities) might still affecting
international affairs - for reasons suggested in Look at
the Forest Not at the Trees. Analyses of the 'dark side' of Japan were
frequently published in the 1980s - but this ceased in the 1990s either
because the 'dark side' had been suppressed domestically in Japan or
because no one thought it still needed to be investigated;
- seek feedback about the reality of a 'new' Japan from within East Asia
- while making allowance for the region's chronic distrust of Japan as a
bye-product of its history.
Other Possibilities
Some possibilities (which are by no means certainties) that
could be examined to determine the realism of Japan's 'new' image include:
- Japan (or someone) may have initiated steps
that could allow control of China. Japan’s tactic for gaining control of China in the 1930s involved seizing the Emperor – in the expectation that this institution (which
epitomised spiritual leadership in Japan itself) could command allegiance in
China. In the early 1990s (soon after Japan internationalised its strategy) a
new religion emerged in China, Falun Gong, which Chinese authorities have
vigorously sought to stamp out – allegedly because it endorses restoration of
Imperial rule in China (according to an apparently 'with-it' Chinese guide on a
tour of Beijing in 2004). That outcome (which corresponds with Japan's preferred
system) could have some appeal in China’s people
because of the corruption and wealth mal-distribution associated with the
(so-called) 'Communist' regime. Falun Gong is apparently like some earlier spiritual movements
in China, which have at times been associated with revolution. The possibility that Falun
Gong could be a ‘stalking horse’ which could be used at some time in an
attempt to gain direct control in China by restoring imperial rule should
neither be ignored nor assumed to be certain;
- Islamist extremists might (or might not) have been encouraged by Japan’s bureaucracy
/ ultranationalists to attack the US
partly to divert
attention from the clash of financial systems which potentially was far more
significant (eg see Eurocentric Aspirations in a World of Rising
'Asian' Influence). Reasons to suspect that this could be possible were outlined
in
Attacking the Global Financial System? (2001).
Examples: The latter
noted, for example:
- The potential mutual interest of Japan’s ultranationalists and
Islamists in eroding the effectiveness of the prevailing international order
based on Western-style democratic capitalist principles, and thus facilitating a
return to power by
traditional social elites (though the nature and aspirations of
+those elites would be different) by removing democratic accountability to an
electorate comprising 'everyman' and the need under capitalism to use national resources
primarily to
meet the demands of citizens as consumers;
- in an early video which rationalised Islamist attacks on the US,
Bin Laden referred to the WWII US nuclear attack on Japan as one justification.
This is an agenda of Japan’s ultranationalists, and in each other instance the
justifications that Bin Laden alluded to apparently reflected the agenda of some group that
Al Qaida had been negotiating with.
- North Korea's
threats to attack both South Korea and the US in 2013 might (or might not) be part of a larger
agenda in which others have been involved (see
'Art of War'
Speculations about North Korea's Threats). For example, both North Korea's threats and the ‘friction’ / sabre-rattling between Japan and China
that had been emerging for a few years might (or might not) have been intended
to justify both Japan and China increasing their military capabilities.
Moreover the nationalist rhetoric that is emerging increasingly from Japan's leaders
- including attempts to justify
Japan's colonisation of Korea and invasion of China as part of a 'noble
cause' parallels nationalistic
rhetoric from the secretary of China's Communist Party about the 'Great
Chinese Race' (which is the same supposed 'Han' race that nationalists in
Japan and North Korea claim allegiance to). However it is also
possible that the Japan / China friction is real, and reflects (say) Japanese
concerns about the implications of China's rising economic and military
power given a potential Chinese ambition to gain
vengeance for injuries Japan inflicted prior to and during WWII (or for
the political and economic
difficulties arguably generated in China by its adoption of a variation of
the neo-Confucian methods that had been the basis of Japans' pre-1990s'
'economic 'miracle');
- changes in Australia in recent decades have significantly undermined
its ability to respond to challenges from Asian authoritarianism - which
may (or many not) simply be a product of the Asia-illiterate naivety of
Australia's leaders and academics without external encouragement. For
example:
- politicisation of public services has deprived elected governments of
any serious 'reality check' on their political agendas on the basis of
accumulated knowledge and experience (see Decay
of Australian Public Administration, 2002 and
On Populism, 2007). The fact that the
secret of maintaining power in China reportedly involves ensuring that
competing factions remains relatively uninformed needs to be noted in this
respect (see China's Bigger Secret) ;
- the dominance that 'post-modern' ideologies have gained in university
humanity and social science faculties. Those ideologies basically involve
the view that 'truth' is primarily a matter of opinion - a view that: (a)
corresponds to core elements of East Asian cultures; (b) discourages any
serious attempt to explore the practical implications of cultural
differences - including the very significant differences between Western
and East Asian cultures; (c) leads to 'academic' support for ignorance
that has serious adverse consequences (see
Eroding the West's Cultural
Foundations and Cultural
Ignorance as a Source of Conflict); and (d) is naive - because even
though there are limits to truth and rationality there is great practical
value in 'approximate' truth (see
The Advantages and
Limitations of Rationality);
- a coalition between Japan and China to promote a new international
quasi-Confucian economic order might (or might not) have been emerging in
2014. The changes put in place in China in 2013 seemed to confirm that
China's (so-called) 'Communist' Party had transitioned in the post-Mao era into the top level in a bureaucracy governing China under something like
the Confucian traditions through which China had been governed on behalf
of emperors for centuries prior to Western expansion (see
The Resurgence of Ancient
Authoritarianism in China). At the same time China seemed to be
seeking to create a new international trade / tribute regime similar to
that by which Asia was controlled prior to Western expansion (see
Creating a New International
'Confucian' Financial and Political Order?). As the latter noted: (a)
power would be developed within such a system by helping to achieve the
goals of powerful interests within other nations (eg amongst the BRICS) or
economic groups (eg along the 'Maritime Silk Road' or through the Shanghai
Cooperation organisation); and (b) China was playing this role particularly with
respect to emerging economies. The parallel between this process and Mao's
reported strategy [1]
of capturing the country-side and thus leaving his Nationalist rivals
surrounded in China's cities (which depended in many ways on the
country-side) might be worth considering. Also the possibility (which is
anything but a certainty) that a 'new' Japan might be
seeking to play a complementary role with traditionally developed
economies should not be neglected;
- Someone might (or might not) have encouraged various countries to
object to the collection of strategic intelligence that had contributed to
US-led efforts to support the development of a liberal (ie democratic
capitalist) international order since WWII (see Smarter
Authoritarians?) ;
- a Malaysia passenger jet was shot down over Ukraine in July 2014- and
this led to mutual blame between the Ukraine (which tends to have European
/ US backing) and Russia [1].
While an incident related to an on-the-ground conflict is most likely, an
external party could potentially have had an interest in promoting
conflict between Russia and Western nations.
The basic point is that it should not be assumed that what seems to
Western observers be happening in East Asia is not necessarily what is
actually happening. The region does not traditionally work in a straight
forward way. It is understood that in Asia it is normal to assume that when
things go wrong, that one's enemy is likely to be responsible. It would not
be expected that it would usually possible to trace how whatever went wrong
was made to happen.
Efforts to look behind the scenes (based on attempts to
understand the region in its own terms and the use of methods such as those
suggested above) are needed.
China's so-called 'Communist' Party reportedly used anti-Japanese rhetoric
connected with Japan's WWII actions in Japan as a means for building
nationalistic support in the post Mao era [1].
While this might have been a 'front' to prevent domestic opposition arising
to a coalition agreement between
social elites in Japan and China, the latter is no means certain. If so the 'vengeance' that the Communist
Party has been promising China's people may be against Japan for the deaths of tens
of millions of Chinese in the 1930s and 1940s - though
nationalist rhetoric emerging from top-level
Chinese sources could have many meanings.
Moreover there were grounds for suspecting in 2012 that any 'coalition'
arrangement between Japan and China's (so-called) 'Communist' Party that emerged in the 1970s might be fracturing - because of adverse
consequences that this might have created for China (see
Friction between China and Japan: The End of the Asian
'Century'?). On the other had it was noted in 2015 that despite the
official cooling of relationships between Japan and China from 2012, there was a
high level of informal collaboration between Japan and China because of: (a) the
similarity of their economic systems; and (b) the risk of a financial crisis
that China faced which was similar to Japan's in the early 1990s and a
determination to learn from Japan's mistakes [1]
In relation to Japan's activities it is also worth noting that in the 1980s
ultranationalist / Yakuza linked
factions with high-level Japanese government connections appeared to have a significant (but generally unrecognised) political
and economic influence
in Queensland. Influence was gained by facilitating
Japanese investment in resource and tourism projects, though it possible (probable?) that activities that have security implications were also involved
The Dark Side of Japan in Australia?:
In the 1980s Yohachiro Iwasaki
developed a close relationship with then Queensland premier (Joh Bjelke
Peterson) after proposing a resort in a somewhat improbable location in
central Queensland. He then apparently introduced his friend,
Ryochi Sasakawa, who:
- helped maintain Queensland's Bjelke Peterson government in power in the
1980s by facilitating many economically-significant Japanese resource and tourism investments; and
- was a notorious ultranationalist Yakuza boss and a suspected Class A war
criminal in 1945 - and was alleged to have been involved in arranging the
development (by Yakuza construction organizations ie those controlled by
Japan's ultranationalists organized crime gangs) of infrastructure to
facilitate Japan's invasion of Manchuria;
- according to Kaplan and Dubro (in Yakuza: Japan's Criminal
Underworld, 1986 - see extract below) had become one of the three main post-war
'kuromaku' in Japan (ie fixers of relationships between government, business
and the Yakuza - a facilitator role that presumably implied an Imperial mandate) - with multi-$bn income from speedboat racing
that was partly to fund MITI’s special projects;
- played a significant immediate-post-WWII role in the Yakuza's: (a) support for
the continuance of Japan's imperial system; (b) the creation of Japan's
democratically-unaccountable economic bureaucracy; and (c) the
establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (see
Establishing
Japan's Post-WWII Political and Economic Systems);
- was a vocal admirer of Admiral Yamamoto who had commanded Japan’s Pearl Harbour raid and planned the proposed invasion of Australia (involving an overland
thrust south from Darwin and a series of 'hops' down the east coast);
- made numerous ‘state
visits’ to Queensland during the 1980s coinciding with visits by thousands of
young Japanese on the Shin Sakura Maru - a ship whose name, 'New Cherry
Blossom Ship', has interesting connotations - given that 'Cherry Blossoms' are
traditionally associated with the samurai and Yamomoto's raid on Pearl Harbour
was by the 'Cherry Brigade').
The Debate about Ryochi Sasakawa
Wikipedia presents a
view of
Ryochi Sasakawa as primarily a 'businessman, politician and
philanthropist'
Kaplan and Dubro (Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld,
1986 - see outline of sections related to Yakuza political roles) suggested
that Sasakawa was one of the key 'fixers' of the relationship
between yakuza, business and politics in postwar Japan:
Kuromaku describes a 'fixer' behind the scenes, who
bridge the gap between yakuza and legitimate business and politics.
Most famous had been Toyama. Postwar dominance was achieved by
Kodama, Sasakawa and Kishi. Kodama helped fund and establish the
Liberal Party and in 1954 helped engineer the election of Hatoyama
as prime minister. Sasakawa has emphasized money rather than
politics to achieve power. An outright admirer of Mussolini -
'squarely behind Japan's military policies of aggression and
anti-foreignism for more than 20 years'. He has made extensive
international connections in business and politics. His postwar
wealth was based on establishing the Japan Motor Boat Racing
Association - which split income with authorities. In 1980 corporate
income was $7.4bn. At the same time he won over yakuza gangs.
Employs squads of financial racketeers to push along his
investments. Sasakawa has spent 30 years on a program of self
aggrandizement - claiming to be a humanitarian. Kishi had links to
Ikki Kita in the 1930s. He was de-purged in 1952, became general
secretary of the LDP in 1955 and Prime Minister in 1957.
The Centre for Media and Democracy cites
critical views of Ryochi Sasakawa as suggesting: (a) that he had
created a fascist party in Japan in WWII; (b) he had developed close
relationship with ex US President Carter; (c) a journalist received
death threats for investigating his empire; (d) he was seen by US
occupation forces as having been 'one of the worst offenders outside
the military in developing in Japan a policy of totalitarianism and
aggression'; (e) he provided the funding to initiate the US-Japan
Foundation - which caused controversy because of his open support
for extreme right-wing causes, his ties to Japanese gangsters and
negative views of him by Japanese intellectuals and liberals; and
(f) a US publisher had ordered the shredding of the entire English
edition of Kaplan and Dubro's 1986 book which had presented a
picture of Sasakawa with war criminal / underworld /
ultranationalist links.
The present writer found himself up to his armpits in allegations of yakuza
and ultranationalist involvement on taking on a lead role in organising concept development on behalf of the Queensland Premier’s Department for a MITI
sponsored project, the Multi Function Polis (MFP) - a MITI proposal that had
apparently been funded by Sasakawa.
That vague and apparently
benevolent proposal for a 'centre for technological and cultural interchange' was
supposedly mainly intended to facilitate the creation of a Japanese
'colony' in Australia
(because the only real interest was in developing a SE Queensland site to which large numbers
of Japanese could be attracted). A large Japanese community would have been necessary for any
significant Japanese influence in Australia, as individuals, who tend to be
strongly motivated to conform to others' expectations, ‘go native’ (and thus
cease to be truly 'Japanese')
unless supported by a large group.
It also seemed that Sasakawa was also supporting development by
Yakuza-controlled companies of infrastructure that would
have facilitated Yamamoto’s 1940s’ plan for the invasion of Australia (eg a
string of airports at resorts down the Queensland coast (some at locations that
made little sense for tourism - such as that sponsored by Iwasaki), and the railway line
south from Darwin that EIE encouraged by initially proposing to finance the
project). EIE was a Yakuza organisation
(according the NSW Bureau of Criminal Intelligence) and also Sasakawa’s front in
proposing the MFP. Iwasaki and EIE were 'special' according to a Japanese
contact with whom the situation was discussed, and who then refused to
elaborate on what 'special' meant. An EIE representative gave a formal
presentation on the MFP to a Queensland Government organised group in which he
rudely implied that Australians would not cope in an Asian environment - a
rudeness that is apparently significant in Japan (ie a Yakuza characteristic as noted below).
If the MFP was established as a significant government-endorsed Japanese 'colony' behind the WWII 'Brisbane line',
this would also
have facilitated Yamamoto's 1940's invasion strategy.
Sasakawa and Iwasaki (both about 90 and since deceased) had
apparently worked together in association with Yakuza organisations involved in developing infrastructure in Manchuria which had
facilitated Japan’s 1930s’ invasion. According to various sources Yakuza are:
- unlike other Japanese in not being polite;
- nationalistic gangsters whose predecessors aided in initiating Japan's modernisation in
the 19th century by supporting the Meiji restoration (eg see
Views of the Power of
Japan's Yakuza). The Yakuza apparently gained a respected role in Japanese society as enforcers of social discipline in Japan on behalf of the state (ie playing a role somewhat like lawyers in Western societies);
and
- dominant in Japan’s construction and leisure industries.
Sasakawa's role in Manchuria and his role in controlling a slush fund
for MITI special projects
are suggestive, though not conclusive, noting
Fingleton's view (which
the present writer can't confirm or disprove) that the methods that MITI used
in orchestrating Japan's post-war economic miracle had been developed in Manchuria by the
Japanese military in the 1930s.
It is unclear what Australia’s intelligence
community made of this. Alan Wrigley (former head of ASIO) took control of the MFP
project, and appeared to try to close it down. The present-writer's whistle-blowing on prior
Yakuza / ultranationalist influence in Queensland and apparent involvement in
the MFP proposal (which made the front page of Brisbane's Courier Mail) didn’t seem
to be officially appreciated (and resulted in subsequent exclusion from all
meaningful work). Senior Queensland officials who had facilitated Japanese
investment seemed to gain post-retirement positions with
allegedly-Yakuza-linked organisations. An internationally known economist with whom the MFP project had been discussed, expressed surprise at the present writer's
'extremely racist' reaction to the situation, until someone in the Asian
studies faculty of his university told him that 'Professor, you are the new
boy on the block'.
Queensland's newly create CJC’s criminal intelligence group said
(privately) that when the Bjelke Peterson government departed, organised crime
linked to police protection and Yakuza seemed to be replaced by those with Mafia
and Triad connections. Both the new police commissioner and the head of CJC
seemed to take a strong interest in organised crime. The former apparently reported
possible corruption by a senior minister and then appeared to be framed for
corruption before being sacked. The first CJC head (the present writer seems
to remember without being able to now locate the reference) reportedly later commented on an unnamed government being
controlled
by organised crime.
Queensland subsequently trended even more to the autocratic
crony capitalist style that had started in the 1980s (see
Reform of Queensland Institutions - or a Rising Tide of Public Hypocrisy?)
complemented by suspect capital accounting (see
About the 2009-10 Budget and
Recovering from Queensland's Debt Binge) - both features that the present writer associates
with, though are by no means limited to, neo-Confucian influences.
There is also a need to think critically about Australia's coalition of
interest with the US (and other traditional allies) - because their actions and
judgments (like Australia's) are anything but perfect or problem free (eg
consider Fatal Flaws and the inability of
US occupation forces to perceive
the neo-Confucian
character of Japan's post-WW2 economic and political systems behind their
liberal democratic face).
While
Australia's security planning is conventionally based on its alliance with the
US (so that measures designed to limit US action in the Western Pacific upset
Australia's conventional strategy), any actions to boost US prospects in the
region through collaboration should be accompanied by efforts to ensure that
what is being supported is in the best interests of the whole regional
community. Some suggestions about ways in which initial US initiatives to
address perceptions of growing security risks in Asia might be modified are in
A Better Australian Response to US Defence Proposals?
Suggested Strategic Response
Given the possibility that infrastructure
and other arrangements that might facilitate a future invasion of Australia
might be being encouraged by Japan and China, closely examining 'economic'
proposals from this viewpoint would seem essential.
However the defence build-up in Australia which is
suggested in the report should not be the primary strategic option considered, because (in the face of nuclear armed states elsewhere)
China’s goal in building up the PLA is most likely primarily to defend itself (and its allies).
Moreover its perceived need for such costly and sophisticated military capacity probably
relates to an attempt which is being made to create a neo-Confucian
international order (ie an
international regime that would allow authoritarian / communitarian 'Asian'
models of socio-political economy to be effective, while at the same time
disrupting the
established global order based on democratic
capitalist principles).
A better solution to this potential standoff is probably to make China’s
heavy military investment pointless, by exposing the limitations of the
neo-Confucian international order that it is presumably intended to defend /
advance.
This might be achieved by:
- ensuring that ordinary Chinese are made aware that, under an elite
controlled system of socio-political-economy, their hard work would never produce much benefit for themselves (see
Creating a New Confucian Economic World).
China apparently maintained tributary relationships with other states prior to
European expansion, under which the 'tributaries' provided nominal 'tribute'
to China's elites and received significantly greater material benefits in
return, because China's elites ensured that China's people worked hard for
limited reward (a situation that also seems to characterise modern China
noting the limited return available on savings and the limited share of
China's income that has been available to households);
- supporting efforts by those in China who want to develop a system of
political economy that does not depend on authoritarian control by
neo-Confucian social elites. It is possible that South Korea's example might
be worth considering. The apparent ongoing interest in more egalitarian
outcomes for China as an alternative to the elitism implicit in the methods
that have been the basis of it rapid economic modernisation can be noted (see
Communism Versus Confucianism:
The Continuing Contest in China);
- promoting understanding in Western societies of how ‘Asia’ works so as the
limit scope for manipulation. Real Asia-literacy is a strategically critical requirement
because policy makers are at risk of dangerous miscalculations in its absence
(see Risks from Asia-illiterate Policy Making
in Babes in the Asian Woods). Moreover given widespread understanding of
how influence is exerted, individuals would have a choice as to whether or not they are
manipulated;
- blocking the protection which is provided to unbalanced mercantilist
financial systems by current account surpluses, by (a) restricting the
availability of credit for consumption; and (b) boosting productivity, and
thus incomes (using methods suggested in China may not have the solution,
but it seems to have a problem, which also refers to other similar
options). The outcome would be significantly increased: (a) savings; and (b)
exports as a percentage of GDP;
Australia and US's regional push,
email sent 19/11/11
Michelle Grattan
The Age
Re:
Gillard goes 'all the way' with Obama's big regional push, The Age,
18/11/11
Your article raised questions about whether
Australia or the US was most enthusiastic about closer military engagement.
I suggest looking at Ross Babbage’s
Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030 (which I have partly summarized in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030). It
specifically suggested the need for US engagement in Northern Australia, because
of growing apparent belligerence by China’s PLA. I got the impression that this
reflected Babbage’s close consultations with officials in Canberra. Given that
growing belligerence and: (a) the increased likelihood of breakdown of global
order because of economic stresses (and US / China economic tensions in
particular) and (b) Asia’s dependence on some Australian resources, there is
good reason to be concerned about potential invasion threat to Australia in
(say) 10 years for the same reason that Japan attempted this in the 1930s.
There is thus a defense case for creating a situation (through a training base
for US forces) to create a situation in which an attack on northern Australia is
also an attack on the US.
My commentary on the situation basically
suggested that the proposed response to the situation envisaged by the defense
establishment in Australia (and US) would be far too narrow and ham fisted to be
effective – reflecting the pervasive lack of Asia-literacy in both systems. Some
recent suggestions about alternatives tactics that might be more effective (by
altering the economic context which determines future levels of military power)
are in
Getting out of the Economic Quicksand.
John Craig
- demonstrating that liberal societies do not have to suffer
widespread moral dysfunctions – as such failings seem to provide strong
motivations for resistance to liberal institutions (and not only in the Muslim
world). This could be achieved by: (a)
reminding churches that
success in their mission of bringing more abundant life to individuals is also
important in creating a social environment that supports liberal legal and governance
institutions; and (b) reminding the community generally that liberty depends on
responsible
individual morality;
- reducing the economic role of financial
services - because, when money becomes the focus of the economic game
rather than merely being the means of keeping score: (a) instabilities can be
induced; and (b) rational action by individuals is disrupted rather than
facilitated.
Though it was
written with another purpose, the suggestions in
A Nation Building Agenda probably constitute a reasonable first draft of the broad range of changes and capabilities that Australia needs for security in
2030. This refers, for example, to: better internal and external support to the
political system; stronger efforts to access external intelligence; improved Asia-literacy; and much better
methods for economic
development.
Very large cost savings could probably be achieved in the medium-long term by
broadening the approach to national security away from primary reliance on
military capabilities.
|
Source Documents +
|
Source Documents related to Australia’s Strategic
Edge in 2030
Outline of Executive Summary
In 2030 timeframe ADO will need to deal with: help in civil
disasters and in resuscitation fragile countries / regions; help in border
security; counter-insurgency campaigns in distant theatres; launching counter
terrorist operations; and direct defence of Australia. Security environment will
be different due rise in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s more
assertive behaviour – and this requires refocusing Australia’s defence
capabilities despite the many opportunities to work cooperatively with China.
The PLA’s rise is associated with: sophisticated surveillance and targeting
systems; missile systems; submarines; surface vessels with cruise missiles;
better aircraft; missile defences; space warfare capacity; cyber capabilities; a
sophisticated command and control network; and nuclear weapons. This challenges
assumptions that are the basis of Australia’s and allies’ security planning –
related to security of the US and its allies in space and Western Pacific. Planning
needs to start now for capabilities needed in 2030. US capabilities are
constrained by GFC. US Department of Defence is however working to counter the
anti-access area-denial capacity of China and Iran. Australia can’t ignore this.
By 2030 PLA will pose direct threat to Australian sovereignty – and many of
PLA’s capabilities are being spread throughout South and SE Asia – thus changing
the
environment for future military operations. Thus ADF won’t have numerical
superiority, and will have lost technological edge. Australia’s national
security community will need to be different – focused on applying asymmetric
leverage – either in collaboration with US or independently (eg because US might
be distracted elsewhere). Four options are available (a) modernised general
purpose force (as in 2008 National Security Statement and 2009 Defence White
Paper) – which would offer only limited leverage against great powers; (b) build
stronger regional alliances – which assumes that they share Australia’s concerns
about the PLA; (c) reduced dependence on US combined with heavier investment in
asymmetric military capabilities – an option that would be effective but
relatively expensive; and (d) developing capacity for asymmetric leverage in
close collaboration with the US. The latter would involve heavy investment in:
regional engagement; cyber capabilities; underwater systems; advanced air
combat; and next generation special forces. Key effect of PLA’s expansion is to
make US operations in Western Pacific more risky – and Option 4 would allow
Australia to offset this. This option would also be costly. Option 4 is
favoured, though a lot more work is needed on it (and plans could usefully be
reviewed every 3-5 years). There is also a need for: mastery of strategy at
highest strategic level, as well as at campaign level; general acceptance of
asymmetric thinking; evaluating total force capacity, rather than individual
elements; fostering innovation; seeking efficiency / effectiveness in overhead
functions; resilience; building a culture of whole-of-nation national security
planning; and fostering exceptional military / civilian leadership.
Other
Key Points in Australia’s Strategic Edge in
2030China’s surging influence has been based on its economic
success, and this has gained more attention than its military development (p1).
Various different responses to China’s development seem to be envisaged by
others – and this paper proposes both economic cooperation and a broader
security approach towards China (p2). This implies the need for a more
sophisticated approach – and to be able to do more than one thing at a time, as
doing only one of these could be risky (p3). This paper focuses only on China’s
military challenge, as many others have written about economic / political
relationships (p3-4). China is close to being able to deny US and allied forces
access to Western Pacific – thus eliminating a fundamental assumption in Australia’s security
planning. US Defence Planners are developing counter-strategies (p4). Australia
faces key questions about China’s 2030 capabilities; how US and other allies
will respond; options for a ‘strategic edge’; and whether modernisation of
Australia’s defence forces would be enough (p7). National security planning
requires looking many years ahead – and this is not easy (p8) During that time
scale, continued stresses in the Middle East and Africa can be expected – while
China will be most powerful state in Western Pacific and the main strategic rival to
US (p9). Strategic thinkers see four scenarios for PRC in 2030-2040 period: (a)
continued rapid economic and military growth – 20% (p9); (b) slower and broader
growth – 60%; (c) much reduced growth and military modernisation with serious
internal problems – 15%; and (d) serious internal disturbances which result in
attempts by government to build nationalist sentiment by focus on external
challenge (p10). In defence planning it is not only necessary to consider the
probability of outcomes, but the severity of consequences. Thus the prospect of
a much stronger PLA potentially impacting on Australia needs to be considered
(p11). China’s rising power has been driven by rapid economic growth – with high
levels of economic integration with Western Pacific neighbours (eg 30% of
Japanese companies manufacturing output comes from China). China’s defence
spending has grown faster than economy – and is now 10 times that in 1989 (p12)
and likely to continue growing at 12% pa for 20 years. US concerns are with
character of China’s defence spending as well as with its size (p13), in terms
of (a) strategic nuclear forces (p14); (b) wide-area surveillance and targeting
(p15-17); (c) new missiles (p17-20); (d) larger modern submarine force (p20-21);
(e) stronger surface forces (p21-22); (f) new advanced fighter bombers (p22-23);
(g) modernised air defences (p23); (h) space warfare capabilities (p24); strong
cyber capabilities (p24-25); and hardened command and control. Analysts have
sought to understand the goals of China's defence investment. These include
(a) keeping PLA happy with political leadership (26); the opportunity created
by economic success; the need to ensure raw material sources; preventing
other's interfering in China strategic interests; an ambition to restore China
as a great power / civilization. Emphasis has shifted from major land war to
ensuring security of access routes and undertaking distant peace-keeping - eg
related to piracy (p27). The main focus of 'Far Sea Defence' is to
prevent foreign forces operating in western Pacific - possible a result of
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. Reference is often made to 'offshore defence'
and to 'assassin's mace' (p28) - which suggests an interest in using
surprise strikes in asymmetric manner to cripple a superior enemy. Main
elements of PLA strategy seem to involve: blind US / allied surveilance and
disrupt command / control systems; launch surprise / pre-emptive attacks on
US, Japanese and other forward allied forces; (p29) and long range
attacks (eg on US West Coast or Australia). It then seems to be assumed that
US and allies would be forced to negotiate regional withdrawal and
accommodation with Beijing. This bears strong resemblance to Japanese Imperial
Forces strategy in 1941-42 (30) ---- incomplete
Other
Observers' Comments on Australia’s Strategic
Edge in 2030Australia’s Strategic Edge
in 2030 by Ross Babbage has near mathematical elegance. He wants Australia
to do to China what China is doing to US (ie make it dangerous for US forces to
operate in Western Pacific). China uses asymmetric warfare methods to do this
(eg via cyber warfare, space warfare, submarines and missiles) – an anti-access
denial strategy. Western way of war depends on vast flows of digital information
– so destroying satellites prevents this. Missiles would also prevent access to
Western Pacific by US carrier groups – and could attach Guam and Okinawa.
Babbage argues that PLA’s build-up has changed strategic environment – thus
threatening US military superiority and Australia’s security. Australia can help
overcome this by hosting US forces here, and by developing Australia’s own
asymmetric approach to china. He suggests build-up of cyber-war capabilities to
protect own assets and perhaps attach Chinese systems. Buying nuclear submarines
from US would be better than developing Australia’s own. They are very
effective, would reinforce US capabilities and would be easier to keep
operational. Babbage does not advocate conflict but argues that nuclear
submarines would be an effective deterrent. Babbage would also seek missiles
that could be launched from ‘arsenal ships’. Creating US bases in Australia
would increase the likelihood of US involvement if Australia were threatened. If
Australia has a real prospect of doing significant damage to China, conflict
would be much less likely to occur. Babbage’s description of what China has done
to strategic environment deserves most attention. He sees this rising PLA as
most serious challenge Australia has faced since WWII. He does not speculate on
China’s motivation for PLA build up – as this can’t be known, could change.
Military capabilities have seldom been acquired without being used in China’s
history. China is seen to have developed capacity to destroy US sanctuary in
space; in Guam; in Japan. Surface vessels 1200km from China’s coast are no
longer safe. China alone amongst nuclear powers plans to double or triple its
nuclear weapons by 2030. Australia is already in range of many weapons. US is
developing its own counter-plans. China is active in cyber war – with thousands
of infiltration daily – and this could have major effects. Babbage’s paper
should be the starting point for a broad national debate. (Sheridan G. ‘Time
to beat China at its own game’, The Australian, 5/2/11)
Australia needs a 40% increase
in defence spending because of increasingly militaristic China, which shows
strategic thinking similar to Japan’s preparations for Pearl Harbour. The Kadoka
report details increased Chinese military spending, and suggests how Australia
should arm (eg with nuclear submarines and arsenal ships) to resist it). Paul
Dibb (ANU) suggests that this proposal would be a bad idea (Nicholson B., ‘Chinese
military plans like Pearl Harbour’, The Australian, 8/2/11)
National security policy is too
important for federal ministers to stay silent when bad ideas are put forward.
Foreign Affairs minister (Kevin Rudd) and Defence Minister (Stephen Smith)
should reject proposals by Ross Babbage that Greg Sheridan reported on. It turns
reasonable concerns about China’s military expansion into virtual hysteria.
Proposals are ill-defined / uncosted, and would be counter-productive or
dangerous. 2009 defence white paper set out costed and coherent policy. Babbage
proposes increasing white paper’s finding of the need for Australia to have
independent military means to ‘impose substantial costs on a major power
adversary operating in our approaches’. Such proposals to rip an arm of China
could provoke Beijing. Rudd and Smith should say that Australia will neither
appease nor provoke China – and argue that its military build up enables China
to defend itself and also support US in dealing with serious military threats in
Asia-Pacific. Babbage reportedly does not believe that US / China conflict is
imminent. His proposals lack details and costings. He proposes increased
cyber-warfare capacity, which white paper already proposes. Babbage is concerned
about China’s military expansion and aggressiveness, but assumes this is only
about countering US naval assets, whereas there are other goals. Pentagon argues
that China’s main aim is to fight and win short duration conflicts against
high-tech adversaries along its borders – but has little ability to sustain
military power at a distance. Though the latter capabilities are being created,
they won’t be effective until the 2020s and are undermined by inferior national
defence industries. Rudd and Smith should insist that Australia’s most rational
response to China’s military expansion is to strengthen US alliance, and go
ahead with planned re-equipment. No senior official has yet endorsed Babbage’s
arguments (Dibb P., and Barker G., ‘Panicky
response would harm our interests’, The Australian, 8/2/11)
Kokoda Foundations, Australia’s
Strateigic Edge in 2030 shows flaws in Defence White paper process. That prcess
was better than its predecessors, but inadequate and never kept to by
governments. There is rather a need for a formal strategic intelligence estimate
of possibilities and best responses. All countries need this to prevent
emergence of another Cold War (James Neil,
Flawed Process, The Australian, 8/2/11)
Ross Babbage argued at one time
that Australia needed the military strength to ‘rip the arm off’ any major Asian
attacker – and now suggests this in relation to China. Launching
'Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030' he described this as response to rapid
growth of PLA. China’s expanding capabilities mean that: assured access to space
and air in Western Pacific is no longer available; key US bases are at risk;
Australia’s allies could fall into China’s sphere; China’s reach will extend to
near Australia over the next 20 years. Report is based on consultations with
those concerned about China, but Babbage assumes full responsibility. Babbage
demolishes fundamental assumptions about Australia’s security (*eg US
operational sanctuary in space, security of US bases in Japan / Guam,
uncontested US shipping and air access to Western Pacific). He suggests in
response: seeking nuclear not conventional submarines; building stealthy arsenal
ships; reconfiguring army for long-range special force operations; create deeper
partnership with US; and make large cyber / space warfare investments. This
would make dealings with china difficult. Babbage will stir debate.
(Dobel G., ‘Rip
off a Chinese arm;, The Interpreter, 7/2/11)
Babbage’s report suggests
China’s military build up constitutes the biggest threat Australia has faced
since WWII, and that there is a need for strong deterrence power which is not
currently available. PLA has acquired modern combat aircraft, a substantial
submarine force and surface fleet, advanced missiles, modernised nuclear force
and growing ability to wage war in space and cyberspace. China has defence white
paper, but has not explained strategic rationale for acquiring such an extensive
range of capabilities. Babbage suggests that China does not seem to understand
that war with US would not finish quickly. Strategy of taking out US bases in a
few hours seemed like Japanese strategy around 1940. Some Chinese strategic
writing was like Japan in lead up to Pearl Harbour. China seems to be naively
assuming that US would just go away – and this is unlikely. (Blenkin M.
China biggest security challenge since WW2, 7/2/11)
Governments around the Pacific
are preparing for war with China at some future time. Most people are unaware of
this – but preparations are being made (for example) in India, Vietnam and
Australia (one of whose strategic advisors has just suggested acquiring nuclear
submarines). Behind closed doors there is fear of China – who doubt the peaceful
rise of the world’s most powerful totalitarian state. China is doing the same as
everyone else – arming themselves. In 2005 a Chinese general threatened a
nuclear response to US positioning guided missiles to target China. China would
expect all of its cities east of Xl’an to be destroyed – while the US would lose
hundreds of cities. Professor Ross Babbage’s report argued the need to prepare
to counter a Chinese Pearl Harbour like strike. (Birmingham J. ‘Why
we’re all up in arms over China’, The Age, 8/2/11)
|
Qualification |
QualificationThese observations are based on an attempt to understand
the intellectual basis of the models of socio-political-economy
that have permitted rapid advancement (ie economic 'miracles') in societies with
an ancient Chinese cultural heritage (initially Japan and ultimately China) -
see brief summary in
East Asia in Competing Civilizations. These observations could easily
contain misperceptions, as they are based only on information that has
been available to the present writer.
They were not based on formal 'Asian studies'. Rather the possibility
that quite different intellectual traditions to those of Western
societies were involved emerged from: (a) experience and study of
bureaucracy and of strategic management in government and economic
affairs (see also
Background notes in Competing Civilizations); (b) a detailed
examination of what was said about Japan; and (c) direct exposure to
what appeared to be undesirable influences
in Australia that Australians generally did not recognise.
When examined from this viewpoint much of what was said about
arrangements in East Asia seemed much easier to understand than when
examined in terms of Western practices.
While there have been some opportunities to get feedback from others,
these have been limited because few seem to have been interested.
Mainstream (eg economic and political) analysts have viewed 'Asia'
through parallels with Western societies, which provides little basis
for understanding. And students of the humanities, who presumably should
have been concerned with the practical consequences of cultural
traditions, appear to have been off on a post-modern 'trip' (see
Competing Civilisations).
|
Addendum A: Ignorant Diplomacy Sill Risks Catastrophe |
Ignorant Diplomacy Sill Risks Catastrophe -
email sent 23/6/12
Max Suich,
c/- Editor, The Australian
Re:
Diplomacy that led to Human Catastrophe, The Australian, 23/6/12
I should like to submit that your useful account of the
role that tensions over ‘race’ played in the lead up to WWII missed the most
important point – namely the incompatibility between:
- the international order established on the basis of cultural
traditions that had allowed Anglo-Saxon empires to be successful; and
- the radically different order that would have been (will be)
associated with the ‘Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ that a frustrated Japan sought
China’s support in establishing through military methods after WW1, and through
more traditional long-term ‘Art of War’ tactics after WWII.
The primary source of past (and potential future) conflict
did (does) not lie in Western racism, so much as in East Asia’s deliberate
inscrutability (ie preventing others understanding one’s ‘shape’) and the
failure of students of the humanities and social sciences in Western
universities to try to understand (because understanding is hard, and domestic
‘racism’ is a much softer target). This was disastrous because with
understanding differences can be managed, but without understanding differences
become ‘racism’.
My
interpretation of your article: Australia’s
hostile, clumsy and rarely coherent policies towards Japan after WWI have
parallels with current policies towards China. Geoffrey Blainey (in Causes of
War) argues that Australia played a significant part in events leading to
the Pacific War with Japan (eg with disputes over raw materials access; market
competition leading to trade war; hostility based on racial pride and imperial
alliances). Australia confronted Japan, the then new Asia / Pacific power, with
careless hostility based on excessive faith in a declining ally. This is
relevant again today in relation to China – though there are differences (eg
China is not the dissatisfied militaristic nation that Japan was). Australia was
a vociferous partner with UK / US before start of Pacific War, and had been
antagonistic towards Japan from 1919 (eg by vetoing Japan’s request to be
recognised as an equal with Anglo-Saxon empires in foundation documents of
League of Nations). This compounded resentment of discrimination against
Japanese in immigration, trade and investment, and boosted the position of
militarists and nationalists in undermining relatively liberal forces in Japan.
Billy Hughes had a major role in this – and exploited Australians’ nationalism,
convictions and prejudices. He gained support for protecting the White Australia
policy and opposing concessions to Japan (ie though Japan’s original demand for
recognition of racial equality had been reduced in League of Nations preamble to
recognising equality of nations, he vetoed this). Historians have written about
this (eg Naoko Shimazu and Neville Meaney). Meaney suggested that Hughes
believed that Japan’s proposals were intended to knock down the walls of the
White Australia policy. Shimazu argues that this reinforced Japan’s rejection of
the West and the search for an independent path that led to invasion of China
and ultimately to war in the Pacific. Carl Bridge, by contrast, sees the Paris
Peace Conference as Hughes’ finest hour, producing outcomes that advanced
Australia’s long term interest. However, like Hughes, he paid little attention
to the advantage that militarists and extremists gained from this in Japan. This
helps sustain the assumption that Australia had no role in the origins of the
Pacific War. Hughes embodied British race patriotism – and this was appreciated
in Australia, and continued by Menzies. Meaney sees this as failure, while
Shimazu notes that an arrogant and immature Japan felt that it had to prove in
Asia that it was not less than the West. Japan was not fighting for universal
racial equality (as it discriminated against others in Asia), but for itself as
the leader of Asia. The final wording of the equality clause was like ‘all men
are created equal’ – though Hughes disagreed. There were negative consequences
for Australia of Hughes’ veto (eg UK support for Japanese territorial expansion
to placate Japan). Some in Australia saw Hughes action as consolidating all of
Japan behind the imperialists, and proposed measures to avoid offending Asian
nations and to ease immigration restrictions.. Hughes rejected the latter, and
praised the US Exclusion Act (which paralleled the White Australia policy). In
1931 Japan’s Kwantung Army falsely accused Chinese dissidents of armed rebellion
and used the incident to seize Manchuria (and create Manchukuo). Japan’s
civilian government (which Hughes had not supported) was undermined. Japan was
then on a war footing – and this increased its obsession with resource security.
In 1937 after several years of creeping military takeover of northern China,
Japan launched a full scale invasion of China. Might Japan have been diverted
from the militaristic cause by granting the racial equality clause or would this
have merely encouraged Japan to believe that it should have a sphere of
influence in Asia (like the European empires)
The real point at issue in Japan’s search for ‘racial’
equality was not about race, but rather about the capabilities of different
cultures. Yet this was not perceived, because Western observers viewed ‘Asia’
through the lens of the universalism of Western social, political and economic
institutions, while traditional East Asia
Art of War tactics emphasise deceiving others about what is going on.
Australia’s current prime minister has commissioned the
production of a White Paper on the (possible) Asian century, and this seems to
be based on the same ignorance about what is different about East Asia as led to
the pre-WWII frictions described in the above article. My reasons for suggesting
this, and an attempt to identify what is significantly different about societies
that have an ancient Chinese cultural heritage, rather than the West’s classical
Greek, Roman and Christian heritage, is in
An Asia-literate Approach to 'Asia'. The latter suggests, for example,
that:
- an 'Asian century' implies that intuitive, hierarchical and
autocratic ethnic groups would prove better able to deal with ongoing economic
and political challenges than rational / responsible individuals operating within the
framework of individual liberty, a rule of law, democratic governance and profit
seeking enterprises that Western societies have adopted;
- this represents the practical consequence of a different approach
to epistemology (ie a rejection of the reliance on understanding and rationality
that has been the foundation of Western strengths).
An attempt to consider the geo-political implications of
the modern version of the tensions with Japan that gave rise to the Pacific War
is in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030. The latter
includes:
- The Need to do More than Prepare for the Last Great Battle of WWII, which
implied (as your article does in a different way) that post WWII frictions have
parallels with those after WW1;
- Suggestions about why it is difficult to understand societies whose
strengths and weaknesses are based on their rejection of the relevance of
understanding;
- Reference to the present writer’s exposure in the 1980s to Japanese
ultranationalist factions, with close connections to the Japanese state, who
seemed to be still trying to win WWII; and
- Suggestions about a strategic response which emphases ‘soft power’ methods
to defuse tensions.
I would be interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum B: Soft power: Active as well as Passive |
Soft power: Active as well as Passive - email sent 14/6/12
David Smith
University of Sydney
Re:
Has Australia fallen for Obama’s soft power?, The Conversation,
13/6/12
I interpreted your article as implying that
‘soft power’ is passive (ie related to others having a favorable impression of a
nation). However I suggest that ‘soft power’ can also be (and needs to be)
active.
My reasons for suggesting this are implied
in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030 (2011). This
suggests, in relation to defence considerations in an ‘Asian century’, that:
- Inhibiting outsiders’ understanding on how you
operate is a conventional East Asian ‘Art of War’ tactic – so gaining such
understanding is a necessary ‘soft power’ tactic;
- The main thrust of traditional ‘Art of War’
tactics involves ‘soft power’ methods – so as to weaken others internally;
- There are active ‘soft power’ tactics that could
be used to reduce in reducing the potential for conflicts.
Active ‘soft power’ methods that might have
been used to defuse the risks associated with violence by Islamist extremists
were suggested in
Discouraging Pointless Extremism (2002).
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum C: A Better Australian Response to US Defence Proposals? |
A Better Australian Response to US Defence Proposals? - email sent 2/8/12
Harley Dennett
Re:
Nuclear drumbeat grows as US eyes Australia, Crikey, 2/8/12
Your article suggested that proposals from the US Center
for Strategic and International Studies for basing nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers in Western Australia may have had more US government support than
Australia’s Defence Minister (Stephen Smith) acknowledged.
Whether or not this is correct, I should like to suggest
for your consideration that the US’s apparent intention to respond to China’s
rising military capacities and militarism by increasing its ‘hard power’ assets
in the Asia Pacific region (including some in Australia) would not only be
expensive but also relatively ineffectual. That the US has such an intention is
implied by various recent proposals in relation to locating forces in Australia,
and reportedly also by discussions between Australian defence analysts and their
US counterparts.
A better alternative, involving a primary emphasis on a
soft power response, is suggested in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, The latter (which
comments on what seems to be an Australian analyst’s response to information
from US analysts) suggests that the US and Australia may have been suckered for
decades by traditional ‘Art of War’ methods, which primarily involve the use of
‘soft power’ – because: (a) the possibility that such games may have been being
played was not considered; and (b) there was no awareness of even what to look
for due to a pervasive lack of Asia-literacy.
If Australia wants to assist the US in countering China’s
rising military capacity and militarism, the most effective way to help would be
to boost general understanding of traditional strategy in East Asia – perhaps by
methods like those suggested in
An Opportunity to Boost Asia-literacy.
John Craig
|
Addendum D: Beyond 'The China Choice' |
Beyond 'The China Choice' - email sent 14/8/12
Hon Paul Keating
c/- Editor, The Australian
[Not for Publication]
RE:
A case for Chinese legitimacy, The Australian, 11/8/12
Your overview of The China Choice
(by Professor Hugh White) suggested that China’s authoritarian system of
government should be accepted as legitimate because it has been successful in
lifting huge numbers of people out of poverty very quickly. The problem is that
this achievement (like the economic ‘miracles’ in other East Asian states) has
apparently involved a neo-Confucian system of socio-political-economy that: (a)
makes global economic growth unsustainable; and (b) is alien to prevailing
international political and economic institutions.
Whether Australia
should promote such systems to the world as legitimate / desirable is more
complex than was indicated by your article (or apparently by Hugh White’s book).
Geopolitical issues related to East Asia need to be considered in terms of how
things have traditionally been done in that region, rather than by assuming that
something like Western-style institutions, methods and
motives are involved.
My interpretation of your article: At the
start of 20th century Europe ran the world – through British and
German empires. Within 40 year this was torn apart by two world wars. Now the
issue is Deng Xiaoping’s restoration of China’s economic power. Can the world
adjust to centre of global economic power in Asia? Hugh White, in The China
Choice, points out that the US never faced a country as rich and powerful as
China (eg USSR never matched US) – and wealth gave power. China’s military has
long been preparing for war with US, and US’s military is now making similar
preparations. Conflict could arise at short notice. China won’t do what Japan
did – become a strategic client of US. US must recognise that the shift in the
economic situation leads to a strategic shift also. Asia’s stability can’t be
ensured by a non-Asian power – a point made by a former US national security
advisor (Zbigniew Brzezinski). The failure of US wars should convince US that
wars on Asian mainland are unwinnable. Stability in Asia requires constructive
regional relationships, not divisive external linkages. US should not be drawn
into Asian wars unless these involve countries with which the US has treaties.
The US needs to decide what characteristics of China pose a threat, and which
can be accommodated. China needs to be encouraged to participate in the region,
without dominating it. If either the US or China says that Australia has to
choose between them, then Australia does have to choose. Australia doesn’t want
to make such a choice, and in a cooperative structure would not need to do so.
Thus Australia needs to convince the US that it needs to adapt to China’s rise.
For more than a generation Australia has not engaged in serious debate with US –
but has simply cooperated with US foreign policy. China’s rapid rise demands
more than that. Asia will be safer place with ongoing US engagement – but as
Australia’s trade is increasingly with north Asia (especially China) a
cooperative US / China structure is in Australia’s interests. This requires
recognising China’s legitimacy, its great power prerogatives and the legitimacy
of its system of government. This is not possible if only democracies are
considered legitimate. While peace prevails amongst democratic states, Kenneth
Waltz argues that structure of international policy is not transformed by
internal changes in states. China has been criticised on the basis of human
rights and values, though the human condition has improved across China. US
president Obama argues that prosperity without freedom is just another form of
poverty, though China has achieved the largest and fastest increase in human
material welfare in history. This is discounted by those who simply pursue human
rights issues. Peace is a value also – so reducing the risk of war is desirable.
The China Choice is an exceptional synthesis of the arguments and
influences that bear upon the future of the Pacific.
While the following is anything but the last word on the
subject, I suggest that a cooperative structure in the Asia Pacific can’t be
achieved simply by (say) convincing the US that China’s system is legitimate
because:
- Cultural differences (and more particularly the failure of
students of the social science and humanities to consider the practical
consequences of those differences) have been a major factor: (a) in the relative
economic success and failure of different societies; and (b) in international
tensions / conflicts (see
Competing Civilizations, 2001+). The latter included: (a)
speculations about the intellectual foundations (and consequences) of East Asian
economic ‘miracles’ (which China finally copied); and (b) an
outline of the origin of the ideas presented here. The former suggested, for
example, that East Asian economic ‘miracles’ have been built on an approach to
knowledge, power, governance and economic goals that is different to that
underpinning Western success and power in recent centuries (which was achieved
because Western political / economic institutions enabled initiative by
responsible rational / responsible individuals);
- Understanding those differences and their practical consequences
is quite difficult (for reasons outlined in
Understanding ‘Asia’). And few, if any, of the analysts who seek to offer
prescriptions in relation to the response by Australia or the US to China’s
rising economic and military power seem to have bothered trying to understand
(see
Risks from Asia-illiterate Policy Making). For example:
- Zbigniew Brzezinski’s argument (that the US should play a
mediating role in Asia) is unrealistic, because what he suggests is impossible
without a deep understanding of how and why East Asia works (see
US can't play a 'conciliation' role in Asia without understanding it).
Likewise Australia can’t play a mediating role between the US and China (as Hugh
White apparently suggests) without a serious effort to understand East Asia (see
Can Australia Help China and the US to Get Along?);
- A real ‘Asian Century’ (ie one in which East Asian
traditions were globally dominant) would imply that political and economic
institutions that are built around the notion of responsible individual liberty
(such as egalitarian citizenship, independent business enterprise and democratic
politics) would no longer have a significant role (see
What does an 'Asian Century' Imply?);
- Economic ‘miracles’ in East Asia have involved non-capitalistic
financial systems in which major business investments are made by state
linked-enterprises with limited regard to expected profitability and draw on
national savings mobilized by state-linked banks. Thus those systems:
- Are incompatible with sustainable global economic
growth, because those systems require large domestic demand deficits (which some
have labeled ‘savings gluts’) to avoid the need for international borrowing. It
has only been the willingness and ability (to date) of their trading partners
(especially the US) to continue increasing their debt levels, that prevented:
(a) the global economy from stagnating because of inadequate total demand; and
(b) the ‘miracle’ economies from suffering financial crises like the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 (see
Are East Asian Economic Models Sustainable?, 2009); and
- Constitute a generally unrecognised form of industrial
protectionism, which economists would regard as undesirable if they understood
(see
Resist Protectionism: A Call That is Decades Too Late , 2010);
- China (like Japan) is facing a severe economic reversal because
such financial arrangements seem unlikely to be viable in future, and this
financial vulnerability may well be exacerbated by the response that others will
need to take in their own interests (eg see
China may not have the solution, but it seems to have a problem). And in
China’s case political instability is also a real risk because the methods it
used to emulate Japan’s economic ‘miracle’ have created the world’s most extreme
wealth imbalances, and this is so incompatible with China’s nominal communism
that another Cultural Revolution against China’s Confucian social elites has
been seen as a real possibility (see
Heading for a Crash?);
- The methods of collaboration that are used under East Asian
neo-Confucian systems involve collaboration amongst subordinates within a social
hierarchy. This is not compatible with collaboration under the prevailing
international institutional framework (see
Eurocentric Aspirations in a World of Rising 'Asian' Influence, 2011).
International collaboration that is compatible with China’s domestic political
system would probably involve something like the China-centred trade-tribute
system that existed in Asia prior to Western expansion (eg see
Creating a New International 'Confucian' Political and Economic Order,
2009);
- The US’s response to the challenge to the West’s global dominance
from East Asia has been very slow to emerge, and thus remains clumsy and
unsophisticated at this stage. It was slow presumably because:
- the challenge emerged quite rapidly, and the US was focused on a
‘war against terror’ (which may or may not have been the result of an
intentional tactic – see
Attacking the Global Financial System?, 2001);
- there is (as noted above) a pervasive lack of deep understanding
of what is different about East Asia, despite the West’s very long military,
diplomatic and economic engagement in the region - so
domestic politics dominates over the national interest;
- US monetary authorities (ie the US Federal Reserve under Alan
Greenspan) apparently expected that financial markets would force changes to
East Asian financial systems that required large ‘savings gluts’, and in 2008
were clearly very surprised when a financial crisis emerged first in the US;
- the US Government seems to be conditioned to think about
geopolitical issues primarily in terms of military capacity, and this is clearly
only a small part of the equation in the Asia Pacific (see
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, 2011 and particularly
A Better Australian Response to US Defence Proposals? ).
Thus there is probably a need for a much deeper assessment
of the issues than appears in your introduction to The China Choice.
Moreover, it is arguably not sufficient merely to seek a
more cooperative approach amongst states in the Asia Pacific. Humanity faces
many challenges (including economic stability, peace and environmental limits)
that can’t be resolved so long as the focus is on who is the ‘top dog’, rather
than on what social, political and economic system is most likely to lead to
those challenges being successfully met. Despite Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation
of ‘The End of History”, the post WWII global order built on Western style
democratic capitalist principles (and with US leadership) has continued to be at
risk even though the long Cold War against Soviet-style Communism was won (eg
see
The Second Failure of Globalization?). The latter addressed:
It might thus be better to promote a more cooperative
approach globally, if this offered a reasonable prospect of reducing the
particular risk of rising tensions in the Asia Pacific. Some, undoubtedly
inadequate and now-quite-dated, speculations about how this might have been
achieved were in
A New 'Manhattan' Project for Global Peace, Prosperity and Security (2001).
This suggested a process to raise awareness of the issues that needed attention
to create an international environment in which all might reasonably hope to
succeed, and a process whereby all participants could develop a response within
frameworks that reflected their own cultural traditions. Some parallel
speculations (in Competing Civilizations) concerned changes to
Western-style democratic capitalism that might be considered in such an
environment.
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum E: Friction between China and Japan: The End of the Asian
'Century'? |
Friction between China and Japan: The End of the Asian 'Century'? - email sent 28/9/12
Greg Sheridan
The Australian
Re:
Beijing worrying many neighbours,
The Australian, 27/9/12
Your article noted that China is pursuing territorial claims (including one that
risks conflict with Japan) with unusual and unexplained aggression. I should
like to suggest a possible (though by no means certain) scenario under which
this could presage the end of the Asian ‘Century’ – at least in the sense that
this would involve ‘Asian’ leadership in a Western-style democratic capitalist
international environment.
This requires considering that China may face difficulties in the
presently-unstable international economic environment that are not apparent
without taking account of characteristics of the neo-Confucian systems of
socio-political-economy that Japan first developed and that have been the basis
of economic ‘miracles’ across East Asia, ultimately
including China.
My interpretation of your article:
For the first time in many years China is pushing territorial claims in
the East China Sea (ie a dispute over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands which Japan
has administered) and South China Sea (ie claiming sovereignty over the whole
sea to the coastal waters of The Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia). This is
being done aggressively (eg with coast guard fleets violating other’s
territorial waters, and violent anti-Japanese protests). The dispute with Japan
is exceptionally dangerous – because both countries have roughly equal military
strength and Japan has a giant economy and is a US ally. US policy towards
China has changed under President Obama. The first phase (offering many
concessions to China) achieved nothing, and in 2010 China started bullying many
of its neighbours. The US then became more hard headed, and Obama announced an
economic and security ‘pivot’ towards Asia. Finally it has been seeking to
engage positively with China – and to encourage China to take a greater
international role. Beijing’s motives for its current behaviour are perplexing.
Comments from Singapore’s Institute for SE Asian Studies (Rodolfo Severino) are
that pushing China towards legal adjudication / clarification
on its South China Sea claims would harden China’s claims. Zheng Yongnian (East
Asian Institute) drew attention to China’s nationalism, and the leadership
transition in China. China’s government has fanned nationalism - which has
created an independent force within China. Increased democracy in China would
thus lead to more chaos / violence, and perhaps international conflict. China’s
development is not unique. Like other countries in East Asia it has engaged in
government-led / sometime ruthless capitalistic development. However in China
there has been no parallel social development. Thus Chinese people feel
insecure. Most people are impoverished. The government is not respected –
because of corruption. If China were a democracy, Chongqing Party boss Bo Xilai
would be elected president – because of his populist style and direct income
redistribution. Much of what he did was illegal – but this is not unusual, as
there is little respect for law in China.
Leftism and nationalism have deep roots in China, but liberalism does not.
China’s biggest task is to develop its middle class. At present government is
strong / rich, while people are weak / poor. Middle class has no institutional
protection. China could experience social chaos. There is a race between reform
and social uprising. Growing the middle class is needed, as otherwise
democratisation could make things worse. Most of the dynamics that govern these
matters are internal to China, so China’s politics are the worry.
The situation
needs to be considered in context. The global economy is in a perilous state.
Europe is in recession, and instability threatens because of the debt / deficit
exposure of many governments. The US is also facing its ‘fiscal cliff’ which
will lead either to a serious recession or financial market concern about
escalating US government debts [eg see
1]. Japan faces government debts that are 200% of
GDP. China’s massive investment program to maintain growth since the start of
global financial crisis (GFC) is recognised to be unsustainable. While many
emerging economies have been doing fairly well, they (in common with Australia)
have generally done so on the basis of strong export demand. Though the reserve
banks of major economies are boosting liquidity, it is anything but clear where
the demand to sustain future global growth can come from.
[Note added later:
Increasing liquidity through quantitative easing by reserve banks does not automatically increase demand - especially where:
In this
environment China (and also Japan) are facing serious risks. These risks
include, but go beyond, the issues mentioned by the Singaporean experts that
your article outlined. A key point is that the rapid economic advancement that
has been achieved in East Asia (including
Singapore)
has involved
neo-Confucian
systems of socio-political-economy
which are anything but ‘capitalistic’ (ie they are not driven by a search for
profit by independent enterprises – but rather by a state-driven goal of
boosting the economic power of ethnic communities). The financial institutions
in affected economies would suffer crises (like the Asian financial crisis of
1997) unless domestic demand is suppressed to the point that current account
surpluses make it unnecessary to borrow in capitalistic / profit-focused
financial markets. The resulting demand deficits (‘savings gluts’) are
macroeconomically unsustainable, and compensating for this has been one
significant factor in the heavy debts that their trading partners have incurred
and also in causing the GFC (see
Impacting the
Global Economy).
Speculations
about China’s predicament now that this strategy is becoming unsustainable are
outlined in
Heading for a
Crash or a Meltdown?
The latter suggests that China’s problem is not just financial and economic, but
that for various reasons the neo-Confucian system of socio-political-economy
that has been the core of its rapidly developing economy since the late 1970s is
an obstacle to developing solutions. Japan, it can be noted, is also approaching
a financial crisis – because it is on the point of incurring current account
deficits and thus having to borrow externally with a
non-capitalistic
financial system.
This may be
significant in relation to the emerging frictions between China and Japan
because:
- A
close observer of East Asia (Eammon Fingleton) has
suggested
that Japan played a significant (but undisclosed) role in introducing into China
a variation of the neo-Confucian system of socio-political-economy that had been
the basis of economic miracles elsewhere in East Asia. And there are reasons to
suspect that Japan and China might have been motivated to enter into a
cooperative arrangement at that time – ie a shared desire to create an
international economic and political order that was not based on Western-style
democratic capitalism (see
Coalitions of
Interests?);
- One
of the two main factions contending for future control of China (ie that centred
in Shanghai, and closely aligned with China’s Diaspora) seems likely to have
played the major role in operating that Japanese-sponsored system in China (see
China’s Political
Tensions).
If so then
confrontation with Japan could be expected not only to divert the nationalism of
China’s people towards support for the Communist Party but also to undermine the
position of factions within the Party that are most closely associated with the
economic methods that were adopted from Japan - and which have now created: (a)
obstacles to China’s future economic progress; and (b) commercially-focused
social elites and wealth imbalances that are incompatible with China’s nominal
‘communism’ (and which Mao’s cultural revolution had sought to purge from
China).
Thus conflict
with Japan could perhaps be regarded as an effective proxy for civil conflict
within China.
There are many
other interpretations that could be placed on current events.
For example China-Japan tensions could be:
- simply intended to unify China's people in a
common cause;
- related to contests for control of China's
communist party [1];
- the outcome of an agreement between China
and Japan to demonstrate to others in Asia that an alliance with the US is
worthless - assuming that China's pressure will Japan to capitulate
[personal communication];
However, no matter what the basis of these tensions, it is
strongly suggested that what is different about the way things are traditionally
done in Asia needs to be considered in seeking to understand, rather than trying
to understand in terms of Western concepts (such as capitalism and democracy)
which don’t have anything like the same implications as they would in the West
(eg see
Embracing Asia
Requires Understanding).
In particular, it would also be desirable to recognise that
traditional Asian
Art of War tactics
feature deception – so what seems to be happening (or is said to be happening)
may not be a reliable guide to what is actually happening.
John Craig
|
Addendum E: Nationalist rumblings in Japan |
Nationalist Rumblings in Japan - email sent 13/12/12
Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki
ANU
Re:
Japan’s paradoxical shift to the right, Inside Story, 6/12/12
I should like to draw your attention to
some speculations about the possible influence of Japan’s ultranationalist
factions, which your article suggests are again making an attempt to gain power
in Japan.
My
interpretation of your article: Nationalist
political factions have re-emerged in Japan, which could be troubling for the
region. Three years ago the Democratic Party government after years of LDP
dominance brought hopes of real two party politics. But this experienced
difficulties because of: (a) the earthquake / tsunami which damaged nuclear
power industry; and (b) the character of politics in Japan (which is closed /
cliquish so that grassroots social movements don't trust it). Vacuum is being
filled by groups exhibiting alarming nationalism. Tokyo governor (Shintaro
Ishihara) proposed purchase of islands in East China Sea, which (a) generated
conflict with China, and (b) diverted attention from nuclear industry problems.
Ishihara is notorious racist / sexist / homophobic. Japanese people feel the
need for strong leadership. Osaka mayor launched Japan Restoration Party
(espousing nationalist, neo-liberal economics and political system changes - a
single chamber parliament and a directly elected PM). He also endorses the need
for dictatorship, and criticises apologies for abuse of 'comfort women'.
Hashimoto's policy of phasing out nuclear weapons ended when Ishihara emerged as
Restoration Party's leader - advocating acquiring of nuclear weapons. Abe has
emerged as head of LDP - with similar views on 'comfort women' and nuclear
weapons. All these groups endorse expanding Japan's scope for military action -
and this would escalate tensions in Northeast Asia.
By way of background I note that I had some involvement in
the 1980s in concept development for the MITI-sponsored Multi-function Polis
project (to establish a centre for cultural and technological interchange), and:
- Thus put in a good deal of effort trying to understand the
intellectual foundations of the economic ‘miracles’ that Japan had pioneered
(see
East Asia in Competing Civilizations for an outline of the
conclusions);
- Immediately found myself up to my armpits in allegations about the
involvement in the development of the MFP proposal of yakuza and
ultranationalist factions (under Ryochi Sasakawa) who seemed to be both: (a)
extremely well connected into the Japanese Government, and possibly playing a
key role in organising Japan’s economic ‘miracles’; and (b) still trying to win
WWII – see
The Dark Side of Japan in Australia?).
As a consequence, I have taken a somewhat cynical view of
events over the past couple of decades. Some speculations about the possible
effect of behind-the-scenes influence on Japan by ultranationalist factions are
in:
-
Unrecognised Clash of Financial Systems – which:
- suggested that the incompatibility between Western-style
international financial institutions and the methods that had been the basis of
Japan’s post-war economic miracles (which were allegedly eventually introduced
to China by Japan) may have had a significant effect on global history; and
- referred in passing to indicators of the continuing significant
influence in post-WWII Japan of ultranationalist factions (see
The Dark Side of Japan);
-
Coalitions of Interests? (in
Comments on Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030) which: (a) notes that
Japan’s primary tactic in seeking to establish an Asian Co-prosperity Sphere in
the 1930s and 1940s involved an unsuccessful effort to mobilize China’s support
(see
Broader resistance to Western Influence?); and (b) tries to draw conclusions
about Australia’s appropriate response to autocratic East Asian states.
These speculations are clearly not the full story (or even
adequate in themselves). However I submit that they such possibilities need
consideration, and would thus be interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum F: Looking for meaning in war warnings from Asia |
Looking for meaning in war warnings from Asia - email sent 25/3/13
Ambrose Evans-Prichard
The Telegraph
Re:
The dangerous drift towards world war in Asia, The Telegraph, 24/3/13
You are getting into deep waters – and
those waters are murky. I should like to suggest considering the possibility
that the ‘war’ issue in Asia might not be the one that is most obvious – and
which was the subject of your article.
An
alternative scenario was the subject of
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030 (2011). The latter
was a response to earlier concerns about the implications of China’s rising
militarism that apparently originated in US defence circles. It advocated a
soft-power response to what seem to be war rumblings in Asia.
It was based on:
At the very least
three scenarios need to be considered: (a) there could be a risk of war between
China and its neighbours (including Japan); (b) Japan and China could be
colluding with the intention of engaging jointly in military adventures against
the US; and (c) there may be no real war risk, but rather a ploy to ensure that
a military bias dominates US foreign policy in Asia. The lunatic threats
currently emanating from North Korea (arguably a Chinese vassal state) suggest
to me that the ‘war in Asia threat’ is more likely to be a deception than a
reality.
John Craig
|
Addendum G: Whose intentions: Kim's or China's? |
Whose intentions: Kim's or China's? - email sent 4/4/13
Greg Sheridan
Re:
Hard to fathom Kim’s intentions, The Australian, 4/4/13
There is a possibility that your article did not consider
plausible – namely that China does actually have a great degree of
behind-the-scenes influence in North Korea. And, if so, then what has happened
perhaps involves encouraging an unstable (virtually lunatic) regime to threaten
attacking others in the expectation of thereby boosting China’s global status
(ie its shift towards a new ‘Middle Kingdom’ role) by encouraging (perhaps
forcing) the US to rely on China to bring what is in effect China’s ‘attack dog’
to heel.
This scenario is anything but certain – but it should not
be ignored. ‘Art of War’ precedents in history might usefully be researched.
John Craig
|
Addendum H: An Art of War Perspective on North Korea's Blustering >>
|
An Art of War Perspective on North Korea's Blustering - email sent 5/4/13
North Korea’s threats to attack the US and others seem
incomprehensible to Western observers.
However the real problem may be that such observers can’t see
the forest for all of the trees (ie particular threats of war).
Some speculations about: (a) the nature of the ‘forest’ (ie the
big picture) that might make it easier to understand the ‘trees’; and (b) about the
desirability of a serious soft power response are on my website. The source of
the problem may lie in the influential neo-Confucian networks that have been
responsible (behind the scenes) for orchestrating economic ‘miracles’ in East
Asia who now find that their efforts are likely to result in failure.
John Craig
'Art of War' Speculations about
North Korea's Threats [Working Draft]
Background: The present writer's
background for these
speculations includes a lot of study of what has been written about Japan as the
basis for a possibly-successful effort to 'reverse-engineer' the intellectual
basis of East Asian 'economic miracles'.
Interpreting Tensions in East Asia
The following account seeks to consider North Korea's threats of war in a
broader-than-usual context. For example, this involves those threats possibly
being one amongst several manifestations of a long term 'civilization' contest
between Western and East Asian societies that is perhaps coming to a head
because growing economic and military strengths in East Asia's 'family states' have been built on
neo-Confucian methods that are incompatible with those implicit in the the
West's universalist / liberal traditions that the US's 'pivot to Asia' would seek to reinforce in the
region.
It is by no means necessary to take such a broad view to produce reasonable
explanations of tensions in East Asia.
Three big things are going on in east Asia. The most visible / disruptive is
China's rise. Next comes resurgence (especially in Japan) of competing /
mutually reinforcing nationalisms. Then is dangerous unpredictability of North
Korea. South Korea's foreign policy think tank (Asia Institute) held conference
on New World Disorder. Residents in Seoul are used to North Korean threats and
don't behave as if they are at risk of imminent attack. The real risk arises
when North Korea puts a nuclear warhead on a missile. Many others would be
affected by Korean peninsular conflict. Chinese diplomats express frustration
with Jong-un. But its influence is limited. North Korea can be as hostile to
China as to US. China has probably concluded that living with Kim is better than
the alternative - collapse of his regime and re-unification of the peninsular
which would give the US a foothold (perhaps a military one) on China's border.
Though some in Communist Party have suggested that North Korea has become a
liability, giving it up would be seen as a a sign of weakness. China has never
clearly articulated its ambitions - but rising military spending, a combatative
approach to territorial disputes - suggests a desire to gain regional primacy.
This is to be expected, However it generates resistance from neighbours. And
xenophobic populism in China's blogoshpere fans nationalism elsewhere. This has
pushed Vietnam and the Philippines closer to US. South Korea suggests that US
should locate tactical nuclear weapons there, and raised questions about South
Korea itself developing nuclear weapons. Japan's government has a nationalist
pose that worries others. Disputes over islands have become entangled with Abe
government's revisionism of Japan's WWII occupation of China and Korea. US has a
problem. Its pivot to Asia was meant to underscore permanence of US balance of
power in Asia - thus encouraging allies and deterring Chinese expansionism.
However the US fears that Japan can treat US treaty as a shield behind which it
can confront China. Some see the tensions in East Asia as a sustainable
equilibrium, but this may not be so [1]
However, it is arguably worth considering the alternative, because different
ways of thinking in East Asia lead to ways of doing things (including trying to
win wars without fighting) that are quite different to those that Western observers are likely to be
familiar with.
Look at the 'Forest' Not Just at the 'Trees'
There is a saying that some people ‘can’t see the forest
for all the trees’.
This could be costly or perhaps even dangerous in relation to North Korea's threats of war
(including nuclear attacks) against the US and South Korea, because that particular 'tree' (ie
threat) has emerged in a 'forest' that involves an historical and geo-political
contest (in which Korea currently has a foot in
both camps) between the West's 'rational / responsible individualism'
and various 'authoritarian / ethnic family-state' alternatives that have been
developing in East Asia for decades.
The 'forest' implies the (uncertain) possibilities that
apparently-crazy threat by North Korea's 'supreme leader' could be intended (for
example) to:
- draw the US and its allies
into an ambush (and perhaps that April 29 might be a
critical date for a nuclear attack) because East Asia's 'authoritarian family-states' are currently facing severe risks - risks that are not obvious to
outsiders but may have resulted in the apparently unexplainable
war-rumblings (from China in particular) that have emerged across the region
over the past couple of years; or
- re-establish China's role as Asia's 'Middle Kingdom" by mediating the
reunification of North and South Korea (under an 'authoritarian
family-state' model?) if the US and its allies: (a) prove unwilling to
engage in another Korean war because of the risk of being 'ambushed'; and (b) can't come up with any other effective
response; or
- prevent a new 'Middle Kingdom' domination of Korea because of the
passionate commitment to 'independent development' that is the core of North
Korea's church'e (Juche)
ideology and which it views itself as the 'centre of the world' in
promulgating.
One problem in assessing North Korea's threats is that Western observers seem much more likely than those in
East Asia to be unable to see the 'forest' for all the ‘trees’.
“..... researchers used an eye-tracking
device to
pinpoint exactly where participants look when given a photo with a salient
object (e.g., a train) set against a busy background. Americans looked outside
the object an average of one time but had eight or nine fixations on the actual
object. On the other hand, Chinese participants had one sharp initial fixation
on the object followed by five or six fixations on the background context. “If
people are seeing different things, it may be because they are looking
differently at the world,” ....” (West C.
How Culture Affects the Way we Think’,
Observer, V20, No 7, 2007)
This difference in ways of looking at a situation is not
limited to visual perception. Western minds rationally focus on specific causes
and effects (ie ‘trees’), while an East Asian assessment of a situation will
tend to be in terms of all the factors present and how they relate or can be
made to relate (ie
‘forests’), rather than on individual elements. A noted Japanese
ultranationalist once enigmatically remarked that 'The only things in this room
that are truly Japanese are the things you cannot see' (ie what was truly
Japanese was not the things, but the way they were arranged / related).
Illustration: Japan has many 'things'
/ 'trees' that look familiar (eg
democratic / elected governments, a bureaucracy, banks, businesses) but it is
misleading to assume that when one looks at those apparently familiar 'things' that one has understood
Japan - because those 'things' operate in a way that Western observers won't be
aware of (eg are driven by hierarchical social relationships rather than abstract concepts
such as law or accounting principles) because of
invisible cultural differences.
And the consequences [??] can also be
virtually invisible to those who think that looking at the apparently-familiar
'things' / 'trees' is sufficient to provide understanding.
Western methods of dealing with problems tend to focus rationally on individual
components / projects subject to well established 'rules of the game' (eg law,
accounting principles) which make it possible to ignore other parts of the
'forest' when dealing with a particular 'tree'. However in East Asia 'rules of
the game' are not respected. Mao was criticised by his successors in China
because of his inability to 'break any rules' (ie to do things in totally
unprecedented ways) - see Communism versus
Confucianism: The Continuing Contest in China. Deng Xiaoping (China's former paramount leader and the architect of
'socialism with Chinese characteristics') famously argued that whether something
worked was the sole criteria for whether or not it was good: "It doesn't matter
whether it's a white cat or a black, I think; a cat that catches mice is a good
cat." [1]
Problems are traditionally addressed without assuming that there are any
unchangeable 'rules of the game' by
bringing the problem to the attention of all the 'trees' and then trying to bring
together diverse and mutually-reinforcing contributions from all over the 'forest' into a solution (which
then reinforces the power of an established regime, or becomes a new political power base
- as Bo Xilia seemed to be
attempting in China).
Power is not associated with making decisions but with using strategic
information to induce others to take favourable actions. The Japanese strategy
game of Go does not involve a single contest, but rather involves
multiple, simultaneous contests anywhere on a large board. Where interests clash
and neo-Confucian methods are being used to seek power, nothing may be
publicly said but diverse and apparently unrelated contests will occur in many
different places.
Similar observations have been
offered in relation to
China where 'wei qi' (the Chinese name for Go) has been used as an
analogy for China's approach to economic development. Little attention is paid
to the profitable use of capital in relation to particular investments - as most
emphasis is placed on the benefits of the synergistic relationships that can be
established between diverse activities.
Thus in seeking to understand East Asia it pays to give more attention to relationships amongst events
/ interests, than to individual elements.
In assessing increased security risks in East Asia (which
include friction between China and its neighbours as well as North Korea’s
blustering), it may help Western observers to pay more attention to the
‘forest’ (ie to the context, what else is going on, what other threats exist) than to the ‘trees’ (eg
a particular threat of war viewed in isolation).
And this needs to be done in 'Asian' (rather than Western) terms - which can be
a
quite difficult intellectual challenge.
The present attempt to look at the 'forest' suggests that, while North Korea has its own agendas that need to be
considered, the source of these threats may lie
in coordinated or conflicted behind-the-scenes efforts to defend / advance the position of Asia's
'authoritarian family-states' by nationalistic neo-Confucian networks in Japan’s
bureaucracy, China’s so-called Communist Party, China’s worldwide Diaspora
(ie in 'Greater China') as well as in North Korea's regime. And this possibility needs to be considered in traditional Asian 'Art
of War' terms (eg featuring deception; very long term agendas; etc) rather
than being taken at face value and considered only in terms of current events.
It is suggested below that rather than being an ignorant ideologue as it appears,
North Korea's 'supreme leader' may be acting out the role of what can be likened to a
'barking dog' to attract attention to the Korean peninsular and thus either: (a) create an
opportunity for China to increase its status as regional power-broker in Asia at
US expense (eg by successfully promoting reunification of North and South
Korea as 'autocratic family-states'); or (b) prevent the loss of North Korea's
independence that that that outcome involves.
Alternately, and less likely, it could be that North Korea is acting as 'attack dog' on others' behalf - and under
one version of that scenario:
- a nuclear attack against the US could actually happen in parallel
with apparently unrelated financial, cyber, terrorist and diplomatic
actions; and
- in providing military support to South Korea the US and its allies could
find that they have been enticed in to an ambush because the threat actually
comes from the entire 'forest' (autocratic Asia) not just from the 'tree'
that is shouting threats.
If so there would be a need to to simultaneously deal with several complex threats
simultaneously and collaboratively - which would be a significant, though not
impossible, organisational challenge.
Why: One scenario suggested below involves
efforts to undermine the liberal Western
international order through diverse,
individually-complex and complementary actions that would have mutually-reinforcing
feedback effects. To even understand the risks there is a need for those with
state-of-art expertise and experience in several different areas to be involved,
and supported by generalists with sufficient competence to act as rapporteurs in
developing integrated responses.
Failure to deal simultaneously with multiple areas of quite different
expertise is costly - as can be illustrated by the primarily security /
military response to terrorist threats posed by Islamist extremists, because:
(a) the costs of security / military responses were high, and the results were
unsatisfactory; and (b) there were arguably options to dramatically reduce the
terrorist threat by discrediting the ideology of the extremists' spiritual
leaders (eg as suggested in Discouraging
Pointless Extremism, 2002+). But the latter required mobilizing knowledge
and experience that were beyond the competence of those dealing with the threats
from a security / military perspective. A narrow focus was arguably also costly
because other parts of the geo-political 'forest' (ie developing financial system and economic
difficulties) were 'off the radar' of authorities who were focused on dealing
with
security / military 'trees'.
One feature of 'forest-oriented' Art of War tactics is to create diverse
complex and mutually reinforcing challenges whose overall implications are
difficult to understand. Some suggestions about how this difficulty might be
overcome are suggested (in relation to Australia) in
A Nation Building Agenda.
Features of the 'Forest'
Some features of the ‘forest’ that may need to be considered
include:
- A ‘clash of / competition between civilizations’ that has been underway for centuries
between Western societies (the Realm of the Rational / Responsible) and East Asia
(The Realm of the Autocratic, Hierarchical and Intuitive Ethnic Group) – see
Cultural Foundations of Western Strength and
East Asia in Competing Civilizations.
Some speculations about how that clash / competition might have
been working out in recent decades if one takes a traditional Art of War
perspective are outlined in Broader
Resistance to Western Influence?.
The latter (which is a possibility rather than a certainty) draws attention to indicators of long-term mercantilist (ie
economically-based) efforts by Japan to achieve its WWII goal of creating
an 'Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' relatively free of liberal Western influences and
the possibility (though not certainty) that: (a) China's so-called Communist
(but now actually neo-Confucian) Party might have entered
into a coalition with Japan's ultranationalists to achieve this goal; and
(b) Islamist extremists (who share some anti-liberal interests with
Japan's ultranationalists) might have entered into a similar coalition with
Japan's ultranationalist in order to divert US attention and resources from the economic
contest by encouraging a 'war against terror' .
Various
scenarios suggesting how threats from North Korea
(which also has an 'authoritarian family-state'
system, though in a different form to those in Japan and China) might make sense
in this context are outlined below.
Elaboration: The methods described in the latter may be relevant because they:
- Involved neo-Confucian elites accelerated economic ‘learning’ in
whole industry clusters (eg consider the ‘vision development and administrative
guidance’ process used as the basis for industry policy by Japan’s Ministry for
International Trade and Industry). In China this neo-Confucian catalytic role appears to have
been taken after Mao's death by the so-called Communist Party rather than by the bureaucracy as
was the case in Japan presumably because under Mao the Confucian bureaucracy had
been portrayed as oppressing the
masses (see also
China's Bigger Secret);
- Were
suggested by Eammon Fingleton (with unknown validity) to have been originally developed by Japan’s
military in the 1930s, and transmitted from Japan to China in 1979;
- Resulted in bad national balance sheets because national savings were
committed without reliance on calculating such abstracts as
'profitability' (see
Indicators of a lack of attention to profitability), and
thus a constant risk of financial crises. Efforts to guard against crises:
- Adversely affected the global financial system - because demand
had to be repressed to ensure that there was no need to borrow in
international profit-oriented financial markets and this required
trading partners to be willing and able to sustain large current
account deficits and ever rising debts (see
Impacting the Global Financial System);
- Led to ongoing contests over the nature of the global financial
system (see An
Unrecognised Clash of Financial Systems); and
- Potentially made global economic growth unsustainable (see
Structural Incompatibility Puts Global Growth at Risk, 2003+ and
Debt Denial: Stage 3 of the GFC?). Unless asset values are rising rapidly to
create a 'wealth effect' (as they were prior to the start of the GFC)
it is very difficult to maintain growth if the first several percent
of domestic demand goes to meet demand deficits elsewhere that are
generated by financial repression to protect underdeveloped financial
systems. Moreover when international financial imbalances remain large it is
arguably impossible for counter-cyclical fiscal or monetary policies to create
sustainable economic recovery (see
Counter-cyclical policy can't solve structural problems );
- May have led China to seek to establish to yuan as an
international trade currency in the expectation that if it were to be
backed by gold reserves, it might be accepted in exchange for hard
currencies without anyone looking closely at China's national balance
sheet (see also Buying Chinese War Bonds?
in relation to the need to do this and
Interpreting the Canary in the Gold Mine in relation to the
potential divergence between the value of physical and paper gold)
- Have created serious risks of political instability in China
because its post-1978 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' (ie the undisclosed reintroduction of
an elitist neo-Confucian social order to drive an economic
'miracle') was incompatible with the popularly-supported equality aspirations of China’s nominal communism
(see
Communism Versus Confucianism: The Continuing Contest in China) - especially
because some in the so-called Communist Party took the opportunity to
enrich their families (and thereby created what is arguably the world's
most inequitable distributions of wealth).
- China's likely efforts to create a
new international neo-Confucian order
on the basis of its growing economic and military strength - ie an order
similar to that which existed in Asia prior to the arrival of Western
influences - and of which Western societies have no recent experience. That
this is under way is indicated by the apparently-easy potential cooption of
Australia as a 'tributary state' under such an arrangement (see
A Diplomatic Coup in Beijing: By Who?).
The creation of such an order would involve the use of behind-the-scenes
methods for influencing neighbours to collaborate in addressing supposed
civilizational challenges that they face from outside. In East Asia such
invisible-to-Western-observers influences might be either welcomed or: (a) the source of
growing war-rumblings across East Asia; and (b) tension with Japan and North
Korea in particular because of the view of ultranationalists in Japan and
devotees of church'e in North Korea that their own ethnic communities
should be the 'centre of the world' in using those methods to achieve
somewhat different goals;
- The US's 'pivot towards Asia' to promote universalist values
- which has the potential to provides a rallying-point for the various East Asian
'family states' and their potential allies world-wide who oppose those
values;
In relation to the goals of the US's so-called 'pivot to Asia' it has been
suggested that:
"As the President explained in Canberra, the overarching objective of the
United States in the region is to sustain a stable security environment and a
regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes and
respect for universal rights and freedoms." [1]
Moreover, while many will believe that universal rights and individual
liberty are widely accepted values that should attract general support,
counter-arguments can be offered. For example:
- East Asia's neo-Confucian 'family states' (eg Japan, China and North
Korea) are anything but committed to
economic openness; or
universal anything;
or individual rights
at the expense of the 'family state' as a whole. To varying degrees
their political and
economic systems are incompatible with such values (to a high degree in
the case of North Korea and with increasing subtlety in the cases of
China and Japan) - and collectively their economic and military power is
formidable.
- Islamist extremists have a similar viewpoint (eg see
possible
collaboration with radical nationalists) - and their influence in
the Muslim world remains non-trivial;
- Despite expressed preference for peaceful resolution of disputes,
recent attempts by the US and its allies to defend and expand economic openness / universal
rights and freedoms have been based primarily on hard-power methods
which have generated collateral damage, and soft power alternatives have
not been serious deployed (eg consider
Discouraging Pointless Extremism).
While ignorance is more likely to be defeated in the academy than on the
battlefield, the contest has been conducted mainly in the battlefield;
- the intellectual / academic case for Western culture has been
undermined by the dominance of 'post-modern' assumptions in the social
science and humanities faculties of many universities. The view that
cultural assumptions are merely a matter of preference and have no
practical consequences is invalid, but seems to be
'politically correct' (eg see
Eroding the West's Cultural Foundations). In Australia a
national history curriculum was adopted that did not even provide
students with an ability to understand the foundations of their own
liberal institutions and past strengths (see
National History Curriculum:
Information without Understanding);
- various features of profit-focused Western financial systems have
contributed to global economic dislocation (eg easy money policies, the
emergence of complex financial systems and the adoption of the Euro
without fiscal integration in Europe);
- there is a widespread view that profit-focused Western style
financial systems are solely responsible for economic dislocation. Such
views are naive (eg see Soros might also see
the world through blinkers), but have not been challenged because of
a lack of any serious evaluation of the cultural issues involved. Thus
resistance movements (such as the Occupy Movement) have emerged;
- a loss of individual responsibility has undermined the viability of
liberal Western institutions, and invited external contempt (see
Eroding the Moral Foundations of
Liberal Institutions).
And opponents of Western values would potentially be further encouraged
by the perception that the West (the realm of the rational / responsible individual) is
in terminal
decline anyway.
The values that the US 'pivot to Asia' seeks to promote are worthwhile,
but substantial changes are probably needed before it is likely that such
a process will be successful.
- The parallels and differences between North Korea's system of
socio-political-economy and those in (say) Japan and China. North Korea's
church'e ideology involves an extreme / isolationist form of East
Asian cultural traditions (especially Confucianism) combined with Marxism - and suggests: (a) what
China would have been like if it had not repudiated Maoist Communism in the late 1970s; (b)
why China maintains ties with North Korea; and (c) that North Korea might
resist China's domination. Though the issues
involved are complex (see following notes) it appears that there is a
cultural and ideological basis for either
collaboration or conflict between North Korean,
Japanese and Chinese nationalists that is not obvious if they are examined
only from a Western perspective (ie in terms of concepts such as democracy,
capitalism, socialism etc that do not really capture the radically different
way in which East Asia thinks and works).
The
North Korean Context: An
overview of North Korea is provided by Wikipedia. A commentary [1] on
the domestic environment in North Korea (which is relatively resource rich
but economically underdeveloped) referred to:
- its long history as the site of conflicts;
- a commitment to 'self reliance' after 1948 (ie closing the country off
economically and diplomatically) and to a philosophy of self-mastery (ie
for North Korea to rely on itself alone). Independence was sought even in
the face of famine, as was a strong defence system;
- perception of the ruling dynasty as somewhat supernatural and 'born of
heaven';
- large numbers of people live in prisons and are subjected to abuses;
- daily life being dominated by the family and propaganda;
- an education system that does not involve learning - and does not
prepare students for the modern world.
The apparent 'brain-washing' of North Korea's population raises
questions about its cultural and educational environment, it relation to
which it has been noted (in sources many of which date from the 1990s) that:
- North Korea's Juche (church'e) ideology holds
that the masses are the masters of a country's development - and in the
basis of a strong military posture and reliance on Korea's resources. It
can be seen as a 'spirit of self reliance, and according to Kim Il-sung,
Juche is based on the belief that "man is the master of everything and
decides everything" [1];
- Church'e is the cornerstone of North Korea / the monolithic ideology
of the Party / the embodiment of Kim's wisdom. It was proclaimed in 1955
as the basis of a Korean centred revolution - rather than one to benefit
other countries. It sought independent foreign policy; a self-sufficient
economy and defence capacity. It was intended to build a monolithic
system of authority under Kim's exclusive leadership. During the first
10 years of North Korea's existence from 1945 Marx-Leninism had been endorsed, and
nationalism was minimized out of deference to China and the Soviet
Union. Church'e was presented as meeting a need for a way to
authoritatively interpret Marx-Leninism in Korea [1].
- Marxism did not show how to achieve socialism, and this created
scope for church'e. North Korea's leadership was influenced most by
China's communist model (and Kim can be likened to Mao). But North
Korea's system differs from China's - intellectuals were never seen as a
class of exploiters (but were included). Its political system is best
seen as corporatist (ie one that an involves and organic politic to the
liberal, pluralist alternative). Kim is seen as the 'head and heart' of
the body politic, not just as a victorious commander. There is an
assumption that Korea is the centre of the world, radiating outwards the
rays of church'e - especially to third world countries. The world's
attention is focused on Korea. Society involves ever widening social
circles revolving around Kim. The family remains the model for social
organisation. One the outer circle are foreigners - as a reflection of
Korea's extraordinary unity and history of exclusionism. However the
circle keeps expanding to encompass foreigners under Kim and his
church'e ideology [1]
- Juche (church'e) ideology involves a fusion of
Korean tradition (Confucianism) and Marxism. North Korea's system is
different to that in other socialist states. Confucian culture ruled
supreme for 500 years during the Joseon (Chos'n) dynasty. It led to an
authoritarian political culture, that influences North Korea.
Confucianism provides: political ideology; a means for communication /
ethics to bind society together; a view of education as a behaviour
changer - and a way of creating a new humanity by internalising of
control and discipline. As in Confucianism Juche stresses the formation
of a new communist humanity. It puts action before theory. Confucianism
which had previously been accepted by criticised during Japanese
colonial period (eg because of its emphasis on five relationships (ie
father and son; ruler and minister; husband and wife; elder and younger
brother and amongst friends) and three bonds (ie to father / ruler /
husband) - but was later incorporated into the Juche ideology as the
basis for authoritarianism in North Korea (The
Resurrection of Confucianism in North Korea, Review of Korean
Studies, 2010)
- North Korea's experience of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) had a
major impact on the country. It brought development / underdevelopment,
agrarian growth, industrialization, dislocation. It spawned a new role
for the central state / new political leaders / communism / nationalism
/ armed resistance / treacherous collaboration. Koreans had always felt
superior to Japan, because of its closer links with China. After 1910
Japan substituted its ways for Korea's (ie it brought in a Japanese
ruling elite. modern Japanese education (replacing the Confucian
classics), Japanese capital and the Japanese language). This was seen as
illegitimate and humiliating - especially as Japan and Korea had
formerly been very similar. Japan's bureaucracies were big by colonial
standards. Many new institutions were established. Koreans became second
class citizens. Japan held Korea tightly and watched it closely. The
strong highly centralised state mimicked that in Japan (intervening in
the economy / suppressing dissent). Koreans always saw all
benefits going to Japan, but Japan's strong colonial state, the
multiplicity of bureaucracies, administrative guidance of the economy,
repression of labour unions and dissidents provided a post-WWII model
for both Korea's. Japan showed Korea an early version of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian path to industrialization [1].
- North's Korea's modern revival of Chosn Confucianism is an
ideological phenomenon (ie it involves the use for Confucianism as a way
for political elites to manipulate the population and legitimize their
role). The image of the family-state comes from the regimes political
discourses. Its Church'e (Juche) ideology has been systematised and transformed
through Confucianism. Confucianism has been used to legitimize the
regimes political power [1]
- Church'e is a break with the Confucian past. It was developed by Kim
Il Sung during the period of struggle against Japanese imperialism. It
emphasises cultural / economic and political isolationism - while
stressing the error of imitating others or becoming international. North
Korea has promoted church'e thought worldwide. It provides a relentless
emphasis on self-sacrifice and hard work. Everything is expected to be
possible through dedication and hard work [1]
- North Korea has created a system of totalitarian control which
exceeds anything in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. The population
is rigidly controlled. Individuals rights are subordinate to the state
and the Party.
Education, mass mobilization, persuasion and coercion are used to ensure
political / social conformity [1]
- Formal education has been central to social and cultural development
for centuries. During the Chosn Dynasty the royal court established
Confucian schools. There was a neo-Confucian emphasis in the sixteenth
century. In the 19th and 20th early 20th centuries, Western curricula
started to be taught. After the separation of North Korea, the education
system was modelled on that of the Soviet Union [1]
- Neo-Confucianism (which combines the social ethics of the classic
Chinese philosophers with Buddhist / Daoist metaphysics) was the
dominant value system of the Chosn dynasty. "One of neo-Confucianism's
basic ideas is that the institutions and practices of a properly ordered
human community express the immutable principles or laws that govern the
cosmos. Through correct social practice, as defined by Confucian sages
and their commentators, individuals can achieve self-cultivation and a
kind of spiritual unity with heaven (although this was rarely described
in mystic or ecstatic terms). Neo-Confucianism defines formal social
relations on all levels of society. Social relations are not conceived
in terms of the happiness or satisfaction of the individuals involved,
but in terms of the harmonious integration of individuals into a
collective whole, which, like the properly cultivated individual,
mirrors the harmony of the natural order." This became rigid by the
sixteenth century - with an emphasis on hierarchy in social relations
and individual self-control. There was no emphasis on individual rights.
[1]
- North Korea's official religion in the 1990s was the cult of Kim Il Sung. North
Korea has sought to use its few Christians to promote links with South
Korea and the West and the North's reunification agenda. Those
Christians see no contradiction in venerating the 'great leader' and his
secular church'e philosophy (just as Japan's Christians had been forced
to accept the divine status of Japan's emperor before WWII) [1]
- North Korea's primary / secondary education system includes a
balance between academic and political subjects - though there is a
strong political component in some 'academic' subjects. Special
deference towards political leaders is expected [1];
- The role of literature and art in North Korea is primarily didactic
- ie an instrument for inculcating ideology and the need to continue the
struggle for revolution and the reunification of Korea. Foreign
(especially Japanese and American imperialists) are predicted as
monsters. The state and the Korean worker's Party control the production
of literature and art - and there are no underground movements like
those in the Soviet Union of China. There is little or no exposure to
foreign influences. There is an emphasis on: taking the best from the
past and discarding change; and collective consciousness [1]
Comparing North Korea with Japan and China
North Korea apparently combines traditional East Asian cultures with
Marxism, while Japan and China have combined those traditions with
something like democratic non-capitalism and socialism respectively. It is noted
(somewhat randomly) that:
- there are some common features of all three systems - including the
image of the 'family-state' and the
role now played by neo-Confucianism (see features mentioned
above) in enabling social elites to
influence the 'family's' thinking and actions. In both North Korea and
Japan the 'family-state' is a single unit, whereas in China it comprises
many different sub-elements (ie China is a 'try of sand' rather than a
'block of granite'). Strict control is sought in all cases, though the
degree of subtlety varies (being greatest in Japan and least in North
Korea). China apparently / possibly intends to
shift towards an education system based on traditional systems of
Chinese thought that could make a population unthinkingly responsive
to leaders' suggestions and willing to sacrifice self for the community
(ie in the direction of North Korea);
- Chinese nationalists view both Korea and Japan as having been
colonised by the 'great Han race' [1]
- both Korea and China used Confucianism as the means of interpreting
Communism in 'Asian' terms (ie as 'socialism with Chinese
characteristics' and North Korea's church'e ideology
respectively), while Japan used
it as a means for interpreting democracy and a non-capitalistic market
economy in 'Asian' terms;
- in both North Korea and Japan there is a Confucian perception that
leaders have a link with 'heaven' (ie with an expectation that they will
act in accordance with what is for the good of their ethnic community),
and in China there is a search for ways to overcome problems of
corruption / abuses of power - perhaps through redeveloping the
Confucian expectation of a 'mantle of heaven';
- Japan's ultranationalists have a view that Japan could take the
central role in the world that parallels North Korea's perception under
its church'e ideology. This could potentially lead to conflicts
of interests amongst leaders in those countries as China increasingly
uses into increasing economic / strength to assert its status as a new
'Middle Kingdom' in Asia (which requires that others accept tributary
status). Not everyone can be the 'centre of the world', and the fact
that all share neo-Confucian methods does not mean that those
methods are being used to achieve identical / compatible goals;
- Korea (both north and South) endorses an ethnic nationalism (ie the
view that Koreans form a race / ethnic groups and a distinct culture).
This emerged during Japanese occupation - and was a motive for resisting
Japanese occupation. It parallels the views of Japanese ultranationalism
and German Nazism that prevailed prior to WWI - and continues to the
present in Korea with a commitment to the ethnic homogeneity and pure
bloodline of the 'Great Han' race [1]
- North Korea, China and Japan all share a passionate commitment to
the uniqueness of each society, and a resentment of the economic,
military and political power and influence of Western societies with
their commitment to universal values and to individuals (rather than the
'family-state'). China's international relations are based on
non-interference - and a disregard for what Western observers see as
'human rights' abuses. North Korea's church'e ideology is all about
self-reliance and not being influenced by others. Japanese
prime minister expressed a desire to 'get our culture back', and growing
nationalism in Japan can be interpreted as a desire to turn inward [1].
North Korea's isolationism might also indicate how Japan and China
might turn inward at some future time, as they have in the past when
coping with the outside world seemed too hard / not worth it (eg after
the voyages of China's Admiral Zheng He, and as Japan
did during the Tokugawa period from the start of the 17th century until
it was forced to open by Admiral Perry).
- The increasing signs of resurgent (ultra?) nationalism in Japan -
including the portrayal of Japan's early 20th century colonial and military
interventions in Korea and China as part of a noble cause
(see Reverting to the
Soul of a Samurai);
- South Korea's apparent shift to a more liberal / Western-style political and economic order in
recent years (eg reducing the role of the chaebol as economic
instruments of the state) - after having used Neo-Confucian methods
initially as the
basis for its rapid economic modernisation,. This could be seen as treasonous
by those
committed to what are believed to be proper 'Asian'
(ie autocratic family-state) models for the region's
development. Moreover this approach might be reversing under South Korea's new
apparently-more-China-friendly president;
- The growing risks of either: (a) a crippling global financial /
economic crises; or (b) financial / economic crises (and thus severe
social stresses and perhaps even political failure)
affecting countries such as Japan and China because of the the
incompatibility between what is required for global financial stability and
the imbalances that have
been intrinsic to 'Asian' mercantilist economic strategies (see
Japan's Predicament and
China: Heading for a Crash or a Meltdown).
Elaboration: These risks are
not easily seen but relate to the way financial systems have been used by
Japan and China to achieve political / mercantilist goals (see
above) and the incompatibility between these and
the Western-style international financial system which facilitates
commercially oriented initiative by independent enterprises to meet the
needs of individuals as savers or consumers. It can be noted that:
- serious problems affecting the global financial
system are becoming increasingly obvious that can't be resolved without
addressing the mercantilist economic tactics
used by countries such as Japan and China;
- countermeasures are available that should be effective (eg see
China may not have the solution, but it seems to
have a problem). However if such counter-measures are not put in place
the financial systems that are the foundations of Western economic and
military capabilities could be seriously compromised;
- the US is showing signs
of: (a) recognising that it has been the subject of mercantilist challenges
from East Asia, and also increasing military challenges; (b) economic
recovery driven (for example) by a housing recovery and shale gas
developments; and (c) the adoption of tactics that might enhance its economic
competitiveness;
- the trigger point for a financial crisis in (say) Japan or China would
involve the emergence of current account deficits that forced such countries
to rely on borrowing in international profit-focused capital markets to fund
growth. This is not immediately likely because of the accumulated foreign
exchange reserves eg that a former World Bank expert China
noted that
those reserves protected China from the 'sovereign risk' otherwise
associated with its financial practices. However there is a
limit to which foreign
exchange reserves can provide such protection;
- Japan is already experiencing current account deficits, and China is
headed that way. Though statistics showing a sudden Chinese export boom emerged in
early 2013, they were not matched by trading partners' trade data;
- China has sought to promote the use of its currency (the Renminbi /
Yuan) for trade. In the absence of a current account surplus, China would no
longer have a torrent of $US from net exports to prevent the need to borrow
in international markets. Thus it might hope to obtain foreign exchange to
cover any current account deficits in return for the Yuan. The problem with
this is that it is not clear why anyone (other than a 'tributary' state)
would want to hold the Yuan [1].
The latter is a 'political' rather than a 'commercial' currency. It is a
component of an economic system that allocates 'market oriented' resources
on the basis of consensus amongst the ethnic connections of a neo-Confucian
elite (rather than on the basis of profit focused judgements by independent
enterprises) and is not
backed by a solid financial market.
There are undoubtedly other features of the 'forest' that have not occurred
to the present writer.
Implications for Security Threats: Some
Scenarios
The possible implications of the ‘forest’ in terms of
various security threats that are emerging in East Asia were previously speculated in
Looking for meaning in war warnings from Asia and
Whose intentions: Kim's or China's?.
In brief: The former suggested that, though there were various ways to
interpret the friction / sabre rattling between Japan and China, the possibility
of an anti-Western coalition between the neo-Confucian factions that dominate
both should not be ignored.
The latter suggested a 'barking dog' scenario under which North
Korea's blustering might usefully be viewed as a means of achieving relatively
low-cost strategic gains for China at US expense.
However these are by no means the only possibilities, and other scenarios
can be suggested in relation to North
Korea's threats.
Firstly North Korea could be simply an isolationist
rogue state. This seems to be
the case, and what is happening makes no obvious sense - though North Korea
apparently believes that its church'e ideology (see above)
provides a possible model of world-wide relevance under Korean leadership. This
belief might justify 'making a lot of noise' to attract attention (especially
the attention of less developed nations).
However, while North Korea's threats may reflect such ambitions and / or domestic
political agendas, given the 'forest'
mentioned above there is a case for taking a broader view.
A second alternative is that North Korea could (as also suggested
above) be a 'barking dog'
- ie making a lot of noise in the hope of generating relatively low-cost
strategic gains for China relative to the US because of:
- the probability that neo-Confucian methods can encourage or
discourage aggressiveness in what is perhaps a Chinese vassal state (and perhaps
also a 'China in training') [eg by encouraging Kim
Jong-un (Korea's young leader) to believe that acting tough is the best way to secure
his political position and get a good deal / concessions / cash for North
Korea - as suggested below];
- the costs to the US of increasing its military involvement in Asia
both financially and in terms of again dislocating efforts to maintain /
increase its economic strength and develop effective non-military
collaboration in Asia. One observer pointed to the obvious difference
between the US's military deployment and China's economic collaboration
emphasis in their efforts to boost their relative influence in Asia (see
The Future of Asia: Hard Liberal versus Soft Autocratic
Options); and
- the potential for demonstrating to Asia and the world both: (a)
that the US’s military capacity is of no use against lunatic regimes; and (b)
that China’s behind-the-scenes methods of exerting influence can (in due course)
be more effective – perhaps as part of a process to re-establish China’s role as
the ‘Middle Kingdom’. Boosting China's role as the regional power-broker (which
'trees-focused-and-forest-blind' Western observers immediately and
predictably perceive as the best way to
solve the problem)
could be a primary motive for the whole exercise. Suggestions from
China that South Korea should look to China's leaders (rather than to the
US) to reduce its risk of being attacked by North Korea can also be noted [1]
- as can the fact that China would be more willing to provide such support
if South Korea steps back towards an 'authoritarian family-state' model
rather than towards towards the West's 'rational / responsible individualism'.
An Explanation in Terms of
Boosting China's Role. A contact
in Australia who it was reasonable to assume had good Korean connections provided a possible explanation in terms of Korea's political
situation (and China's potential role) along the following lines:
North
Korea’s threats to attack South Korea and the US are the result of political
contests within North Korea, and its international relationships (especially with
South Korea,
China, Russia, Japan and the US). North Korea’s new president
Kim Jong-un (born in 1983) is seen by some
in North Korea as too young, and has been competing to retain power with the
husband [ ???] of one of his father’s daughters [???]. The husband is both
older and more willing to listen to China. To prove himself Kim Jong-un tries to
prove that he is very tough.
North
Korea has already moved most of the equipment and forces that it would need for
an attack very close to the border. [[This view was
contradicted [1]
by a source who privately claimed reliable Chinese and North Korean contacts
- and the reality was impossible to ascertain]]
Kim
Jong-un’s goal is to gain concessions from other major powers with an
involvement in the Korean Peninsula, as well as money.
The best solution for Korea would be for the
US to remove its forces out so that China can help North and South Korea to
re-unite (as East and West Germany did). They are one people, and have
complementary strengths – the north is resource rich while the south has
sophisticated economic capabilities. Together they could become very strong.
South
Korea’s new president (Park
Geun-hye) is much more willing to listen to China than her
predecessor (Lee
Myung-bak)
To understand this there is a need to consider 'who's who' in the
Kim dynasty. This includes:
Kim Il-sung
(1912-1924) who led North Korea from its establishment in 1948 til his death.
He: was autocratic; established an all-pervasive cult of personality; promoted
the church'e ideology; and is still regarded as the 'Eternal President'
Kim Jong-il
(1941-2011) who succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung as 'supreme leader' in
1994 until his death
Kim Jong-un (1983- )
is the third son of Kim Jong-il, who was appointed as his father's successor
in 2009, and is North Korea's current 'supreme leader' (though he is a member
of a tripartite committee that in theory equally share one third of the
president's powers - the others being
Kim Yong-nam (1928- )
Kim Jong-il's eldest son and who is chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly
and Pak Pong-ju who is
Premier of North Korea).
Against this is the apparent church'e view that Korea should be
independent of all foreign influences, including China's, despite the features
they have in common. However this objection might be negated by a claim that China would merely act as peacemaker between North
and South Korea, and the assumption that a war-weary and internally divided US
might be willing to accede to this in preference to becoming involved in a new
Korean war that could result in being 'ambushed' (as
in many Western movies) if the 'US's posse chases the gun-toting outlaws up a
dry gulch'.
A weird, but not necessarily impossible, version of the 'barking dog'
scenario is that North Korea's (partly
Western educated) 'supreme leader' might be desperately trying to get an opportunity to
get outside help to head off a China-sponsored reunification of Korea as a
Chinese tributary state (which is one possible
outcome).
In support of this scenario it is noted that:
- Kim Jung-un reportedly asked US President Obama to 'just phone me';
- a domestic
political power contest may exist between the young Kim Jong-un
and an older leader who might be more willing than he is to 'listen to
China';
- a passionate commitment to 'separate development' is the foundation of
North Korea's church'e ideology and the view that North Korea is
the 'centre of the world' in promulgating that world-changing ideology;
- there are indications that war-rumblings
between Japan and China could emerge from China flexing its diplomatic
muscles in Asia, in ways that threaten Japan's perceptions of its status;
- the 'leadership' role of elites in East Asia can consist of creating
'chaos' which forces their subordinates to collaborate in creating a new
order - and the undoubted chaos being created by Kim Jong-un (which will
force many global powers to collaborate in finding a solution) can be
viewed in that light.
The third alternative is that North Korea might be an 'attack dog' -
seeking to generate real conflicts to enable itself and allies to obtain vengeance for
perceived historical
injuries, or to progress emerging conflicts. Two different scenarios can be
envisage involving either:
Elaboration: As a 'barking dog' North Korea has: (a) a militaristic population with the
world's largest army (including reserves) of 8 million; (b) second rate
weaponry; and (c) no allies. However as an 'attack dog' acting on behalf of
others North Korea might not only possess an army of 8 million but also: (a)
sophisticated weaponry / logistic capabilities provided by allies; and (b)
unexpected allies.
North Korea has threatened pre-emptive (perhaps nuclear) strikes against the US and
South Korea.
Attack Dog Scenario 1 ('We Fooled You')
However as an 'attack dog', it is possible that North Korea's real target could be Japan (if the friction
between China and Japan is real and relates to the injuries that Japan
inflicted on China in the 1930s and 1940s - as North Korea maintains massive
resentment of Japan because of both this and Japan's 1910-1945 colonisation). If China were
encouraging North Korea as an 'attack dog' as
its proxy for action
against Japan, US intervention on behalf of Japan would presumably be limited
to destroying the 'dog's' ability to launch further attacks. One problem with this
revenge-for-the-1930s-and-1940s scenario is that it is not clear, from North
Korea's viewpoint, why such an
attack would be launched now - though Japan's
increased nationalist
rhetoric and suggestions that the early 20th century colonisation of Korea was
part of a noble program might provide an explanation..
However China's motivation under the 'Attack Dog 1' scenario might involve North Korea acting as China's
'attack dog' in relation to the current sabre-rattling between China and Japan
which could have its origin not only in history but also in: (a) Japan's
increasingly nationalist
rhetoric and attempt to rationalize its invasion of China in the 1930s;
and (b) the serious
current political and economic difficulties that China now faces as a
consequence of the apparent transmission to China's
so-called Communist Party in the late 1970s of the neo-Confucian methods that
had been the basis of Japan's pre-1990s economic miracles.
Attack Dog Scenario 2 ('Don't say we didn't
declare war before we attacked this time')
However, if the possible anti-Western-liberalism coalition between neo-Confucian elites in Japan and China is real, then
the 'attack dog's' target for attacks could be South Korea and the US in
order to:
- discipline South Korea for its perceived treason
through apparently accepting a more 'liberal' / Western approach to
'Asian' development (an action that would be 'justified' on a similar
basis to the Tiananmen Square massacre) and draw the US into what would
amount to an 'ambush' as it provides military aid to South Korea against
an attack that seems to be coming only from North Korea but could actually
involve many different apparently unrelated
elements;
- help gain revenge
for: (a) centuries of perceived injuries that resulted from Western expansion,
for which the US is the main current banner carrier; (b) US Admiral
Perry's intervention in the mid-19th century that forced Japan to open to
the West; (c) Japan's military defeat in WWII, in particular in relation
to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and (d) the outcome of
the Korean War; and
- reduce the risk of the financial crises that will
affect Japan and China if the global financial system is stabilized /
reformed under Western-style rules (ie if action is taken against systems
dependent on 'financial repression' to defend poorly developed financial
systems).
In relation to this way-out (and thus
not necessarily likely) version of the 'attack dog' scenario it can be noted that:
- There are reasonable indications: (a)
that Japan's ultranationalist factions and neo-Confucian bureaucracy
have sought to use traditional Art of War tactics to undermine the US
since 1945 through mercantilist economic tactics, despite Japan's official
position as the 'good cop' in Asia (from a US perspective); and (b) that China
was brought into this process in the late 1970s;
- China and North Korea might participate in a coalition with Japan
(even though they have strongly resented Japan's colonial and
military interventions prior to 1945, and the lack of any apology) if:
- private apologies for historical offences have been offered;
- Japan's pre-1945 'Asian Co prosperity Sphere' ambitions and post-1945
mercantilist economic tactics were presented as compatible with China's
and North Korea's current ambitions;
- it was seen as possible to make a significant difference to the US's
(and thus the West's) economic, military and political power through a
diversity of coordinated but apparently unrelated actions.
Such coordinated attacks might
include:
- the threatened (possibly nuclear) attack from North Korea - which would either:
(a)
generate a massive US response (eg 'turning North Korea into a car park')
that further weakened the US's international status (see
below); or (b) bog the US and its allies
down in another more-or-less-conventional 'Asian' war in defence of South Korea - and thus impose
unwanted costs and disrupt US efforts to get its economy and a liberal
global financial system back into order;
- further disrupting the global financial system (and also and
the Internet), which are critical elements of the 'nervous system' of the
Western-style global order, but much less important to the way East Asia
operates (see below);
- unexpected new attacks against US targets by
Islamist extremists worldwide (noting the uncertain possibility that the latter were
acting in
coalition with Japan's ultranationalists in launching the 911
attacks - eg Osama Bin Laden's reported reference to the US atomic attacks
in Japan at the end of WWII as one of the justifications for the 911
attacks);.
- efforts to lay foundations for international collaboration
independent of post-WWII Western-style international machinery (through the BRICS network
and otherwise)
Speculations about
Disabling the Financial System and the InternetThe global financial system is weak (see
Debt Denial: Stage 3 of the GFC)
largely, though not solely, as a consequence of
the macroeconomic distortions associated with East Asian systems of
socio-political-economy .
Moreover:
- when / if the international financial system recovers East Asian economies are likely to suffer
serious relative decline for reasons referred to above;
- capitalistic (ie profit-oriented) finance is the 'nervous system' of Western
economies - but
much less
important in East Asia where economic coordination tends to be
achieved through social relations (rather than by independent
calculations of profitability). As noted above
the West's strength in economic affairs lies in dealing
rationally
with individual activities ('trees') in an ordered environment (eg
involving a rule of law and profit-focuses accounting principles), while the strength of East Asian neo-Confucian traditions
lies in developing consensus without reliance on any given 'rules of the
game'. Thus creating chaos in financial system might
incapacitate the West economically, but be less serious in East
Asia ;
- the global financial system could be weakened further by
cyber attacks against financial institutions (eg consider China's
alleged involvements cyber warfare) or by irresponsible quantitative
easing.
In relation to the latter, there is a need to consider: (a) the
role that Japan played through easy money policies and 'carry trades' in
creating the asset bubbles that contributed to the GFC (ie Japan was for
many significant years the world's main source of credit) (see
An Unrecognised
Clash of Financial Systems and
GFC Causes); and (b) its recent
monetary actions seem to have gone beyond the measures adopted by
reserve banks in the US and Europe.
Financial repression in Japan (ie a financial
system that is arranged to
direct savings / credit
into investment, rather than to households for consumption) is
arguably the reason that Japan has experienced two decades of deflation.
This is are now being used to justify extreme quantitative easing that
will presumably be intended to: (a) direct new credit into carry-trades and asset bubbles
elsewhere; and (b) devalue the Yen - both of which might reduce Japan's
need to borrowing in international profit-focused financial markets.
What actually happened as a consequence is difficult to interpret as it was
suggested that:
- this presumption about substantial capital outflow was the
reverse of what was actually happening [1],
but that
- interest rate risk increased in Japan - perhaps in recognition of
its government's extraordinarily heavy debt levels. Under some
circumstances this could lead to a flight of capital from Japan into
$US [1]
The Internet is
now a critically important element of the 'nervous system' of Western
societies (ie it allows analysts with different perspectives to communicate to make rational
sense out of a complex and rapidly evolving political and economic
environment). However the Internet is much less important in East Asia
(because abstract understanding is less important than intuitive
consensus),
and is potentially vulnerable to the cyber warfare capacities that China
is seen to have been developing.
If North Korea is acting in coalition with Japan and China it might then posses an army of 8m 'virtual samurai' and also: (a)
more advanced technological capabilities (supplied by allies) than those
publicly demonstrated; (b) unexpected logistic capabilities and (c) an
ability to launch nuclear attacks against the US using long range missiles,
for which any nuclear responses would be limited to North
Korea (ie the 'attack dog' might be willing to be sacrificed - noting the
emphasis on self-sacrifice that is a major element of North Korea's
national ideology - and to expect that its allies would significant weaken
the US and its allies through 'unrelated' attacks on the the West's
(financial / communications) 'nervous system'). China and Japan would not be seen to be involved
in a military sense and
could continue uninterrupted economic and military build ups.
If a nuclear attack on the US provoked a severe
military response, then the US's global status (and liberal geo-political
agendas) would be eroded (as occurred after the 911 attacks) because, its
response would be:
- directed against one of the world's most backward societies - and one
whose 'mission' has been to mobilize support for its church'e
ideology from other poorly developed societies;
- popularly portrayed in China as an attack by capitalist-imperialists
on a Chinese ally, and equated in Japan with the still-resented US nuclear
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end WWII; and
- viewed with limited sympathy in many parts of the world because of the
sorts of blowback that has been the outcome of US efforts to use military
force to support the creation of a democratic capitalistic world order -
in an environment in which that order is increasingly strained and
questioned because capitalism is seen (arguably
incorrectly) as the main cause of the GFC.
In support of the Attack Dog 2 Scenario is that:
- some possible
components are in clearly place. North Korea has threatened war. Japan has
launched an aggressive (?) program of
quantitative easing that could be expected to stimulate asset bubbles and
further increase the
already-significant risk of another financial crisis. China's
cyber-warfare capacities seem to be well developed, and to have been
causing security concerns;
- the US 'pivot to Asia' in support of liberal Western values could provoke a
reaction from the 'family states' (notably Japan, China and North Korea) opposed to those values (see above);
- the out-of-the-blue terrorist attack on the
Boston Marathon suggests the possibility
that a new program of attacks by Islamist extremists could be experienced.
However it certainly does not prove this - especially if there is only one
isolated incident and as responsibility for that attack has not been established
(though it appears that
Islamist links are possible [1,
2]);
- Japan's prime minister has also made nationalistic remarks that could
be seen to inflame tensions in the region (and perhaps would be a way to
both encourage nationalists across the region, and also divert suspicion
from Japan if the US and South Korea were attacked by North Korea). [1];
- the General Secretary of China's Communist Party has
espoused a nationalistic vision of the
resurgence of the 'Chinese race' - which is significant in that: (a)
China's nationalists reportedly perceive both
Korea and Japan to have been colonised by the 'Great Han Race'; and (c)
Japan's ultranationalist regarded Japan's Han origins as the basis for
efforts to co-opt China (Japan's 'big brother') in the 1930s as part of
Japan's push for an Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
Against the Attack Dog 2 Scenario is that:
- the elements of an Attack Dog 2 scenario could be in place without
necessarily implying any collaboration amongst those involved;
- Xi Jinping's nationalistic vision of of the
resurgence of the 'Chinese race' could be purely for domestic consumption
- to motivate China's people to look past their disaffection with the
inequalities and abuses of power associated with rule by the so-called
Communist Party;
- it would require a lot to
convince China and North Korea that they really can trust Japan now.
Elsewhere in Asia, Japan
appears to trigger not only resentments for past actions but a general perception that
it simply can't be trusted;
- there are reportedly signs of real frictions between Japan and China
in relation to Asia-wide governance arrangements (ie those related to the
way in which regulatory networks operate) [1].
The fact that Nomura (as significant player within Japan's financial
institutions) has publicised weaknesses in China's financial system also
reduces the likelihood of behind-the-scenes collaboration [1].
China Communist Party reportedly used anti-Japanese rhetoric connected
with Japan's WWII actions in Japan as a means for building nationalistic
support in the post Mao era [1];
- it could be seen as an unnecessary overkill because: (a) there are
alternative, less extreme, tactics for dealing with the challenges that
the neo-Confucian 'autocratic family-states' face; and (b) the West (ie
the realm of the rational / responsible individual) can be
perceived to
be in terminal decline anyway.
However if the Attack Dog 2 scenario is realistic then it might be that April 29
could be the date on which a nuclear attack on the US would be launched.
Why: April 29th
is Shōwa
Day - the anniversary of the birth of Emperor Hirohito (Japan's emperor
from 1926 to 1989). As the head of Japan's 'family-state' Hirohito's
approval would have been required for Japan's 1930s militarism and post-WWII
mercantilism - by 'smiling on' those kuromaku (fixers in the
relationship between government, business, Yakuza and the military) of whom
he approved. The 'tale of the 47 ronin' has been
said to be Japan's most popular folk tale - and concerns ronin (masterless
samurai) who pretend dissolute living for decades after their master had
died while trying to defeat an enemy so that they could get an opportunity
to finally kill his enemy. A nuclear attack by North Korea on Shōwa Day (the
day on which Japan not only celebrates an emperor's birthday but
contemplates its struggles during his reign (the Shōwa era), including the still-resented US
atomic attacks that ended WWII) would leave no one in Japan with any doubt
about what was going on (even though nothing would need to be publicly said).
Overall the 'barking dog' scenarios (even
including the 'weird' version) seem most likely, but the
'attack dog'
scenarios (which could have more dire consequences for the world) should not
be ignored. Even if they are invalid, there is a pressing need for greater
awareness amongst Western observers that they might be
possible.
A Soft Power Response
A possible
‘soft power’ response to early perceptions of security risks in Asia (ie
China’s military build-up) was suggested in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030.
With appropriate
modification this might also be relevant to developing a strategy for responding
the specific security threats, such as
that associated with North Korea’s blustering. This might involve, for example:/
- ensuring that defence, security and emergency response organizations
as well as those dealing with financial / telecommunications systems consider the implications of broader views of North Korea's blustering
such as those speculated above;
- drawing public attention to such speculations, while
denying that they were being considered;
- seeking assessment of the situation from experts on Asia's
'Art of War' traditions;
- promoting strategic Asia literacy amongst business, community and
political leaders - and on this basis encouraging research into options for
more financially / economically sustainable and less
internationally-disruptive systems of socio-political-economy in countries such as Japan,
China and North Korea;
- highlighting in international forums (eg G20) the impossibility of
achieving sustainable economic growth by counter-cyclical fiscal / monetary
policies while substantial international financial imbalances remain
unresolved - and thus bringing serious pressure to bear for reform of
economic and financial systems in East Asia, while offering Asia-literate help in
achieving those reforms;
- a minimalist / reactive military response to North Korea's threats and
actions as the lessons of Western
efforts to use military force to establish a foundation for political and
economic success in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan (as in Vietnam) is that what
works in Western societies does so because of many cultural and
institutional pre-conditions that are not automatically present elsewhere
(see Fatal Flaws and
Saving Muslims from Themselves);
- strengthening domestic economic and political institutions.
|
Addendum I: Do Others Share the 'China Dream'? |
Do Others Share the China Dream? - email sent 6/5/13
Dr James Leibold,
La Trobe University
Re:
The Impossible Dream, Inside Story, 22/4/13
Your very useful article dealt with the meaning of the
‘vision’ that is being presented to its people by China’s current leadership. I
should like to suggest implications of the ‘China dream’ beyond those your
article mentioned.
My
interpretation of your article: After being
appointed as party secretary Xi Jinping led the Politburo Standing Committee on
a tour of the The Road to Rejuvenation exhibition at National Museum in
Beijing - and there promised to pursue the 'China dream' (ie the great revival
of the Chinese race). The exhibition tells the epic tale of China's decline and
dismemberment at the hands of foreign forces and the struggle of the
Communist-led people to reclaim their national pride, dignity and power. China
is seen to finally be in control of its own destiny after 170 years of struggle
(from opium Wars). Modern Chinese leaders have tried to define their leadership
through such slogans as the China dream. Achieving the 'Chinese races’ great
rejuvenation' is now seen to be closer. The 'China dream' was originally the
title of a book by Liu Mingfu (a PLA colonel) which addressed overcoming
American hegemony and assuming global supremacy. It was initially banned, but
then republished after Xi's museum visit. Its call for a revival of Spartan,
martial spirit echoes the new leadership’s crackdown on corruption and lavish
living. The military (and its 'princeling generals') are key supporters /
advisers of Xi, and China's more assertive foreign policy reflects the
moralistic nationalism at the core of his statist vision. The Party's austerity
program (outlined in Politburo's 'eight point regulation') aims to improve work
styles and resembles the Maoist 'mass line'. In contrast to US approach this
argues that China dream is a collective enterprise (ie the China dream asserts
that if it is good for the country, it’s good for the nation and everyone
benefits. This continues the cultural tradition of Eastern collectivism which
holds that a big / powerful country safeguards the happiness of the people and
allows everyone to share in benefits of state development. Individual dreams and
state dreams are seen to be mutually related. This raises questions about whose
dream matters most - the Party's or the people’s. On the Internet some Chinese
dispute the 'China dream'. But others (soldiers and nationalists) embrace the
dream. The China dream is a powerful method for grassroots mobilization - but
the Party may not have the legitimacy / capacity to control the future. Xi's
predecessor had a vision of 'China's peaceful rise'. Xi's 'China dream' may
define the next decade or fizzle out. Xi is a relaxed / confident patriot who
views his princeling status as mandate to rule. He is clearly different to his
predecessor Hu - though both were risk averse - preserving the Communist Party's
wealth and power above any other priority.
The potential pursuit of a Spartan / martial spirit (that
you suggest was the original meaning of the ‘China dream’ and is compatible with
newly emerging Politbureau policy) is clearly incompatible with the world’s (and
Australia’s) expectation that China is preparing to shift from export and
investment driven growth onto consumer-driven growth that would provide the
demand to drive global growth that heavily indebted Western nations can no
longer provide. However such a Spartan / martial spirit is compatible with:
- The apparent shift in China’s education system towards starting
education with rote learning of the Chinese classics (see
Competing thought Cultures). That approach to education can be expected over
time to create a community that is conditioned to comply with suggestions from
the state, and not to place much emphasis on individuals thinking for themselves
or on their individual interests;
- The suppressed domestic demand that was critical to China’s role
as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ prior to Western expansion (see
Creating a New International 'Confucian' Political and Economic Order ). The
latter involved tributary states gaining net material benefits from accepting
China’s dominance as China’s people worked hard for limited reward;
- The austerity and individual-sacrifice-in-the
interest-of-the-nation-state that characterises North Korea (see
North Korean Context);
- The samurai spirit of which signs are re-emerging in Japan (see
Reverting to the Soul of a Samurai which amongst other things refers to the
current Prime Minister’s view of Japan’s 20th century invasion /
colonisation of Korea and China as part of a ‘great cause’).
It can also be noted that:
- Presenting a vision (such as the China dream) is a neo-Confucian
technique for mobilizing a community (see also
Look at the 'Forest' not just at the 'Trees' in relation to differences
between East Asian and Western ways);
- Chinese nationalists reportedly argue that the ‘great Han race’
colonised Korea and Japan centuries ago (see link in
Comparisons with Japan and China) – and in the 1930s a similar belief in the
‘Han race’ led Japan to invade China (seen as Japan’s ‘big brother’) in an
unsuccessful attempt to mobilize China’s support in establishing an Asian
Co–Prosperity Sphere;
- Incompatibilities between continued global economic growth and the
financial systems that have been the basis of neo-Confucian economic ‘miracles’
in East Asia suggest that the region can’t simply keep going as it has been
going (see
Fasten Seat Belts: Rough Weather Ahead ).
The similarities between the aspirations of nationalists in
Japan, China and North Korea do not help in resolving the question of whether
they are currently in conflict or collaborating (an issue that is considered in
'Art of War' Speculations about North Korea's Threats). Concealed
collaboration is possible (eg see
Broader resistance to Western Influence?), but is by no means assured.
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum J: Soft Power Requires Changing Minds more than Providing Aid |
Soft Power Requires Changing Minds more than Providing Aid - email sent 8/6/13
Dr Susan Harris Rimmer,
Director of Studies
Asia Pacific College of Studies,
ANU
Re:
Why soft power is so hard: the impact of aid cuts on regional security,
The Conversation, 7/6/13
Your article made a good case for a
comprehensive and balanced approach to promoting Australia’s regional security,
and for a significant role for ‘soft power’ in that mix. I should like to
suggest ‘soft power’ options that are potentially both more effective and much
cheaper than conventional foreign aid.
My interpretation of your article:
Opposition foreign affairs minister said
that Australia foreign policy assets (military, defence, economic, trade,
diplomatic and foreign aid) will focus on economic diplomacy. This view of the
role of foreign aid is important because of confusion in this year’s budget
about this. The key question is what will make Australians secure in this region
in the Asian century? Arguably foreign aid and development policy should be a
core of Australia’s regional identity and ‘soft power’ in the Asian Century.
Australia consistently under-invests in soft power (given that having the
winning story is more important than having a winning army). Australia has a
great story to tell (eg of humanitarian assistance). Yet this is not recognized
in the budget. Aid should help overcome poverty. John Howard once suggested that
building Mosques to support moderate Islamic schools helped reduce terrorism –
and this probably doesn’t hurt. NGOs argue that health and education programs in
PNG and community buildings in Afghanistan help. ASPI argued the need to
carefully consider the link between aid and national security – though some NGOs
object. The involvement of military forces in providing aid encroaches on the
role of impartial NGOs. The US talks of three national security pillars
(development, diplomacy and defense). The strategic use of soft power is a
better solution.
Some suggestions about the importance, and nature, of ‘soft
power’ options to improve Australia’s regional security are in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030 (2011).
The latter points to the fact that ‘soft power’, ie the
manipulation of access to information by Confucian intellectual elites: (a) was
for centuries the primary method whereby political and economic power was
exerted in China (and over China’s tributary states); and (b) has been the
foundation of ‘economic miracles’ in authoritarian East Asian ‘family states’
(such as Japan and China) in recent decades. The assumptions that have been made
about the nature of a possible Asian Century in the federal government’s white
paper (ie that an Asian Century would involve Western-style institutions and
methods in a different setting) appears quite inadequate (see
Australia in the Claytons Century: The 'Asian' Century you have when you are not
having an Asian Century, 2012). The possibility that an attempt is
currently being made to recruit the US as a ‘tributary state’ by the use of
‘soft power’ methods is suggested in
Will the US / China Summit be a Western or an East Asian Meeting? (2013).
The importance of ‘soft power’ in relation to reducing
terrorism by Islamist extremists was suggested in
Discouraging Pointless Extremism (2002) and
We need Enlightenment to Combat Radicals (2013). The former argued that
Australia should assist Muslim communities to understand what would be required
for political stability and economic success, and thus demonstrate to
extremists’ potential recruits that the extremists would further exacerbate the
constraints on modernisation that Muslim-dominated societies have experienced
for centuries. However, for reasons suggested also in
Saving Muslims from Themselves (2012), the constraints on initiative that
are implicit in the way Islam is enforced even by moderate Muslims implies that
merely building mosques cannot be enough to eliminate the breeding grounds of
extremism.
However Australia has made no serious use of ‘soft power’ –
and this is, for example, arguably the main source of what is currently seen as
an increasing security risk – ie that associated with the uncontrollable flow of
asylum seekers from failing Muslim-dominated states (see
The biggest issue missing from the asylum seeker debate, 2012).
Australia needs to get serious about ‘soft power’ – but not
just (or even primarily) through providing conventional foreign aid.
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum K: The Future of Asia: Hard Liberal versus Soft Autocratic
Options |
The Future of Asia: Hard Liberal versus Soft Autocratic Options - email sent 15/10/13
Dan Steinbeck
Difference Group
Re:
Two Visions: U.S. and Chinese Rebalancing in Asia, EconoMonitor,
14/10/13
Your article pointed to the discrepancy
between the way in which the US and China seem to be seeking to boost their
influence in Asia – the US seems to be giving priority to boosting its military
capacity (which some could see as promoting a new Cold War) while China seeks
greater influence through promoting economic collaboration.
There is little doubt that the US’s
efforts to date have been poorly considered. Boosting support for liberal
political economic and political institutions (relative to autocratic Asian
alternatives) could be far more effectively achieved by ‘soft power’ methods –
for reasons suggested in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030. And the
economic imbalances that have had their origin in East Asian systems of
socio-political-economy could probably be challenged most effectively by methods
that have nothing to do with the deployment of military forces (eg see
China may not have the solution, but it seems to have a problem).
The US’s military emphasis is perhaps due to warlike
rhetoric from the region (especially from China, Japan and North Korea) and a
lack of
strategic understanding of how East Asia traditionally operates (eg that Art
of War strategies emphasise deception and traditionally seek to ‘win without
fighting’).
However such strategic understanding is arguably also
necessary to make sense of China’s ambition to create a Maritime Silk Road as
the basis for a common destiny for China and ASEAN.
Some speculations about the way in which ASEAN countries
(and perhaps others) might be linked into a China-centred ‘soft-power-empire’
were outlined in
Creating a New International 'Confucian' Economic and Political Order?
(2009). The latter referred to the likely recreation of tributary relationships
similar to those that existed in Asia prior to Western expansion.
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum L: Is China Heading in the Direction of North Korea? |
Is China Heading in the Direction of North Korea? - email sent 26/10/13
Ambrose Evans Prichard
Telegraph
Re:
China turning into 'giant North Korea' say panda pundits,
Telegraph, 25/10/13
Your article referred to claims by
Minxin Pei and Jonathan Fenby that China might be reverting to sinister
police-state Maoism (and become a giant ‘North Korea’ held down by repression
alone). I should like to put a different ‘spin’ on that possibility.
My interpretation of the balance of your
article: It is thus claimed by
Minxin that people are losing faith in China’s ability to engineer a ‘soft’
political landing. However a member of China’s upper house recently claimed that
Edmund Burke’s evolutionary conservatism is the new Maoism – and this is
incompatible with Minxin’s claims (eg that the Communist Party is in a state of
decay; core values are eroding; corruption is endemic). He also argues that high
income economies tend to be democracies – as middle class fury does not tolerate
such features. Recent cuts to bank lending rates are meaningless as most
companies can’t borrow from banks – which gives rise to shadow banking. If
interest rates were liberalized many SOEs would go bust. A recently establish
free trade zone does not seem to be really politically supported or practical.
China can’t open its capital accounts because capital would flee – and capital
flight is already under way. Foreign exchange reserve claims are exaggerated.
President Xi Jinping is seen to have taken over Bo Xilai’s vision – contrary to
the perception that he was cut down for reviving talk of Red Guards and visions
of the Cultural Revolution. Xi has revived self-criticism sessions – even in
politbureau. He is quoting Mao and speaking of class enemies – which are
Leninist reactions. Anti-corruption drives are seen as internal party warfare.
China is not following Taiwan – as Taiwan was never totalitarian. Security
forces are now in full control, but this may not continue. The rise and fall of
Chinese dynasties depends on control of army. Xi’s party loyalists have been put
into top military posts. Hopefully China will break historical determinism and
find a civilized way forward. But clamping down on the Internet and Maoist
revivalism makes this difficult
The claim outlined above, ie that China might actually be
preparing for inward looking repression rather than the outward looking
liberalization that is being proclaimed, is based on a perception that: (a) the
Communist Party is becoming repressive rather than truly reformist; (b) a
recently announced free trade zone does not seem to be genuinely supported; and
(c) reliance is increasingly being placed on security forces to maintain
control.
I should like to draw attention to other possible
indications of inward-looking repressive intent.
First China’s education system is reportedly being
organised to build education on the foundation of rote learning of certain
Chinese classics (see article, The Poor Understanding of two thought
cultures, referenced in
Competing Thought Cultures). My understanding is that the primary intent and
outcome of such an education system would be to create a compliant population –
because (contrary to the intent of Western education) those Chinese classics
seek to inculcate a view that attempts by individuals to understand what is good for
themselves or the community is futile. This is thus probably a shift in the
direction of thought control that seems to characterise North Korea (see
North Korean context) and seems incompatible with the economic
liberalization agenda that China has officially endorsed (see
Financial and Educational Reform in China: Headed in Opposite Directions?).
Second there seems to be a lack of realism in emerging
claims about China’s potential for financial system reform and its ability to
provide a major stimulus to international trade and investment (see
Preparing for a 'Con'?). The latter points, for example, to: (a) external
observers’ beliefs that China’s economy has been being kept afloat by massive
increases in credit a fair amount of which may be poorly directed (eg perhaps
$230bn new credit was created in September 2003 alone); and (b) recent claims
that China’s major banks are arranging write offs that would have a ‘big effect’
on fixing their balance sheets. If hundreds of $bns of bad debts are emerging
annually, then the $4bn recent write-off by China’s major banks would be hardly
likely to have a ‘big’ effect.
Third China’s likely actions may best be understood by
considering the influence of a form of China’s
traditional Confucianism (whereby society is controlled by bureaucratic /
intellectual elites through the deployment of strategic information through a
social hierarchy responsible to the source of military power) – rather than the
possible ideological directions outlined in your article (ie that China may be
reverting to ‘Maoism’ (Minxin’s view) or that something like Edmund Burke’s
‘evolutionary conservatism’ might be the ‘new Maoism’) . A modified form of
Confucianism:
The late 1970s reintroduction of
a form of Confucianism into China by the so-called ‘Communist Party’ would have
had to be secretive because
Mao’s cultural revolution was specifically targeted at purging Confucianism from
China. Mao’s view had apparently been that Confucianism had been responsible
for oppressing Chinese people for centuries (see more in
Communism Versus Confucianism: The Continuing Contest in China). The latter
notes that the significance of the Bo Xilia case in China was perhaps that there
is widespread support in China for restoration of the social equality that
Chinse people enjoyed under Maoism (ie all were poor but at least were equal)
and considerable resentment of the fact that the methods that have since been
used by the ‘Communist’ Party have reintroduced a form of Confucian social
hierarchy.
Finally it seems possible that
China is facing
immense structural obstacles which might encourage its current leadership to
conclude that inward-focused repression (perhaps combined with the establishment
of a tributary empire like that which existed prior to Western expansion – see
Xi’s Maritime Silk Road) might be the best option for maintaining their
future power.
John Craig
|
Addendum M: Penance in the Politburo? |
Penance in the Politburo? -
email sent 1/11/13
Ambrose Evans –Prichard
Telegraph
Further to my response (Is
China Heading in the Direction of North Korea? ) to your article about
Minxin Pei’s observations of apparent decay in the Chinese state, I should like
to draw attention to a ‘possible’ explanation of president Xi Jinping’s reported
revival of self-criticism in the Politburo.
My hypothesis is that this does not reflect a desire to
ensure that all members are committed to collectivist ‘working class’ goals
(which would be the Leninist position that Minxin spoke of) but rather to
promote their commitment to elitist communitarian behaviour (ie to submitting
their personal interests to their roles as the head of an ethnic ‘family
state’). This hypothesis is based on:
- The
apparently discrete adoption of
neo-Confucian methods by the (so called) Communist Party as the basis for
orchestrating China’s economic opening / modernisation from the 1970s;
- A (plausible) account of the way in which China’s willingness to
maintain high rates of capital investment to drive economic growth may be
rationalised (see
Outline of 'Rise of the Ferro Dollar'). The latter suggests that the
achievement of spin-offs and synergistic relationships (which neo-Confucian
methods of
stimulating real-world / market changes would be effective in achieving) is
the rational for that strategy;
- The apparent inadequacy of those economic spin-offs / synergies in
compensating for the rapid rise in China’s debt levels that accompanied
widespread investment with limited regard to the profitable use of capital – so
that China is potentially facing a debt-driven financial crisis (see
Preparing for a 'Con'?);
- The fact that members of the Communist Party have exploited their
positions to benefit themselves / connections is presumably
one of the reasons that the positive spin-offs / synergies have not been
adequate to compensate for the limited emphasis on return on investment in
particular endeavours. This would not be the only reason for this problem.
However it might justify seeking ‘penance in the Politburo’.
I give no guarantees about the reliability of this
hypothesis but merely suggest that it is worth considering.
John Craig
|
Addendum N: Smarter Authoritarians? |
Smarter Authoritarians? -
email sent 1/11/13
Editor
The Australian
Re:
Psssst. Everybody’s doing it’, editorial, The Australian, 1/11/13
Your article realistically pointed out that espionage is
central to protecting freedom and fighting terrorism.
I should like to suggest for your consideration that the
current pressure that is emerging around the world to constrain (in particular)
efforts by the US to collect strategic intelligence is thus (perhaps) a
reflection of the behind-the-scenes influence of those who are motivated to
constrain freedom and / or engage in terrorism.
The US has taken a global role since WWII in promoting a
liberal international order – backed by its economic, diplomatic and military
strength which in turn has relied on the collection of strategic intelligence.
One can realistically argue that these US efforts have not always been effective
or well directed. However blocking intelligence gathering on the grounds that it
is a threat to others’ privacy would be a major step towards
further undermining the
US’s ability to use its economic, diplomatic and military capacity to influence
global events.
When casting around for suspects to consider in
orchestrating such a program it might be worth considering the nature of East
Asian traditional ‘Art of War’ methods (which involve primarily the use of ‘soft
power’ methods to undermine opponents’ capacities). Some suggestions on what
this implies are outlined in
Broadening the Scope of National Security and
Look at the 'Forest' not just at the 'Trees'.
The latter are part of a document,
Comments on Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, which basically suggested
that there is a need for much greater awareness and use of ‘soft power’ methods
in dealing with smart authoritarian regimes.
John Craig
A Note on Possible Motivations: (added later) - The
above is only one way of interpreting pressures that are emerging to constrain
the collection of strategic intelligence by the US and its allies.
However it is worth recognising that liberal Western
institutions (reliant on the rational social, economic and political initiative
of individuals) have for decades apparently been facing increasing challenges
(see
Competing Civilization) from authoritarian systems involving:
- East Asian nationalists who have built economic
strength on Confucian-style enforcement of elite consensus; and
- Islamist extremists who have been using
terrorist tactics to promote further repression of individuals as the
'answer' to the historical problems affecting the Muslim world.
There is also some possibility that:
Another possibility is that Western factions may
have unwittingly been aiding the world's more authoritarian ideologies. It
is, for example, suggested that the a British newspaper (The Guardian)
had had access to information provided by Edward Snowdon about US
intelligence gathering and had been going through those documents carefully
and using then 'strategically' [1].
The irresponsibility of using stolen secret information that had presumably
been gained in an effort to reduce security risks without an alternative
method to deal with those security risks was suggested in
Must
Authoritarianism Triumph This Time?
|
Addendum O: Changing Australia's Security Approach |
Changing Australia's Security Approach - email sent 5/11/13
Murray Hunter
Re:
Change needed in intelligence approach, Online Opinion, 4/11/13
Your article (which was clearly based on careful
intelligence gathering) suggested that Australia should eliminate
much of its
intelligence gathering capacity and should not align itself with the US in order
to avoid ‘missing the boat’ on a big shift in regional influence.
However the nature of the change in the international order
and regional influence that is under way is by no means certain. The shifts in
regional influence that Australia now needs to cope with were certainly not
those described by the simplistic and over-optimistic Australia in the Asian
Century White Paper (see
‘The ‘Asian’ Century you have when you are not having an Asian Century).
Quite the reverse in fact as the most probable imminent
changes in the regional environment (see
An Approaching Crisis?) will arguably involve:
- financial crises (especially in Japan and China) associated with
their huge state debts, casual accounting practices and evaporating
ability to rely on export-driven growth; and
- potential conflicts emanating from North Asia – to complement and
increase the global risks of conflicts that are emerging in the Muslim world.
I should thus like to submit for your consideration that
the change that Australia mainly needs in relation to its intelligence
operations is probably not to eliminate them but rather to introduce more real
Asia literacy (eg as suggested generally in
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030).
Eliminating intelligence-gathering would merely weaken the
foundations of defence capabilities and facilitate gains by the breed of
authoritarians that the world is currently confronting (for reasons suggested in
Smarter Authoritarians?). It is by no means certain the authoritarians will
be the ones who determine the ‘big shift in regional influence’ that Australia
needs to avoid ‘missing the boat’ on (eg see
Must Authoritarianism Triumph This Time?).
John Craig
|
Addendum P: Knowledge is Power: If You are Clever in the Way You Use It |
Knowledge is Power: If You are Clever in the Way You Use It - email sent 11/11/13
Rowan Callick
The Australian
Re:
Beijing pursues a global image with forceful projection , the Australian,
11/11/13
Your article drew attention to China’s
probable expansion of a domestic method of exerting control (by influencing the
nature of available information) into the international arena.
Might I respectfully suggests that the
implications of this needs to be considered in the light of the fact that
under East Asian traditions power in exerted, not by the Western method of
making decisions on the basis of rational understanding, but rather by control
(by highly educated elites) of the information that subordinates use as the
basis of decision making (see
comment on power and
China's Bigger Secret).
John Craig
|
Addendum Q: Coordinated Efforts to Undermine Western Intelligence
Gathering? |
Coordinated Efforts to Undermine Western Intelligence Gathering? - email sent 19/11/13
Mark Kenny
Re:
Caught red handed, without an easy fix, The Age, 19/11/13
Your article
pointed to Australia’s diplomatic embarrassment about intelligence gathering
activities in Indonesia, and to suggestions that a coordinated effort might be
being made to undermine Western intelligence gathering generally (an activity
that is a critical foundation of effective international relations and of
defence / military strategies, and has to draw on more reliable sources than the
local media).
“All countries
gather information, but the first rule in the spy game is don't get caught. Just
as was the case with the WikiLeaks docu-dump, Australia has been caught
red-handed courtesy of the security failures of its senior alliance partner, the
US. The information has come to light through Edward Snowden, who is now
protected in Russia. This has raised suspicions that his information is being
used for partisan strategic purposes. The claim is that information is being
released in a manner designed to do maximum harm to potential weak points in the
Western alliance. First came the hammer blow to US-German relations through the
revelation of US hacking of Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone. Now we have
another hit to Canberra-Jakarta relations “
Attempts to put such a coordinated effort into context are in
Smarter Authoritarians and
Changing Australia’s Security Approach, while the wisdom of continuing to
collect intelligence in Indonesia is implied by the reportedly rising influence
of more rigid / intolerant Islam (see
Even Moderate Islam seems Damagingly Rigid and
The Muslim World Seems to be Headed for Chaos) - even
though all indications are that Indonesia's current regime is not complicit.
Clearly, as your article noted, intelligence gathering efforts require
diplomatic skill. It also requires ensuring that such activities are well
managed, and not able to be abused.
John Craig
|
Addendum R: Speculations about Asia's Arm's Race |
Speculations about Asia's Arm's Race - email sent 7/12/13
Callum Newman
RE:
Australia's Box Seat View of the Next Arms Race, Morning Money,
7/12/13
It is worth considering whether the potential conflict between
China and Japan over a few islands is real, or whether it is a front for efforts
by both to run up their military capacity in preparation for a confrontation
with the US and its allies.
These possibilities are considered in both:
Comments on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030
and
Art of War Speculations about North Korea's Threats. In relation to this it
is noted that:
- China certainly has a grievance against Japan which could
generate conflict because of Japan’s militaristic actions in the late 19th
/ early 20th century and in the 1930-40s. However both Japan and
China have grievances against Western societies (eg dating to the Opium Wars in
China and Admiral Perry’s pressure on Japan to open to the world in the 1850s);
- China’s Communist Party apparently justifies its authoritarian
rule on the grounds that the Party is the means for China to gain vengeance for
past oppression – and this seems to refer back to the time of the Opium Wars (as
well as to Japan’s aggression in the general community mind);
- Nationalists in China, Japan and Korea view all three countries
as having been a product of the Great Han Race – and all now rely on
neo-Confucian methods in implementing their socialist / democratic
non-capitalist / Marxist systems respectively. Those methods involve massive
difference in the way in which society is conceived and organised relative to
Western traditions (eg see
What does an 'Asian Century' Imply);
- In the 1930’s Japan’s primary tactic for establishing an ‘Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere’ involved gaining control of China’s emperor so as to
(hopefully but unsuccessfully) bring China onside in pursuing that agenda
because China was seen as Japan’s ‘big brother’;
- The tactics that have been the basis for ‘economic miracles’ in
East Asia were developed in Japan and spread across Asia. Those tactics were
based on a modified form of the Confucian methods that prevailed across North
Asia prior to Western expansion (whereby power was exerted by intellectual
elites through control of the information available within the community).
Eammon Fingleton (a Japan watcher) claims that those tactics were developed by
the Japanese army in Manchuria in the 1930s and were passed to China in the
late 1970s;
- In the 1980s, while working for Queensland Government, I had
direct exposure to Japanese ultranationalist factions acting on behalf of
the Japanese government who seemed to be still trying to win WWII. This involved
a 1945 Class A war criminal (who was a vocal admirer of Admiral Yamamoto who had
developed Japan’s invasion plans for Australia in the 1940s) sponsoring the
development in Australia of infrastructure that would
have facilitated Yamamoto’s plans;
- Traditional East Asian ‘Art of War’ tactics feature (for
example): very long term action; deception; holding up a ‘mirror’ so that when
others look they see a reflection of themselves; getting close to enemies; and
winning before military conflict by encouraging enemies to become weak by
serving them.
The
possibility of collaboration (rather than conflict) between Japan and China
should not be ignored by those having a box seat view of Asia’s coming arms
race.
John Craig
|
Addendum S: Danger from Japan? |
Danger from Japan? - email sent 17/5/14
Rob Copeland
Wall Street Journal
Re:
Chanos: Japan’s Shinzo Abe Is ‘Most Dangerous Figure in Asia’, Money Beat,
16/5/14
Your article drew attention to a view that Japan’s prime
minister is the biggest threat to Asia’s economy because he is an
ultranationalist.
However there is nothing new about ultranationalist
influences within Japan’s government. Considering post WWII history in the light
of this is arguably worthwhile (eg as suggested in
Broader resistance to Western Influence?). It is also worthwhile considering
the relationship between the aspirations of Japan’s ultranationalists and the
neo-Confucian systems of socio-political-economy that Japan pioneered as the
basis for its pre-1990s ‘economic miracles’ - and which have been spread across
much of across East Asia (see
Understanding East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy).
The latter do not involve acceptance of the universalist values or concern for
the welfare and capabilities of rational individuals which have characterised
Western systems.
John Craig
|
Addendum T: Beijing Could Not Afford to Wait |
Beijing Could Not Afford to Wait - email sent 11/6/14
Dr Benjamin Herscovitch
Centre of Independent Studies
Re:
Beijing’s real international ambitions, China Spectator, 11/6/14
Your article suggests that the existing liberal
international order that the US supports will carry China to international
pre-eminence – and that territorial disputes are the only real threat to peace
in Asia. I would like to argue the reverse – ie that China’s current leadership
is in an increasingly perilous position in a liberal international environment
and that China’s territorial posturing is largely a diversionary tactic.
My
interpretation of your article: Hans
Morgenthau argues that ‘international politics, like all politics, is a struggle
for power’. He saw the drive to live, propagate and dominate as inherent to
human nature. The pitiless power politics in Asia seems to confirm this.
Washington and Beijing are divided by strategic distrust. China seeks to bully
its maritime neighbours – and countries in the region are expanding defence
budgets and seeking US security assurances. How far Beijing will go is the
question. China won’t challenge US-led Asian order of free-trade and free
navigation. China complains about US ‘great power chauvinism’ and ‘superpower
hegemony’ – and wants to see US unipolar international system replaced with a
multipolar world. But China does not want to be the region’s new hegemonic
power. China’s foreign minister emphasised that China does not want to replace
US in its position in the world. For China, the benefits of usurping US
leadership would be minimal. China is likely to have world’s largest GDP by 2019
– and China does not need to challenge US to achieve this. US-led liberal
economic arrangements will allow China and other nations to surpass the US.
However, while China might be content with slow decline of US-led unipolar
international system, it may seek to change the territorial status quo. In 1982
Deng Xiaoping suggested that China would defer action on territorial disputes –
and thus implied that these might be revisited in future. And as China’s power
relative to its neighbours grows there may be a temptation to unilaterally seize
territory. But Beijing’s revisionism is cautious and considered, It will allow
US decline to loosen American pre-eminence and won’t resort to violence unless
maritime neighbours block its territorial aggrandisement. China will employ
tactics of domineering power politics when it can’t get its way by more
enlightened means.
China’s rapid economic advancement has been built on a
variation of the non-capitalistic neo-Confucian model that Japan pioneered (see
Understanding East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy,
2009). This involves state-orchestrated economic development under which
state-linked enterprises are funded by national savings that are mobilized
through state-linked financial institutions with limited regard to return on
capital (see
Evidence). It does not rely on decisions by independent profit-seeking
enterprises. Under Confucian teachings wealth is accumulated by savings, not by
earning a return on capital (ie profit). Thus financial institutions tend to
accumulate bad balance sheets and a financial crisis is inevitable in a liberal
market environment unless the need to borrow from international profit-focused
financial markets can be avoided by suppressing domestic demand so that
investment is funded domestically through ‘tame’ banks. The Asian Financial
Crisis in the late 1990s demonstrated the hazards facing countries with cronyist
financial systems that lacked the protection of current account surpluses.
However seeking protection from financial crises by
suppressing domestic demand is unsustainable in the long term (see
Structural Incompatibility Puts Global Growth at Risk, 2003). Trading
partners must be willing and able to sustain significant current account
deficits and rising (eg household and government) debts if global economic
growth is not to be stifled. They can’t do this forever.
Accumulated debt now increasingly constrains the ability of the rest of the
world to provide the excess demand that has been vital to protect the major
non-capitalistic neo-Confucian economies from financial crises. China, for
example, has been recognised to need to shift from export-dependent growth to
domestically-driven growth – and thus must eventually face current account
deficits and the hazards of having to import capital through financial
institutions whose balance sheets would not withstand external scrutiny.
Financial crises are now a significant risk for the major non-capitalist
economies (see
Japan's Predicament and
China's Predicament). And if anyone bothered to publicise the macroeconomic
constraint that the global economy faces from economies with non-capitalistic
financial systems, the countries involved would presumably soon lose
international standing (eg see
China may not have the solution, but it seems to have a problem , 2010).
In this environment China is apparently seeking to
establish a new international China-centred tributary system like that under
which Asia was ruled prior to Western expansion so that it would hopefully not
face the financial disciplines implicit in the liberal international order that
the US has championed (The
Resurgence of Ancient Authoritarianism in China). And the countries most at
risk from those financial disciplines seem to be seeking to build their military
capacities to defend their preferred authoritarian order as fast as they can –
perhaps using trivial territorial disputes as a pretext.
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations.
John Craig
|
Addendum T: Scratching the Surface of the 'New Japan' |
Scratching the Surface of the 'New Japan' - email sent 14/7/14
Editor
The Australian
Re:
Welcoming the New Japan, editorial, The Australian, 9/7/14
Your editorial suggested very appropriately that Australia
should welcome a ‘new’ Japan. The problem is that, if one looks below the
surface, it might be found that creating a ‘new’ Japan remains a future
challenge, rather than a past accomplishment. If so Australia’s leaders and
their allies perhaps will require a ‘new’ (and high) level of Asia literacy if
they are to successfully meet that challenge.
My
interpretation of your editorial: Shinzo
Abe’s speech to Australia’s parliament signified the richness, depth and breadth
of Tokyo’s relationship with Canberra. Shared interests and common ideals
include: open political systems, competitive markets, free trade, human right
and the rule of law. Friendship has been built despite wartime events. The
moment was also testament to the emergence of new more confident Japan following
two decades of economic stagnation and the strategic rigidity of its post-war
pacifist constitution. A once-militarist state, Japan has become a good
international citizen – and has helped promote stability and prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region. It now wants to be seen as a more normal nation. This will
be a diplomatic challenge for Australia, as China has argued that Japan is using
Australia to build a network against China – Australia’s biggest trading
partner. Others suggested wrongly that Abe’s visit will create new instability
in the region. Beijing has increased its rhetoric and aggression in several
territorial clashes with neighbours. Abe has called for the seas and skies of
the Pacific and Indian Oceans to be open and free. Australia’s prime minister
has advocated improving all of Australia’s international relationships – rather
than taking the view that it is necessary to choose between (say) the US and
China. Abe suggested that there should be no limits to Australia’s strategic and
economic partnerships. Japan has played a key role in developing industries in
Australia – and has more than four times China’s investments here. The trade
pact will bring prosperity and friendship to both Japan and Australia.
There is a profound incompatibility between the cultural
traditions that long prevailed in East Asia and the liberal Western-style
aspirations (such as universal values, social equality under a rule of law and
an emphasis on the welfare and capabilities of individuals) to which Asia was
exposed as a result of rapid Western progress in recent centuries (see
Competing Civilizations, 2001+). Japan, more than any other country, long
struggled to resist such challenges to its traditional culture and social order.
Now resistance most obviously comes from China's current
regime.
Moreover, though Japan adopted nominally liberal political
and economic arrangements after WWII, there are convincing indications that
Japan’s resistance to liberal Western practices clearly continued behind the
scenes at least until the late 1980s (see
Broader Resistance to Western Influence?). Key points from the latter are
outlined in an Attachment following this email.
There are undoubtedly indications that Japan has undergone
a fundamental transformation since around 1990 after the financial system that
underpinned its post-WWII mercantilist economic strategy collapsed (see
A ‘New Japan’).
On the other hand the latter also suggests that there are
also reasons for caution (eg a lack of transparency about Japan’s
probably-imperially-mandated (rather than truly democratic) post-WWII system of
government; the massive cultural obstacles to genuinely adopting liberal
democratic arrangements; the difficulties that Western observers have in
perceiving what is going on in cultures that lack transparency; the nature of
traditional Art of War tactics; Japan’s response to its late-1980s financial
crisis; recent indications that Japan’s financial / business dealings remain
incompatible with a liberal market economy; Japan’s renewed risk of a massive
financial / economic crisis – like that during the Great Depression which led to
power being seized by Japanese militarists in the 1930s; and widely-expressed
concerns about the possible ultra-nationalistic / militaristic aspirations of
Japan’s prime minister (Shinzo Abe).
On balance it seems that looking below the surface of the
‘new’ Japan could well reveal … the ‘old’ Japan. The vision of a ‘new’ Japan is
highly desirable – but Australia’s leaders (and their allies) may require a
great deal of relevant knowledge and skill to help make it happen. Some
speculations about a possible ‘soft power’ response to China’s increasingly
assertiveness (and apparent efforts to create a new international order on the
basis of traditional East Asian authoritarian / communitarian alternatives to
liberal Western traditions) were outlined in
Suggested Strategic Response.
If close examination of the ‘new’ Japan reveals it to be
the ‘old’ Japan wearing new clothes, then a similar response to Japan would be
appropriate.
The
background to the present writer’s attempts to understand the issues outlined
above is on the CPDS’ web-site.
John Craig
Attachment: Key Points in
Broader resistance to Western Influence?
In brief this drew attention to:
- The massive cultural differences between Western societies and
those in East Asia with an ancient Chinese cultural heritage (eg in terms of the
nature of: knowledge; power; governance; strategy; and economic methods). East
Asian communities that (say) opened to international trade to boost their
economic and military strength lacked the foundations needed for success through
simply copying Western institutions;
- the Meiji restoration in 1868 to promote Japan’s economic and
military strength to resist liberal Western influences. The imperial restoration
was apparently stimulated by nationalistic samurai - with Yakuza (Japanese organised crime
gangs
whose predecessors had often been samurai) playing a supporting role. Ultranationalist groups (including Yakuza
gangs) have since
then apparently consistently pursued themes of racial and cultural superiority
and had significant political influence;
- Japan’s unsuccessful efforts in WWII to use its military power to
mobilize China to support the creation of an ‘Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’;
- The post-WWII establishment of a nominally liberal democratic
system of government in Japan, behind which power seems to have been actually
exerted by Japan’s bureaucracy through a modified version of the Confucian
methods whereby East Asia had been governed on behalf of emperors for centuries
prior to Western expansion;
- Japan’s post-war economic ‘miracles’ that were apparently
orchestrated by Japan’s bureaucratic elites and financed with national savings
to boost Japan’s economic power with little regard to return on capital. Though
nominally independent, Japan’s banks and major companies were closely linked
with agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI). The goal of those methods was mercantilist (ie
building national economic power) rather than creating opportunities for
citizens as investors / consumers;
- The possibility suggested by an experienced Japan-watcher that
those economic methods had been developed by Japan’s military in Manchuria in
the 1930s and that they were transferred to China in the late 1970s;
- The role a prominent ultranationalist, Ryochi Sasakawa, had in
providing gambling-sourced funding for MITI’s special projects and as one of
three top-level facilitators of relationships between government, industry and
ultranationalist factions – a top-level-fixer role which in Japan would have
required a mandate from Emperor Hirohito;
- The virulent economic contest to be economically No 1 that Japan
launched in the 1970s and 1980s – followed by the financial crisis that resulted
in about 1990 when Japan’s non-capitalistic financial system collapsed as the
result of creating vast quantities of credit for non-financially-viable
investment;
- The incompatibility between the non-capitalistic financial system
that had been a core component of Japan’s post-war economic ‘miracles’ and the
profit-focused international financial system which led to increasing
difficulties (eg international trade and financial imbalances) and attempts by
Japan from the 1970s to sponsor the creation of alternatives to Western-style
international financial machinery.
Broader resistance to Western Influence? is part of a document (Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, 2011) whose
basic theme was that:
- Australia’s strategic position is being challenged not only by the
‘hard power’ that China’s increasing belligerence implies, but also by the ‘soft
power’ methods that characterise traditional East Asian Art of War strategies;
and
- The possibility of a hidden anti-Western coalition between Japan
and China through their respective nationalistic factions should neither be
ignored nor taken as given.
|
Addendum U: Are Analysts
Making a Big Mistake about China and Japan? |
Are Analysts Making a Big Mistake about China and Japan? - email sent 18/8/14
Professor Hugh White
Australian National University
Re: Is
China making a big mistake about Japan?, China Spectator, 14/8/14
Your article
raised questions about whether Japan might in future accept a subordinate status
in a China-led Asia, or whether it might seek to establish itself as a major
regional power in competition with China. However anti-Western collaboration by
Japanese and Chinese nationalists is another possibility that would
explain both the failure of Chinese analysts’ to portray Japan as a strategic
competitor and the casualty-free Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute which
justifies military build-ups all around.
My interpretation of
your article: It has long been assumed that
China does not want a rearmed, strategically independent ‘normal’ Japan. But
China’s
assertive policies are pushing Japan to rearm and become strategically
independent (ie a ‘normal’ Japan). This is the reverse of what analysts
usually expect is in China’s interests and leads them to conclude that China
is making a mistake and there is thus no threat to US regional leadership.
However there are also other possibilities. China’s actions seemed designed to
undermine Japan’s confidence in US protection – and this seems to have
worked in terms of boosting Japan’s emphasis on collective self-defense and
search for allies. Alternatives to assuming that China has made a mistake are:
(a) China’s leaders assume that Japan is incapable of becoming a normal
military power again (given demoralization by economic stagnation, political
drift, demographic decline and natural disasters). Amy King (ANU) has
argued
that this is what China thinks. Chinese statements never mention Japan as a
possible strategic rival. If Japan can’t respond to China’s assertive
tactics, it may have no choice but to acquiesce to China’s regional
leadership. However Japan may not be willing to do this – given its
sense of identity and fears about what might happen under China’s regional
leadership. Brad Glosserman (CSIS) has
implied
that Japan would accept a subordinate status in a China-led Asia. However there
is also a real possibility that China has misunderstood Japan – and that Japan
might respond to any decline in US influence by seeking to itself become a great
/ nuclear-armed state. This creates a dilemma for China – as to whether it
would rather face Japan or the US as its major strategic rival in Asia.
In assessing what is happening it is desirable to recognise
that the ancient Chinese cultural heritage of counties in East Asia (including
Japan) involves ways of thinking, social organization and government that are
quite different to Western traditions. An attempt to outline the intellectual
foundations of those cultures and some of their consequences is in
East
Asia: The Realm of the Autocratic, Hierarchical and Intuitive Ethnic Group?
Japan’s nationalists have a long history of resistance to
Western influences presumably mainly because of the latter’s emphasis on liberal
institutions that promote individual welfare and initiative (rather than the
welfare and initiative of ethnic communities as a whole
under the guidance of authoritarian social elites). After being forced to
open to trade in the mid-19th century Japan’s nationalists
sponsored the Meiji Restoration (ie renewed imperial rule) to build Japan’s
economic and military strength. After the political and economic dislocation
associated with the Great Depression in the 1930s Japan’s nationalists
promoted military rule on behalf of the emperor and invasion of China in an
effort to mobilize support from China (as Japan’s ‘big brother’) in
establishing an ‘Asian’ Co-prosperity Sphere. And there are reasons to
suspect that Japan’s nationalists (who apparently still remain
extremely
influential) might have orchestrated some sort of new / hidden
/ partial imperial restoration after 1945 in relation to the organisation of
Japan’s post-war economic ‘miracles’ and the virulent contest with the US
to be ‘No 1’ that lasted until the 1980s (see Broader
Resistance to Western Influence). While there is no certainty, the latter
refers to features of post-WWII Japan that seem more compatible with a variation
of rule by Confucian bureaucracies on behalf of emperors that had been
widespread in East Asia prior to Western expansion than the post-WWII democratic
political system that Japan appeared to have adopted.
It is also worth recognising that:
- an experienced Japan-watcher
suggested
that Japan’s post-WWII economic methods had been developed by its military in
Manchuria in the 1930s and transmitted to China in the late 1970s;
- recent changes to government in China appear to have confirmed
that the (so called) ‘Communist’ Party is also something like the Confucian
bureaucracies that ruled across Asia for centuries on behalf of emperors prior
to Western expansion (see The
Resurgence of Ancient Authoritarianism in China) – and, if so, this raises
questions about which ‘emperor’ the (so-called) ‘Communist’ Party would
see itself as being accountable to;
- China’s diverse attempts to promote a new international economic
and political arrangement in competition with the post-WWII liberal
Western-style international institutions can be seen as an attempt to re-create
something like the trade-tribute systems under which Asia was administered from
China in the centuries prior to Western expansion (see
Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order?); and
- Japan had sponsored efforts to create ‘Asian’ alternatives to
Western-style financial systems since the 1970s because of a fundamental
incompatibility between prevailing international institutional arrangements and
the non-capitalist financial systems that have been part of the
mercantilist (ie power rather than profit seeking) economic ‘miracles’ of
the major East Asian economies (see
A
Generally Unrecognised 'Financial War'?) .
It is arguably unwise to try to understand East Asia's
virtual
'whole-of-society bureaucracies' simply
in terms of Western analogies for reasons suggested in Babes
in the Asian Woods. And this applies in particular in relation to strategic
/ defense considerations. Ancient East Asian ‘Art of War’ strategies have
features that derive from the region’s traditional cultural / social /
government arrangements that have no close Western parallels – a point that is
developed further in Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030.
Regards
John Craig
Notes added later: In September
2014, soon after Western powers had committed themselves to what seemed like
another extremely long and demanding military / security contest with Islamist extremists in
the Middle East (ie the (so-called) 'Islamic State') and the extremists'
domestic allies within Western societies, it was reported that Japan and China
were on the point of resolving their differences and moving towards
collaboration [1].
This development might usefully be considered in the context of questions raised in
Is the Barbarity of ISIS Another Attempt to Ensnare the US in the Middle
East?
and
Islamist Extremists are not Alone in Favouring Pre-modern Social Systems
.
In early 2015, it was noted that China and Japan have
very similar economic systems, and that (despite the the chill in diplomatic
relationships from 2012) there had been a great deal of informal / behind
the scenes collaboration because China seemed likely to face the same sort
of risk of a financial crisis as Japan experienced after 1990, and it was
believed that Japan's experience could help China avoid that fate.
|
Countering
Non-military Security Threats to America from East Asia |
Countering Non-military Security Threats to America from East Asia - email sent 28/9/14
Joseph Bosco
Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Re: China's
Deadly Miscalculation in the Making, Real Clear Defense, Sept 26, 2014
Your article suggested that ‘China thinks it can defeat
America without Battle’.
This is, of course and as your article noted, the essence
of the traditional East Asian ‘Art of War’ methods. Defense against those
methods (which seem to have been deployed against America since the end of WWII
by covertly making real world social, political and economic changes
that expose the US to diverse risks) can’t primarily
involve ‘military’ considerations – for reasons suggested in
Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030. As the latter suggests the
US’s significant security threats in Asia from an ‘Art of War’ perspective
are probably not limited to China (eg see Are
Analysts Making a Big Mistake about China and Japan?). In ‘Asia’
America is dealing with societies that think and do things differently (eg see
Look
at the 'Forest' not just at the 'Trees').
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations
John Craig
|
China as a Dominant Power |
China as a Dominant Power - email sent 24/11/14
John Lee and Paul Dibb
Re: Why
China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia,
Security Challenges, Nov 2014
Your article, which was
summarised as follows, seemed to reach a conclusion that is very reasonable at
the present time.
“The
belief that China will soon become the dominant power in Asia is based on
assumptions that its continued and rapid economic rise, and its emergence as a
regional peer of America’s in military terms is all but assured. Such a
belief underpins arguments that a fundamental strategic reorganisation of Asia
is inevitable, and that it will be necessary and perhaps even desirable to
concede to China significant ‘strategic space’. Dependent largely on
linear extrapolations about the future, such arguments ignore the implications
of China’s economic, social and national fragilities, its lack of major
friends or allies in the region as well as the considerable military
deficiencies and challenges faced by the People’s Liberation Army. With
the Defence White Paper due for release in 2015, the government should bear in
mind that planning for an era of Chinese dominance in the region—or even its
emergence as an American strategic peer in Asia—would be premature if not
improbable. Australia should not design its defence force for war with
China, but it should be able to counter Chinese coercion and contribute to
Allied military operations if necessary. “
However I should like to
suggest for your consideration that it would be useful to bring an ‘East-Asian
Art of War’ perspective into such an analysis.
China seems to be engaged in efforts to transform its global political stature
using methods like those used to generate economic ‘miracles’ in East Asia
in the past. This could make an appreciable difference in the time frame of any
Defence White Paper – and thus needs to be recognised.
The ‘Art of War’ is to win
beforehand – by building up one’s own strength and encouraging enemies to
become weak. It is understood that a classic tactic to defeat strong enemies is
to serve them so that they become weak, dissolute and dependent – and then to
build the strength to defeat them in a weakened state. This potentially involves
concerted action over a long period (eg several generations). In dealing with
cultures that use such methods any Defence White Paper by the Australian
Government needs to take a very wide / long-term perspective on what constitutes
strength and weakness.
Moreover quite different ways
of looking at things are involved (eg see Look
at the Forest Not at The Trees). And these
translate into different methods. Western societies tend to focus on specific
things that are believed to be the most relevant (eg the factors considered in
your paper). East Asian societies tend to look at ‘everything’ because they
don’t believe that it is useful / possible to identify what is relevant.
Observations about the different way of thinking involved were outlined by Reg
Little (a former DFAT Asia specialist who was arguably the first Western analyst
to anticipate China’s rise) – see outline in Competing
Thought Cultures. Western thought involves
the use of mental models on the basis of its classical Greek heritage. This is
useful as the foundation of rationality in analysis and decision making by
individuals. However from an East Asian perspective this is narrow and limiting.
There is no emphasis on mental models that reflect the way things were done in
the past (and which lead Western analysts to focus on what can be expected to be
relevant – and ignore what seems likely to be irrelevant). Anything can
be evolved into anything. Things can be done in radically new ways. Rather than
creating ‘law’ (ie rules on how individuals behave or should behave)
government under East Asia’s Confucian traditions itself stimulates changes in
the way social, economic and political systems as a whole behave through the
influence of highly-educated bureaucratic elites.
For example, East Asia is
associated with ‘economic miracles’ (ie economic outcomes that defy
explanation in accord with traditional economic expectations). These
‘miracles’ are a by-product of quite unique ways of doing things (see
Understanding
East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy).
After WWII Japan did the reverse of what Western analysts believed was
appropriate (ie Japan concentrated on Western societies’ areas of highest
productivity (mass production manufacturing) rather than on the labour intensive
industries that were seen to be its area of comparative advantage). And from the
1950s consensus-forming methods to accelerate economic learning were used by
Japan’s bureaucratic elites (ie in MITI and the MOF - presumably operating
under some sort of imperial mandate) to gain dominance in those sectors. The
result was that in the 1960s and 1970s de-industrialization in Europe and North
America created significant economic problems. Similar methods of orchestrating
economic ‘miracles’ were then adopted by the Asian ‘tigers’ and by China
from the late 1970s. Economic strength then became the foundation of increasing
military capacity.
A feature of those
‘bureaucratic’ methods for economic learning / coordination is
limited
concern for profitability in the use of capital,
because emphasis is only placed on ‘real economy’ outcomes. Symbolic
outcomes (such as the profitability that allows rationality to be used as a
basis for decision making by independent enterprises in a Western context) are
not emphasised. This lack of emphasis on profitability can lead to a debt crisis
– as in Japan in the late 1990s and China now. However unless this difference
in economic methods is made explicit the application of models related to
‘productivity’ (which your article cites in relation to China’s economy)
can’t completely accurately capture what is happening from an East Asian
viewpoint.
East Asian attempts to gain
power are not limited to the economic and military domain. ‘Everything’ is
in play. Some suggestions about what this implies in terms of what ‘defence’
has to involve are in Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030.
Social, political and even criminal efforts will all be dedicated to achieving a
bureaucratically coordinated outcome. Also under ‘Art of War’ traditions
very long term time scales and deception are expected to be involved. Looking at
what seems to be the ‘main game’ in terms of political and military capacity
can lead to neglect of what is the ‘main game’ from an East Asian viewpoint
(ie creating new capacity in non-traditional and unexpected areas that
eventually starts the have a strong influence on what had previously been the
‘main game’). Any analysis that presumes that the analyst knows what is
going on through the use of established concepts can be misleading. Things that
look familiar (based on traditional mental models / concepts) can have quite
different functions to those it looks like they would have. Under
traditional Art of War methods, things that are real threats can look quite
innocuous. Deception is the core of those methods. There is also a need to look
at what is actually being done, not at what one would presume is being done on
the basis of traditional mental models. There is a need to look not only at what
is happening in the ‘main game’ but also at what is happening elsewhere.
Methods of exerting power are
unlikely to correspond to Western models / assumptions about how this could /
should be achieved. For centuries prior to Western expansion Asia had a
China-centred administration under
a
trade-tribute regime that bears no relationship
with Western methods and models. Moreover, there are reasonable grounds for
suggesting that attempts have been made for several years to establish something
similar (see Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order,
2009+). The latter referred to the pressures that are making this necessary, to
the ‘soft power’ methods that are being used and to the large number of
initiatives that are under way to create such as framework.
It is also worth noting that
Mao defeated the Nationalists in China by capturing the country-side – and
thus making the cities (which the Nationalists held) vulnerable. China’s
current efforts to create a new China centred international order have
apparently been focused on emerging economies (though those efforts are now also
starting to be used in Asia). It was recently pointed out that China is now the
dominant foreign investor in Africa and is squeezing out Western competitors
(eg see Larkin S., Why
China’s wealthy move fast in global markets’,
Business Review, 22/11/14). And the BRICS group (which is being
orchestrated by China’s bureaucratic elites – ie the so-called Communist
Party) is being presented by European opponents of Anglo American traditions as
a vehicle for creating a new international order (Global
systemic crisis 2015 – The dynamics of the future distance Europe from the
rationale of a Western camp war , 15/11/14). The
latter analysis is not earth shattering – but it does suggest that China’s
current regime (like Mao) is probably seeking to ‘capture the countryside’
as a means for defeating those who ‘occupy the cities’. This is not
reflected in any analysis that focuses on Asia and is based on traditional
perceptions of what comprises political and military strength. China might
currently be seeking, not so much to gain political and economic power in Asia,
but rather to challenge the West’s current are of greatest strength – ie the
US’s influence over global political and economic institutions. Challenging
the West’s area of greatest economic strength (ie mass production
manufacturing) was what Japan did successfully after WWII. And methods like
those used domestically to achieve economic ‘miracles’ seem to be in use
internationally to build a global political power base.
I am not suggesting that the
conclusion of your article is wrong at the present time – merely that
presenting an ‘East Asian Art of War’ perspective on what is going on should
provide readers with a better understanding of how the situation might change.
Until 1945 the ‘war’ against the West by East Asian nationalists was
fought by trying to use Western methods. This didn’t work – because those
methods were incompatible with East Asian cultures. Since then more traditional
Art of War methods seem to have been favoured – and these now need to be
recognised in geo-political analysis and thus in any Australian Defence White
Paper.
Speculations about what a
Defence White Paper might include to counter the use of ‘Art of War’ methods
are in Suggested
Strategic Response.
John Craig
|
The US's Most Significant
Intelligence Failure? |
The US's Most Significant Intelligence Failure? - email sent 10/2/15
Dr Michael Pillsbury,
Centre for Chinese Strategy,
Hudson Institute
Re: It’s
becoming clear we made 5 dangerously wrong assumptions about China, Business
Insider, Feb 9, 2015
Your article provided an outline of some key points in your
recent book on China’s long term strategy (ie the so-called The
Hundred Year Marathon). You argued that the US’s failure to recognise that
it has been deceived about China’s strategy from the 1960s has been its
greatest intelligence failure. There is little doubt about your core contention
(ie that China has been engaged in an extremely long-term strategy to gain a
dominant geo-political status). I should like to suggest how it is
possible to gain greater understanding of why and how this has been happening by
giving specific attention to core cultural differences between Western societies
and those in East Asia with an ancient Chinese cultural heritage. Also I should
like to suggest that the US’s inability to perceive China’s long term
strategy may not be its greatest intelligence failure.
My
Interpretation of your article: Successive
US administrations have been urged to provide support to China since the late
1960s. It was believed that this would help China become a democratic / peaceful
power without ambitions of regional / global dominance. It was believed
that engagement would lead to cooperation on policy problems. It hasn’t. Views
on regional / global order were supposed to converge. They haven’t.
Cooperation against terrorism, for example, has been limited. It was believed
that democracy would evolve in China – starting at the village level. However
it was clear in 1997 that local democracy was highly constrained (ie neither the
Communist Party nor opposing candidates could be criticized). In the 1990s study
tours to China were repeatedly given reasons why China’s progress was at risk
(eg environmental constraints, restless ethnic minorities, corrupt officials).
At the same time China continued to achieve very high and sustained growth.
Americans like to believe that others aspire to be like them. But in the 1940s
efforts to understand the Chinese mind-set found that there was a preference of
indirect action / ambiguity / deception – as compared with the US preference
for direct action / clarity / transparency. Deception is highly prized in
Chinese literature. It is now recognized that deception has been the main
feature of China’s recent strategy. China seeks to encourage its enemies to
act inexpediently. Chinese ‘hawks’ have long encouraged the Chinese
leadership to mislead and manipulate US policy-makers. This started in the era
of Mao Zedong – with an intent to avenge a century of humiliation and an
aspiration of replacing the US as the world’s economic, military and political
leader by 2049. This plan is called ‘The Hundred year Marathon’. Revelation
of this plan was greeted with disbelief in the US. The strength of the Hundred
Year Marathon is that it operates by stealth. The plan is so well known that it
is never written down – though now it is well advanced there is an increasing
willingness to discuss it more openly. There is now more open discussion of a
‘Chinese-led world order’ because it is believed that the US is in
unrecoverable decline. The Communist Party is seeking to restore China’s
‘proper place’ in the world. There is pride in the fact the US had not even
realized that the ‘Marathon’ was even underway. This has been the US’s
most significant intelligence failure.
I should like to offer some observations about the issues
raised by your article. The background to these is that I had an opportunity
some time ago to ‘reverse engineer’ the intellectual basis of East Asian
economic ‘miracles’ and thus to compare these with Western methods for
achieving social, economic and political progress (see
Background
Note).
The key to understanding East Asian societies with an
ancient Chinese cultural heritage is arguably to recognize the absence of the
emphasis on the ‘rational’ / abstract methods of problem solving that
Western societies gained from their classical Greek heritage. Likewise the
welfare and contributions of individuals is not valued in the way Western
societies do because of their Judeo-Christian heritage. Some suggestions about
the traditional East Asian alternative to the use of information as a basis for
understanding and rational decision making by individuals in diverse contexts
are in East
Asia: The Realm of the Autocratic, Hierarchical and Intuitive Ethnic Group?
(2001+).
Such worldviews do not involve belief in universal values,
law as the basis for guiding individual behaviour, profitability as a guide to
resource allocation, or interchange / dialogue as a basis for building
cooperation. Deception is foundational because the purpose of providing
information (ie education, management, government, international relations) is
not to enable others to understand, but rather to encourage them to do things
that are believed likely to benefit the provider’s ethnic community (see
Why
Understanding is Difficult, 2011). Power is often exerted indirectly
by influencing the whole system in which others operate and by which they are
constrained, rather than directly by dealing with individual ‘things’
(see Look
at the 'Forest' not just at the 'Trees' ). And such indirect
system-as-a-whole methods necessarily require a long (eg multi-generational)
time horizon. And outsiders’ failure to understand how this works can be
hazardous (see Babes
in the Asian Woods, 2009+).
Confucianism was the traditional method by which imperial
bureaucracies governed and exerted power by using information to manipulate an
ethnic nations’ behaviour within a social hierarchy. This was an extension of
traditional East Asian educational methods. And a modified version of
Confucianism seems to have been the basis of ‘bureaucratic’ government in
those major East Asian societies that achieved post-WWII economic miracles (see
Understanding
East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy, 2009).
Consider, for example, the process of ‘vision development and administrative
guidance’ that Japan’s bureaucracy used to develop whole industrial
clusters. Similar methods are also arguably the basis of an attempt now to
create an China-centred international order that: (a) is similar to the
trade-tribute system through which Asia was administered from China prior to
Western expansion; and (b) potentially provides China’s elites with a means to
intervene economically and politically in other countries (see
Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order).
Your article suggested that the US’s inability to see
through China’s likely deception about its ‘Hundred Year Marathon’ to gain
vengeance for its historic humiliations was its greatest intelligence failure.
However I suggest that it is possible (though not certain) that the US may have
been subjected to a similar deception by another major East Asian power (ie
Japan) - see Broader
Resistance to Western Influence?, 2011+. It is worth noting for example
that: Japan’s post-WWII economic development methods were plausibly seen to
have been developed by its military in Manchuria in the 1930s; those methods
could not have been successfully used by Japan’s bureaucracy to achieve
market-responsive economic outcomes in a truly democratic environment – which
implied that the post-war bureaucracy had to be operating under an imperial mandate (as
Confucian bureaucracies traditionally did); Japan played the lead role in a
generally
unrecognised ‘war’ against liberal Western-style financial systems for
years before China became economically significant; and a variation on the
‘bureaucratic non-capitalist’/ neo-Confucian methods that Japan had used to
achieve economic ‘miracles’ somehow came to be adopted by China (presumably
as the best hope of achieving the goals of China’s ‘hawks’) in the late
1970s (ie after the economic failure of the ‘Communist’ methods that had
been used in the Mao era).
I would be
interested in your response to my speculations
Regards
John Craig
|
Would Buying Japanese
Submarines Be Clever? |
Would Buying
Japanese Submarines Be Clever? [August 2015]
Andrew Bolt argued (Let's
not sink cash into subpar subs, Courier Mail, 6/8/15)
that Australia should not buy technically inferior submarines from
Adelaide merely to preserve industry and employment in that state -
but should instead buy Japanese submarines because peoples' lives and
Australia's national security could depend on acquiring a superior
product.
However there is a geopolitical complexity that needs to be
resolved first - because it is not completely clear whose side Japan
would be on in a potential future conflict. The issues involved (but
not a definitive answer) are outlined in The US's
Most Significant Intelligence Failure above, and include:
- the long term / carefully disguised nature of strategy under
East Asian traditions - as illustrated by China's apparent
deception of the US in relation to its intentions;
- the significance of hard-to-understand cultural features
(which are radically different to the cultural foundations of
Western societies) that give rise to such strategic methods, and
to unfamiliar / invisible ways of exerting power (ie through
status in an ethnic social hierarchy rather than through making
decisions);
- the possibility that the US has been even more
completely deceived by Japan over an even longer time scale in
relation to which it is noted that:
- Japan's post-WWII political and economic systems were
almost certainly created by the same imperially-mandated
ultranationalist factions that had led Japan in the 1930s to
invade China to gain its support in building an 'Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere' (ie a region dominated by authoritarian
elites where liberal Western traditions would not be
influential). An imperially-mandated bureaucracy (rather than
the so-called Liberal Democratic Party) became the real
post-WWII government of Japan (especially in relation
to economic affairs). US occupation forces were concerned
about some of these developments (eg the continuance of
Japan's Imperial system which was seen as responsible for
Japan's militaristic extremism in the 1930s), but saw Communism
as a greater threat;
- a key behind-the-scenes 'kuromaku' / fixer (Ryochi
Sasakawa - now deceased) was:(a) involved in the development
of infrastructure to facilitate Japan's invasion of
Manchuria; (b) a suspected war criminal in 1945; (c) central
in facilitating the creation of Japan's post-WWII economic systems - and
enabled to provide multi-$bn gambling-sourced special
projects funding to Japan's economic agencies; (d) a vocal
admirer of Admiral Yamamoto who had planned Japan's Pearl
Harbour raid and intended invasion of Australia and concluded
that Japan could not win a 'war' against the US; (e) a
notorious ultranationalist and Yakuza boss; (f) politically
and economically influential in Queensland in the 1980s -
which led to the present writer's awareness of his role; and
(g) apparently involved in stimulating the development of
infrastructure in Australia that would have facilitated
Yamamoto's 1940s' invasion plan;
- Japan used a variation of traditional methods of exerting
power through elite Confucian bureaucracies to orchestrate
economic 'miracles' with mercantilist aspirations (that were
very obvious in the 1980s) to build a globally-dominant
economy (ie its methods were a way of boosting national power
rather than citizens' individual welfare). Those methods were
suggested by a close Japan-watcher to have been: (a)
developed by the Japanese military in Manchuria in the 1930s;
and (b) transmitted to China in the late 1970s. Those methods
involved financial systems that were incompatible with
established international financial systems - because they
involved little concern for
financial return on levels of national savings that were
forced so high through constraining consumption that there
was no need to borrow from international profit-focused
financial institutions. For decades this amounted to a
Japan-initiated / hard-to-understand 'financial war' that has
contributed to international financial imbalances and instabilities and
to the
escalation of debts that increasingly constrain global
growth;
- From the late 1970s China used a variation of Japan's
neo-Confucian methods (which involved control through what
was still ironically called its 'Communist' Party) to
orchestrate the rapid development of its economy and
geo-political role. As in Japan and Singapore (in different
ways) authoritarian state dominance of the economy (as well
as of the society generally) was ensured by banks and
business groupings that were either owned by the social
elites that controlled government (or by their cronies;
- the international neo-Confucian economic and political
order which China now seems to be seeking to create to
challenge the liberal Western-style international order
parallels Japan's 'Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' ambitions in
the 1930s. China's version would be a 'soft-fascist' system
in which the power of ethnic elites would not be constrained
by democratic or financial considerations, and probably
parallel the 'trade / tribute' system by which Asia had been
administered from China prior to Western expansion. This
system is being developed through China's role as a
facilitator of the aspirations of emerging economies. At the
same time Japan develops relationships and dependence on
its military technologies in the developed world - which
may, or may not, be strategically connected with China's
efforts to build global economic and political power;
- though Japan became the US's 'best friend' in Asia after
its financial system failed in the late 1980s, its government
and economic systems were not fundamentally changed .'Getting
close to enemies' and 'holding up a mirror so that when
others look at you they see a reflection of themselves' are
classic East Asian Art of War tactics;
- Japan's current prime minister expresses ultranationalist
rhetoric (whose core is the presumed racial and cultural
superior of the 'Great Han Race' that is seen to be common to
China, Korea and Japan);
- vocal disputes by Japan and China over uninhabited
islands provide both with a harmless justification for
military expansion;
- Japan reportedly provides behind-the-scenes advice to
China about how to now avoid the financial failures that
crippled Japan's aspirations to become No 1 economically in
the late 1980s.
As noted above, evidence and reasons for these assertions were
presented in
more detail in The US's Most Significant
Intelligence Failure (and in other linked references).
It has been suggested recently that the US has pressured Australia
to buy Japanese submarines as part of its efforts to manage the
development of its allies' defense capabilities in the Asia Pacific [1].
While the US's judgment in such matters area should not be ignored,
it should also not be presumed to be infallible.
The above does not prove where Australia's submarines should be
built. It merely seeks to identify issues that need to be evaluated.
|
Understanding What is Going
on is the Best Response to China |
|
As Power Shifts from
the US to the
Soviet Union, to Japan, to China, to .... |
As Power Shifts
from the US to the
Soviet Union, to Japan, to China, to .... - email sent 26/9/15
Michael Fullilove
Lowy Institute
RE: Australia’s
global role will change as power shifts to China, The Australian,
26/9/15
Your article points to the fact that the world is in a mess
– and that the international order that has maintained stability in recent
decades is failing. Some reasons to suspect that this diagnosis is correct are
in An
Approaching Crisis - From Late 2013?
(which is a recent addition to
The Second Failure of
Globalization, 2003+).
Your article also takes it as given that, as the liberal (ie
democratic capitalist) international order that the US has championed since WWII
fails, a new authoritarian China-centred international order will replace it.
There is little doubt that China’s leaders would like this to be true
and have been manoeuvring to achieve this outcome (see
Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order, 2009+).
However there is very considerable doubt that China’s
leaders will succeed in their ambition – because China’s recent and current
huge rate of poorly-directed investment is unlikely to any more sustainable than
was: (a) the Soviet Union's huge rate of poorly-directed investment in the 1950s; and
(b) Japan’s huge rate of poorly-directed investment up
to the 1980s.
China’s current regime is in VERY serious difficulties
(see Ongoing
Uncertainty) because: (a) its neo-Confucian elitism is widely resented by
Chinese people; (b) the so-called ‘Communist’ Party maintains power purely
on the basis of sustaining economic growth; (c) doing so has required incurring
huge debt levels – similar to those that derailed Japan’s ambition to
become No 1 economically in the 1980s; and (d) China’s efforts to avoid
Japan’s fate by creating new state-manipulated 'market’ methods of generating
capital for investment seem to be failing.
John Craig
|
The Limits of Mr Turnbull's
History Lessons
|
The Limits of Mr Turnbull's History Lessons -
email sent
1/10/15
Peter Cai, China Spectator
Re:
The
value in Turnbull's history lessons, China
Spectator, 25/9/15
Your article highlighted Mr Turnbull’s interest in history as a guide to
dealing with the foreign policy and economic issues raised by China’s rising
influence.
My
Interpretation of your article: Australia’s
prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, is a history buff – which means that he can
see current issues in a broad historical context. He
quoted Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War to explain Australia’s strategic
challenges. He compared the US with Sparta at a time when Athens was gaining
ascendency. There is a need to ensure that Americans (unlike Spartans) do not
engage in reflexive antagonism to a rising power that could end in conflict.
Classically trained prime ministers have set a high standard in
parliamentary debate. However there is a need to see why the Peloponnesian War
is relevant in analysisng Australia’s foreign policy. It has been seen as
relevant in modern times by Donald Kagan (a historian and strategist); US
Secretary of State in 1947 (George Marshall); and former US Sectary of State
(Henry Kissinger) in relation post Cold War rivalry between China and the US.
Kissinger was critical of the lack of education about history that
foreign policy makers have. History is important in developing foreign and
economic policies. Australia’s new PM has an interest in history as it relates
to China’s rise – eg how its traumatic past shaped its current practices.
If one does not understand other people’s history, one won’t
understand what they will do. Margaret MacMillan (Oxford University) quoted two
examples of where this was not done. First the US lost the war in Vietnam
(according to Robert MacNamara) because it did not understand affected
peoples’ history, culture, politics and the personalities / habits of their
leaders. Second Tony Blair consulted Middle Eastern experts before agreeing to
participate in Iraq invasion – but then ignored their advice that doing so
would not be welcomed. Tony Abbott would have been wise to avoid East Asia’s
wars in praising Japanese soldiers – as doing so recently caused an uproar in
China. Historical lessons are also relevant in developing economic policy. Ben
Bernanke (ex Federal Reserve Chairman) said that lack of attention to economic
history (eg of the 1929 Great Depression) was a major problem. Australia has had
23 years of uninterrupted prosperity – and many believe economic crises only
happen to others. It is good to have a leader who thinks deeply and seriously
– and can draw upon an understanding of history.
Undoubtedly history can have lessons. However a recent address by Mr
Turnbull to the Australia-China Council strongly suggested that Australia
desperately needs genuinely Asia-literate advice about China. Without this, it
will be impossible to reach foreign and economic policy conclusions that are any
more constructive than the Vietnam War and the invasion of Iraq no matter what
the ancient Greek historian Thucydides had to say about the contest between
Athens and Sparta.
My reason
for suggesting this are outlined on my web-site. For example:
- While
history shows that instability and conflict can arise where major powers
compete, deep understanding about what is different about the ‘other’ is
vital to competing successfully – a conclusion that both Japan and China
eventually reached;
- When Western influences expanded into Asia, China’s
long established Confucian system of imperially-mandated bureaucratic government
did not cope well. It had emphasized guiding society simply on the basis of
wisdom gained from a study of history – and this was found to be inadequate in
dealing with societies that had economic and military strengths on the basis of
cultural traits that China had never encountered before;
- A modified and unpublicized form of Confucian
government has been the basis of real-economy ‘miracles’ in countries such
as Japan and China behind a democratic-capitalist and socialist ‘face’
respectively. However this has been very poorly understood by Western observers
because: (a) that system is built on cultural, social and political foundations
that are radically different to those of Western societies; and (b) deception is
the essence of traditional Art of War strategies;
- The state-manipulated financial systems that have
been involved in neo-Confucian real-economy ‘miracles’: (a) have contributed
to global financial and economic instability; and (b) now put China at risk of a
major set-back.
John
Craig
Detailed Comments
The Limitations of History
It was suggested that Australia's Prime Minister (Mr Turnbull) is
a 'history buff' who believes that important lessons can be learned,
for example, from what Thucydides wrote about the history of ancient Greece.
Thucydides’s History Lesson: The history of ancient Greece
that Thucydides wrote about illustrated the potential for instability and
conflict where major powers compete. What he had to say about foreign policy is
described in Kemos A., The
Influence of Thucydides in the Modern World.
He wrote a theory of the ‘realist’ foreign policy that dominated in the US
during the Cold War. This rationalized drawing on support from unsavory regimes
if they could help in the contest with Communism – ie the end was considered
to justify the means because there was no basis for judging morality in
international affairs.
After 'realist' foreign policy was
ultimately recognized by CIA to lead to ‘blowback’
against the US, ‘realism’ was replaced with foreign policy ‘idealism’
under the post 911 influence of the so-called Neocons. This
rationalized using
US military power unilaterally to change unsavoury regimes (eg by the invasion
of Saddam Hussein's
Iraq). Since that (predictably) proved problematic, the US has apparently ceased assuming that
military force could achieve ‘idealist’ changes in other regimes and moved back towards a more
‘realist’ stance through diplomatic engagement sometimes
with less than ‘ideal’
partners in order to deal with the greatest perceived threats.
[In the gap created by the end of the US's
unilateral use of its military power to install regimes it prefers,
Russia now seems to have taken it upon itself to try to do so - eg in
Crimea, Ukraine and Syria]
However what Thucydides wrote is of very limited relevance in relation to the challenges and opportunities arising in East
Asia. Those challenges and opportunities involve cultural traditions that are radically different from those in
Western societies, and unless those differences are understood any foreign
policy and economic strategy calculations can’t be realistic.
China found that history was an inadequate guide to coping with expanding Western influence in the 19th century.
The Qing
Dynasty (1644-1911) that controlled China in that era was governed in
accordance with Confucian traditions. The latter involved guidance of society by
imperially-mandated bureaucratic elites on the basis of the wisdom that they
gained from intensive study of history. However historical wisdom simply
didn’t work in dealing with expanding Western influence because the latter was
so different to anything China had encountered before, and those
cultural differences
were the basis of strategically-significant advantages.
Thus one critically important
lesson from history is that reliance on the lessons of history is inadequate
when dealing with unfamiliar social, political and economic systems.
Learning the Limits of History in Asia: This was a lesson that Japan had learned by 1868 (ie by
the time of the Meiji Restoration). Imperially-mandated samurai were given
control of Japan’s government and charged with boosting Japan’s economic
strength (and thus its military potential) by emulating Western practices. And, over 100 years ago, China also demonstrated the
limitations of wisdom derived from a study of history history. The Confucian
Qing dynasty was displaced in 1911 and, after decades of turmoil, the Chinese
Nationalist Party gained power with a variation of European-style (ie democratic
capitalist) political ideals. It was then defeated in 1949 by the Communist
Party which under Mao sought to adopt a version of Western socialism. And then,
in the late 1970s, after the failure of Mao’s supposed Great Leap Forward and his
Cultural Revolution to purge China’s residual Confucian influences, the
‘Communist’ Party adopted a variation of East Asia’s traditional Confucian
system of government. Japan had discretely adopted such a system after WWII and
had demonstrated that the guidance of elite imperially-mandated bureaucrats, whose wisdom
was not solely derived from the study of history, could be the basis of catch-up
real-economy ‘miracles’ (see Understanding
East Asia's Neo-Confucian Systems of Socio-political-economy, 2009+).
A General Lack of Asia Literacy
Unfortunately understanding
societies with an ancient Chinese cultural heritage has been very limited in
Australia. ‘Asia’ has been assessed largely in terms of parallels with Western
concepts and institutions, though real Asia-literacy has been critically
important to formulating defense, foreign and economic policies (eg See
Babes
in the Asian Woods, 2009+; and Comments
on 'Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030', 2011+).
Critical differences arise from cultural features that have no
relationship with the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman foundations of Western societies –
as suggested in Competing
Civilizations (2001+).
And one of the features of those cultures is that information is
not be provided that would enable others to understand (see
Why Understanding is Difficult). The purpose
of providing information is to encourage others to do things that
would be advantageous to a person's ethnic community, not to help them
'understand'
An Example:
Not
Understanding Japan: Though US occupation forces were
concerned about the post-WWII continuance of Japan's imperial system
because of its association with Japan's war-time ideologies, there
was no appreciation of the significance of the post-WWII creation of
Japan's democratically-unaccountable (and thus presumably
imperially-mandated) economic bureaucracy (see
Establishing Japan's Post-WWII Economic and Political Systems).
The methods used by that economic bureaucracy (developing vision and
promoting nationalistic collaboration within industry clusters and
financing the resulting consensus through state-linked banks) was
effective in achieving real-economy 'miracles' - because the economic
bureaucracy was not responsive to interest group pressures and could
thus allow market-driven outcomes to emerge. Those
methods
were suggested to have been developed by Japan's military in
Manchuria in the 1930s. However what was happening was simply
invisible to US and other Western observers because of their lack of
understanding how power is
exerted in East Asia (ie power is not associated with making
decisions but with occupying a high position in an ethnic social
hierarchy (as Japan's emperor did) and having subordinates (eg
ultra-nationalistic Yakuza gangs) who: (a) actively influence a
society's social, political and economic arrangements; and (b) will comply with one's wishes -
wishes that reflect the consensual view of their subordinates).
Over-simplifying Economic Options
Mr Turnbull’s recent speech
to the Australian-China Business Council (ChAFTA
and Rebalancing of Chinese & Australian
Economies, 6/8/15) illustrated
Australia’s problem. For example:
- Mr
Turnbull identified collaboration between China and the US and Australia during
WWII as the basis for future collaboration. This was simplistic. As noted above,
the Chinese Nationalist Party that led China’s resistance to Japanese invasion
had European-style political ideals, and these (and Mao's version of Communism) have since been
supplanted (as in Japan) by a variation of traditional Confucian government which needs to be
understood if one is to understand China. Moreover China seems to be seeking
to create a new Confucian
international order like that by which Asia was administered
from China's prior to Western expansion - and this is quite
incompatible with liberal Western institutions. As far as China
is concerned, Australia's choice is presumably
whether or not to take the role of a tributary state in
China's new order (eg by a focus on economic opportunities
without consideration of broader issues);
- Mr
Turnbull discussed ‘economic’ opportunities purely in terms of economics
though, as a by-product of traditional culture, social, economic,
political, military and even criminal affairs can’t realistically be addressed separately
in East Asia.
Thus:
- It is not sensible to try to deal with national 'security'
issues in isolation (See Comments
on 'Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030', 2011);
- There is no such thing (in relation to significant
economic activities) as truly 'private' enterprise. Countries
such as Japan and China are corporate states. The 'private'
sector is viewed as an extension of the state. State
corporatism is a system of political economy that differs
from both democratic capitalism and socialism - and was
characteristic of fascist regimes in the 1930s. Though
enterprises may not be state owned, they are dependent for
success on social connections which ultimately lead back to,
and up, the state. And l'aw' does not exist to create an
environment in which independent entities can take actions
that are in their individual interest, but rather to disciple
those whose actions don't conform with the national consensus;
- Business relationships will have political implications
(see In East Asia Deals Always
Involve Politics; 2012 and 'Free'
Trade with China: Not Likely under a Neo-Confucian Regime,
2013);
- Mr Turnbull did not seem to recognize that the 'real economy'
opportunities that China's economy presented to Australia have
been
built on an irresponsible expansion of credit that puts their continuance
at risk (see
below).
Financial Systems: Where the Rubber Hits the Road
Much deeper understanding is
now important in any future development of foreign and economic policy because
the financial practices associated with the neo-Confucian systems that achieved
economic ‘miracles’ have had seriously adverse domestic and global effects.
National savings were allocated to significant economic undertakings by elite
social consensus rather than by calculations of the ‘profitability’ of each
endeavour (see Evidence).
This:
- is a by product of traditional
epistemologies
that (unlike those derived from the West's classical Greek
heritage) place no emphasis on the use of abstract concepts (such
as law, truth, universal values and profitability) as a basis for
rational independent decision making;
- makes it impossible for affected
communities to operate within the framework of Western-style
financial systems without difficult cultural change - because of: fundamental differences in the way
information is used; the need to change economic goals from
economic 'power' to financial returns; the inseparability of
economic issues from questions of social / political power; and
the lack of appropriate legal systems (see
The Cultural Revolution Needed in 'Asia' to Adapt to Western
Financial Systems, 1998);
- laid the foundations of a challenge (led initially by Japan)
to the prevailing international financial system (see
A Generally Unrecognised 'Financial War'?);
- imposed
severe constraints on global growth. Structural demand deficits
in the neo-Confucian systems (ie the
suppression of demand below national income) were needed to protect financial
institutions with suspect balance sheets from any need to borrow in
profit-oriented international financial markets (see
Structural
Incompatibility Puts Global Growth at Risk, 2003). The
resulting 'savings gluts' and international financial imbalances
would have stifled global growth unless their trading partners
(especially the US) had been willing and able to sustain strong
demand by adopting dangerously easy monetary policies to
allow debt-and-wealth-effect-driven demand
well in excess of their national incomes(see
Impacting
the Global Economy, 2009);
- resulted in
very high levels of poorly directed investment in the neo-Confucian systems which:
- led to a
financial crisis in Japan in the late 1980s and to its subsequent decades of economic
stagnation;
- created a risk for China
like that which had previously derailed Japan’s advancement. This risk seems to be
forcing China to try to establish an international order in which the
constraints on autocratic rule by social elites that democratic and financial
accountability impose would not apply (see
Creating a New International
Confucian Political and Economic order, 2009);
- is now
likely to put an end to China’s rapid economic advancement, because the
methods that China has been seeking to use to generate capital for investment
without ever-escalating debts (ie through state-manipulated 'markets') don’t seem to be working (see
As
Power Shifts from the US to the Soviet Union, to Japan, to China, to ...., 2015).
Conclusion
It would be naïve for
Australia to attempt to encourage the US to develop strategies for responding to
China’s increased economic, military and political role without deep understanding of these issues.
Any contest between the US and China (like the contest with the
Soviet Union
in the 1950s and Japan in the 1980) is primarily a matter of the
unlikely sustainability of economic systems where potential
competitors make huge badly-directed investments. What Thucydides
said about the Peloponnesian wars is probably of limited relevance.
|
The Complexity of National Security |
|
Consider Also Port of Darwin's Potential Significance in any Attempt to
Invade Australia
|
Consider Also Port of Darwin's Potential Significance in any Attempt to Invade Australia - email sent 10/11/15
Nicholas Rothwell,
The Australian
Re: Disquiet
over sale of Darwin Harbour to Chinese Landbridge Group, The
Australian, 7/11/15
Your article pointed to some national security concerns
related to the lease of Darwin’s Harbour to a Chinese company and to the lack
of coordination that seemed to exist between those concerned with Australia’s
economic and defence challenges. I should like to suggest additional reasons for
such concern. Darwin is not only a key centre for trade and US / Australian
military cooperation. It could also be a key target in any future attempt to
invade Australia.
My
Interpretation of your article: In
late 2015 concerns were expressed about the sale of Darwin
Harbour to a Chinese company. This has become part of strategic rivalry between
the US, China and Japan. No one in Canberra seems to have considered these
implications as the Trade Minister (Andrew Robb) and Minister for Northern
Development (Josh Frydenberg) viewed the issue only in economic terms.
Peter Jennings (ASPI) pointed out that the Northern Territory Government had
crafted the deal as a 99 year lease to avoid having to get FIRB approval.
Defence Department privately communicated their concerns about the deal. Darwin
is a key to US / Australian military cooperation. Naval cooperation will have
special emphasis on Darwin. A federal cabinet defence and security committee
needs to review such decisions. On the other hand concerns about strategic
issues fail to highlight the economic importance that Darwin now has - and will
have in future [Darwin's history in terms of economic and military relationships
with Asia were also outlined]
In the 1940s Admiral Yamamoto, who had planned Japan’s attack on Pearl
Harbour, also laid plans for an invasion of Australia. Those plans apparently
involved an overland thrust south from Darwin combined with a series of
‘hops’ down the Queensland Coast.
The possibility that a future invasion
attempt could also involve a strategy in which Darwin is involved should be
considered, as well as Darwin’s role in trade with Asia and in US / Australian
military cooperation, because:
- It is now being publicly acknowledged that China seems to be
trying to create a new international order to challenge the liberal
international order that the US has championed since WWII (see Monk P.
A
New Security Plan Needed, The Australian, 9/11/15). The latter also
drew attention to suggestions by Professor Ross Babbage that Australia needs to
give much higher priority to Asian intelligence gathering, and to critically
examining current strategic policy assumptions;
- The ‘international order’ that China seems to be seeking to
create appears similar to the way Asia was administered from China prior to
Western expansion (see Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order, 2009). As the
latter suggests, that international order also appears to be one that: (a) has
some parallels with the ‘Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ that Japan’s
then-ultra-nationalist regime had sought unsuccessfully to gain China’s
support in establishing in the 1930s and 1940s; and (b) involves
‘quasi-fascist’ rule by social elites through hierarchical social networks
without the institutionalized democratic or financial constraints
that apply to liberal Western states;
- There is a need to recognise the possibility of political
motivations in major investment decision by significant Chinese enterprises –
because China (like Japan) has become something of a corporate state – ie one
in which non-state-owned enterprises act as an extension of the state because of
their social connections (see In
East Asia Deals Always Involve Politics, 2012);
- China’s attempt to create a new international order through
political and economic influence seems likely to fail – as its economy is
heading for major setbacks. China’s effort to by-pass the bad-debt constraints
that derailed Japan’s economic ambitions in the late 1980s isn’t working
(see Financial
Systems: Where the Rubber Hits the Road, 2015). Thus, unless ambitions to
create an alternative to the liberal international order are abandoned, more
forceful methods may be considered;
- In the 1980s there were indications that ultra-nationalist
Japanese factions (with some, but perhaps not great, government connections)
were involved in stimulating the development of infrastructure in Australia that
would have facilitated Yamamoto’s 1940s' plan for an invasion of
Australia in which Darwin played a key role (see The
Dark Side of Japan in Australia in Coalitions
of Interests?, 2011);
Australia remains (as it has been for many decades) an important
source of raw materials for major East Asian economies and thus a potential
military target if trans-Pacific diplomacy proves unable to deal with economic
and military tensions.
Your article highlighted Australia’s apparent inability
to coordinate assessment of proposals (such as that related to Darwin Harbour)
that have both economic and strategic implications. However merely dealing
simultaneously with both the economic and strategic implications of such a
proposal would be inadequate without deep understanding of the cultural factors
that affect the way economic and strategic goals are perused in societies with
an ancient Chinese cultural heritage (for reasons suggested in
Babes
in the Asian Woods, 2009 and Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, 2011).
Traditional
Art of War strategies in East Asia are not the same as those in Europe –
and can involve a close linkage between economic and military actions.
John Craig
Related Items
Added Later
Outline of 'Military
Ties to Darwin Port's Chinese Owner Landbridge group'
(Nicholson B., the Australian,
13/11/15)
Defence experts believe that the new Chinese operator of Port of
Darwin should be under more scrutiny - because of evidence of its
close links to PLA and its efforts to set up its own internal
militia. Defence Department approved the 99 year lease last month.
But the company is seen as commercial front for the Chinese military
and Communist Party. NT Chief Minister (Adam Giles) endorsed the deal
- but company web-site reveals its establishment of a 'people's armed
militia' (which demonstrated links to Communist Party and PLA). Mr
Giles reports that Landbridge says that its web-site was
misinterpreted - and proposes to get a proper interpretation. Federal
Defence minister (Marise Payne) remains happy with the lease.
Landbridge is owned by Ye Cheng - a former senior military officer
and Communist Party official. Its secretary (who controls the
company's port development activities) is a former PLA officer. Geoff
Wade (Chinese linguist at Crawford School of Public policy)
says Landbridge is a commercial front closely tied to state-owned
operations, the party and the PLA. Navy describes Darwin Port as
vitally important - as a base for border protection operations. Wade
argues that Darwin deal is an attempt to weaken Australia / US
alliance - and thus is a cause of security concern. It also
demonstrates the need for review of Darwin contract and a data-base
which records China's interconnected economic, cultural and political
activities in the region. Such links are typical of large Chinese
firms - and this does not tend to be understood in Australia because
businesses are presumed to be like those in Australia. These
connections make Chinese firms susceptible to pressures to assist PLA
and Chinese intelligence services. Defence Department Secretary
(Dennis Richardson) indicated a lack of concern about the lease
because it involved a commercial port - not a naval base. Defence
(including Australian Signal's Directorate, Defence Security Agency
and Defence's strategic policy area) had examined security issues
when advised on the lease - and had had no concerns. The Navy was
concerned only about access - because this involved a commercial
port, not a naval base.
Power in East Asia Comes from Organising Things Through 'Connections' not from Holding Port Sites - email sent 19/11/15
Brendan Nicholson
The Australian
Re: Final
say for ADF in China port lease, The Australian, 9/11/15
Your article noted the Defence Department’s claim that
Australian authorities can at any time take back control of Darwin’s port from
the Chinese company leasing it under the Defence Act. This reveals the complete
lack of understanding by Defence (and ASIO) of what they are dealing with in
East Asia – a situation which is hardly unusual (see Babes
in the Asian Woods, 2009).
The port site is not the key issue. Until such time as
there is a clear separation in China between ‘business’ and China’s
unrepresentative authoritarian state, Chinese ‘businesses’ that invest in
Australia must unfortunately to be regarded as agents of the Chinese state in
pursuing political agendas. And those agendas would be pursued primarily through
the insider connections and status that were gained from an established business
presence in Australia. The spin-offs from exploiting domestic-insider
‘connections’ (eg to potentially-manipulable politicians)
can have
security implications that are quite separate from whatever happens on a
particular site (as illustrated by the possible
manoeuvrings of ultranationalist Japanese ‘businesses’ in Australia in the
1980s) .
As was pointed out today in another article (Jakobson L., Darwin
Port Row Shows We Don’t Understand How Chinese Society Works, The
Australian, 19/11/15) it is perfectly normal for a Chinese company to have
its own militia and to be intimately linked into the machinery of the PLA and
the Chinese state.
Until that situation changes, significant investments in
Australia by Chinese ‘businesses’ should be strongly discouraged.
Australia needs to take China seriously, because: (a) it is clearly seeking to
create an authoritarian alternative to the liberal international order that is
compatible with Australia’s society and institutions -
and to do so partly by providing benefits to influential Australians who accept
a subordinate social status in China's intended new 'tributary' regime (see
Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order, 2009); (b) it
is very likely to fail in doing so (see Financial
Systems: Where the Rubber Hits the Road); and (c) this could give rise to
serious security threats (see Consider
Also Port of Darwin's Potential Significance in any Attempt to Invade Australia).
Continued top-level naivety about such matters in not in Australian’s
interests.
John Craig
|
Road Signs in Mandarin: A Symbol of Australia's Incorporation into the
Empire China Hopes to Create? |
Road Signs in Mandarin: A Symbol of Australia's Incorporation into the Empire China Hopes to Create? - email sent 9/12/15
Jessica Marszalek,
Courier Mail
Re: Get Visitors on the Road, Courier Mail,
9/12/15
Your article indicated that the federal tourism minister
(Richard Colbeck) will ask state tourism ministers to translate road signs into
Mandarin to coax more cashed-up Chinese tourists into Australia and onto the
wide open road.
This seems naïve, because:
- China’s prospects are poor for reasons suggested in
Ongoing
Uncertainty. China has built a strong real-economy on the basis of the very
bad balance sheets that results from the
nature
of its financial system – and, as happened to Japan when its
equally-dubious financial system imploded in the late 1980s, China now seems
very likely in the not too distant future to experience significant economic
reversals. This at the very least will probably make ‘cashed up Chinese
tourists’ somewhat thin on the ground. In fact China’s situation could
become much worse because (unlike Japan) political stability is not assured in
China if (as seems likely) its growth juggernaut is derailed;
- In order to head off this risk China’s leaders have apparently
been trying to create an authoritarian international trade / tribute regime
which they could control to challenge the prevailing liberal Western-style order
(see Creating
a New International 'Confucian' Financial and Political Order). Road signs
in Mandarin would be a great symbol of Australia’s acceptance of a tributary
status in a hoped-for international order that is dominated by China’s
‘princelings’.
Australia’s federal government has a singularly poor
understanding of what it is dealing with in East Asia – eg as suggested in
Australia in the
Claytons' Century (2012) and
The
Limits of Mr Turnbull's History Lessons (both of which referred to an apparent huge
lack of Asia-literacy) and Power
in East Asia Comes from Organising Things Through 'Connections' not from Holding
Port Sites (which commented on the controversy about apparent federal
government naivety in relation to the leasing of the Port of Darwin to a PLA-linked
Chinese company).
A serious study by state tourism ministers (and others) of
differences that need to be considered in dealings in East Asia (eg as suggested
in Babes in the
Asian Woods and Comments
on Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030) would seem to be smarter than
debating a proposal related to road signs without considering its
international economic context and symbolic
‘big picture’ implications.
John Craig
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Submarine Scepticism |
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